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ABSTRACT 
THREE ESSAYS ON HEDGE FUNDS 
SEPTEMBER 2014 
LIPING QIU, B.E., ZHENGZHOU UNIVERSITY OF LIGHT INDUSTRY, CHINA  
MBA, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST   
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Bing Liang 
 
In Essay 1, using a large panel data, we investigate the dynamics of hedge fund leverage from 
2002 to 2011 and find considerable variations in both time series and cross-section. On average, 
hedge funds decrease leverage prior to the beginning of the financial crisis, with leverage remaining 
below the pre-crisis levels. We also find that younger funds with lower current leverage and stricter 
fund governance are more likely to increase leverage following favorable performance; funds exposed 
to higher risk, higher management fee and higher current leverage tend to delever. Managers increase 
leverage in order to enhance future performance following superior returns only to be disappointed. 
Newborn funds with higher incentive fees, shorter notice periods, higher minimum investments, high-
water mark provisions, managers’ co-investments, and younger family ages tend to have higher 
leverage when the short-term borrowing cost is low and the market risk is also low. We find mixed 
evidence on the performance difference between levered and unlevered funds, but levered funds do 
survive longer.  
In essays 2, using a combination of the TASS database and the Barclay hedge fund database 
from January 2000 to December 2010, we study the performance of emerging market hedge fund by 
examining the sources of performance, the relation between performance and investor flows as well as 
the relation between performance and fund size. We find that the presence of the management 
companies in their investment region is the most important source of the risk-adjusted performance. 
vii 
 
The funds with a presence in their investment region outperform other funds by 4.2 % per year. The 
local information advantage is significant for all major geographical regions. On average, 18% of the 
emerging market hedge funds have delivered positive and statistically significant alpha. Funds 
producing significant alphas (have-alpha funds) experience greater capital inflows than the remainder 
(beta-only funds). Have-alpha funds that experience high investor inflows do not have higher 
probabilities of being classified as beta-only funds nor have worse risk-adjusted returns in the future.  
In essay 3, we study the dynamics in the performance report of hedge funds and 
investigate the determinants of return revisions from 2002 to 2013.  We find that historical returns 
are routinely revised. About two-thirds of the hedge funds in our sample have revised their 
previously reported performance. On average, more than one-fifth of monthly returns were 
revised after being first reported. We find that positive revisions significantly outnumber negative 
revisions to returns of December. We also find an obvious decreasing time trend in both the 
number and proportion of return revisions, even after adjusting for performance report recency. 
We find a strong connection between return revisions and desirable fund characteristics such as 
strong fund governance at the overall fund level, the individual fund level, and the individual 
revision level. The revised funds outperform unrevised funds after revisions. Our findings suggest 
that correction may be a plausible explanation for the return revisions in hedge fund performance 
report. We have not found direct evidence that hedge fund managers manipulate returns. 
 
Keywords: hedge funds, leverage, financial crisis, newborn funds, survival, emerging market, 
presence, performance, size, capital flows, hedge funds return, return manipulation, correction, 
governance 
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ESSAY 1 
HEDGE FUND LEVERAGE: 2002-2011 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Excessive leverage is said to be the root cause of Global Financial Crisis in 2008 
and the European sovereign debt crisis.
1
  The excessive use of leverage in the hedge fund 
industry has created concerns for the risk of the industry and its impact on market 
stability. The debacle of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 and the blow-
up of two Bear Stearns credit strategy funds in 2007, all related to exorbitant leverage 
levels, heightened concerns over the risks associated with high leverage and the possible 
impact on systemic risk. Monitoring the dynamic usage of leverage in hedge funds and 
investigating the implications of leverage are important issues not only for investors, but 
also for the regulatory authorities.  
The hedge fund industry is one of the fastest growing sectors in finance. Hedge 
funds are generally characterized as highly leveraged and sophisticated investment 
vehicles.  The widespread use of leverage is one of the dimensions in which hedge funds 
differ from other managed portfolios. Unlike mutual funds, hedge funds are not explicitly 
governed by regulations that limit their leverage level. Leverage plays an essential role in 
hedge funds’ investment strategies. Hedge funds not only use leverage to take advantage 
of investment opportunities, but also vary leverage dynamically in order to adjust market 
risk exposure, aiming at amplifying returns while attaining a level of volatility desired by 
investors, which are otherwise unachievable.  
                                                          
1
 Speech by Mr. Norman T. L. Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the 
Economic Summit 2012 “Roadmap to Hong Kong Success”, Hong Kong, 9 December 2011. 
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Like any other market which is driven by supply and demand, hedge fund 
leverage reflects the changes in credit demand and supply. The leverage employed by 
hedge funds is acquired through direct financing, derivatives transactions, repurchase 
agreements, and short sales. Leverage allows hedge funds to magnify their exposures and 
thus magnify their risks and returns. However, the use of leverage by a hedge fund is 
constrained by other players, either directly or indirectly. The first group of players is the 
fund’s creditors and trading counterparties such as the prime broker, which is the main 
leverage supplier. Hedge funds must consider margin and collateral requirements at the 
transaction level, and any credit limits imposed by trading counterparties such as the 
prime broker. Therefore, hedge funds are often limited in their use of leverage by the 
willingness of creditors and counterparties to provide the leverage. 
The second category of players is the hedge fund clients, who are generally 
institutional investors and also strategic players. These investors have their own leverage 
policy which would in turn limit the use of leverage by the hedge funds. For example, 
CalPERS adopted the System Statement of Investment Policy for Leverage with the 
intention to “set limits and standards on the use of leverage that reasonably balance 
investment flexibility with risk management.”2  In addition, the contract between the 
hedge fund and its clients related to the fee arrangement, consideration for withdrawals 
and submissions of new money also affect the use of hedge fund leverage (Titman 
(2010)). 
The nature of voluntary reporting for hedge funds to data vendors complicates the 
monitoring of their use of leverage. In addition, research on hedge fund leverage and the 
                                                          
2
 California Public Employees’ Retirement System Statement of Investment Policy for Leverage, 
November, 2011. 
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implication for hedge fund operations as well as market stability is relatively scarce in 
academic literature.  
In this paper, we explore hedge fund leverage on a cross-sectional and time series 
basis. Our data consist of all hedge funds covered by the Lipper TASS Hedge Fund 
database (hereafter, TASS) from January 2002 to August 2011. Based on the monthly 
average leverage ratio over time, we examine the following research questions: What are 
the dynamics of hedge fund leverage? What drives the changes in leverage level over 
time? How do these changes relate to each other and to a fund’s past performance, flows, 
and other characteristics? What are the effects of the changes in hedge fund leverage on 
future performance, risk-taking behavior, and capital flows from investors? What 
determines the leverage level of newborn hedge funds? What is the relation between 
hedge fund leverage and their performance and survivorship? 
Our empirical findings provide important insights on several theoretical 
predictions relating to the dynamics of hedge fund leverage. On average, hedge funds 
decreased their leverage in mid-2007 prior to the financial crisis. In fact, we find that 
funds newly added to TASS over our sample period, which is from January 2002 to 
August 2011, deleveraged an average of seven months earlier. We also find that when 
compared to their peers, funds tend to enhance leverage usage when the current fund 
return is high, leverage level is low and the fund is young. Funds with stronger 
governance are generally able to obtain credit more easily and thus are more likely to 
increase leverage. This finding is consistent with established funds having good 
performance choosing a higher leverage level in order to augment their returns further 
when both the fund and the lender feel safe to do so. On the other hand, hedge funds tend 
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to deleverage when the current return volatility is high and their leverage level is high. 
Deleveraged funds also tend to charge a higher management fee. This finding is in line 
with the general belief that fund managers decrease leverage usage in order to reduce risk 
when the fund’s leverage and risk are already high and when the interests of the 
managers and the investors are better aligned. In the cross-section of newborn hedge 
funds, we find that from the macro-economic perspective, higher Volatility Index (VIX) 
and TED spread lead to lower leverage. In addition to the economy-wide factors, fund-
specific variables have a profound impact on the leverage level of newborn funds. 
Specifically, higher incentive fees, high-water mark provisions, manager co-investments, 
shorter notice periods, higher minimum investment amounts, and younger fund family 
ages are all associated with higher fund leverage. 
We also examine the impact of leverage change on fund performance, risk and 
investor flows. We find that increases in leverage do not result in improved performance. 
On the contrary, the performance for leverage increased funds is worse not only than 
their performance prior to the increases, but also than their peers and the deleveraged 
funds. The fund flows indeed increase after funds increase their leverage. Funds 
deleverage when risk and current leverage is high. We find economically lower return 
volatility in deleveraged funds, though the difference between the reductions in 
volatilities of deleveraged funds and of the unchanged funds is not statistically significant. 
From the newborn funds, we find that levered funds show better performance than 
unlevered funds, but funds with higher leverage do not necessarily have stronger 
performance. We also find that funds employing leverage generally are more likely to 
survive longer, and a higher leverage usage is associated with a longer lifetime, 
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consistent with the operational risk literature (see Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and 
Schwarz 2008, 2012). 
Our study contributes to the research on hedge fund leverage in several ways. 
First, our exploration on the dynamics of hedge fund leverage is related to estimating the 
leverage. Estimating hedge fund leverage is a difficult task as these funds have significant 
flexibility as to the types of assets they can invest in. Weak reporting requirements for 
hedge funds complicate the monitoring of their use of leverage. McGuire and Tsatsaronis 
(2008) use factor regressions with time varying betas to estimate hedge funds’ use of 
leverage on the basis of publicly available data. Employing the data drawn from two 
annual surveys of 647 managers, Eichengreen and Park (2002) provide evidence that 
hedge funds reduced their use of leverage and credit following the Russia-LTCM crisis. 
Ang, Gorovyy and Inwegen (2011) track hedge fund leverage in time series from a 
dataset provided by a fund-of-hedge fund over the period from December 2004 to 
October 2009. They find that hedge fund leverage decreased prior to the start of the 
financial crisis in mid-2007. In this paper, we investigate the dynamics of hedge fund 
leverage using the monthly average leverage data provided by TASS over the period 
from January 2002 to August 2011. Consistent with Ang, Gorovyy and Inwegen (2011), 
we find that on average, hedge funds decreased their leverage in mid-2007. Secondly, our 
study on hedge fund leverage is also related to the previous work on the determinants of 
hedge fund leverage. Eichengreen and Park (2002) find that larger funds employ more 
leverage. Schneeweis et al. (2004) document that hedge fund strategies with relatively 
lower risk generally report higher leverage. Brown et al. (2008) discover that hedge funds 
with higher operational risk tend to have lower leverage, which is an indicator that 
6 
 
lenders and equity investors were already aware of the operational risk of the problem 
funds. Ang, Gorovyy and Inwegen (2011) document that changes in hedge fund leverage 
tend to be more associated with economy-wide factors than with fund-specific 
characteristics. Decreases in funding costs or increases in asset prices predict the 
increases in hedge fund leverage over the next month, while increases in fund return 
volatility predict the decreases in hedge fund leverage. Lan, Wang, and Yang (2011) find 
that incentive fees and strong fund performances provide strong incentives for managers 
to increase leverage. Thirdly, this paper relates to the literature on the impact of hedge 
fund leverage. Agarwal and Naik (2004) find no empirical evidence of significant 
underperformance or overperformance between levered funds and unlevered funds by 
comparing the averages and distributions of alphas and information ratios of funds that 
use leverage with those that do not. Similarly, Schneeweis et al. (2004) find no 
statistically significant difference between the risk adjusted performance of funds with 
below median leverage usage and those with above median usage. Moreover, within 
particular hedge fund strategies, at the fund level, there is little evidence showing a 
systematic relationship between the use of leverage and the level of risk-adjusted 
performance. Teo (2011) demonstrate that leverage amplifies the effects of capital flows 
on hedge fund performance, which is consistent with the findings of Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009). Leveraged speculators such as hedge funds are susceptible to a margin 
spiral if margins are increasing in market illiquidity. Recently, Cao, Liang, Lo, and 
Petrasek (2014) find that hedge fund ownership in general improves stock market 
efficiency, but during liquidity crisis, this positive role is reversed especially for levered 
hedge funds because of margin calls and investor withdrawals.  
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Our paper also contributes to a growing body of work on the dynamics of hedge 
funds. Fung and Hsieh (1997) were among the first to point out that hedge fund strategies 
are highly dynamic, unlike the buy-and-hold strategies of most mutual funds. Chen and 
Liang (2007) illustrate that the market exposure of self-claimed market-timing hedge 
funds varies with future changes in market return and volatility. Schwarz (2007) study the 
dynamics of hedge fund fee structures. Bollen and Whaley (2009) show that a sizable 
percentage of hedge funds shift their risk exposures significantly over time. Patton and 
Ramadorai (2013) propose a new method to capture hedge fund dynamics by using high 
frequency instruments. Cai and Liang (2012) investigate whether or not hedge funds 
allocate assets dynamically among asset classes such as equity, bond, commodity, 
currency and credit. Deuskar et al. (2011) investigate the dynamics of hedge fund 
compensation contracts and find considerable cross-sectional and time series variations in 
hedge fund fees. They also study predictions on the dynamics of compensation contracts. 
Agarwal and Ray (2011) examine the determinants and consequences of changes in 
hedge fund fee structures including changes in the management fee, incentive fee, and 
high-water mark provisions. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the data. 
Section 2 presents the dynamics of hedge fund leverage, including the leverage level and 
changes in time series, the determinants of the changes, and the implications of the 
changes on future fund performance, risk and investor flows. Section 3 examines the 
leverage of newborn hedge funds and the relationship between fund performance and the 
leverage of the newborn funds. Section 4 explores the relationship between hedge fund 
leverage and their survival probabilities. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
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1.2 Data 
We obtain data from TASS. The main database consists of historical returns and 
fund characteristics such as the average leverage ratio, leverage indicator, maximum 
leverage ratio, inception date, redemption frequency and lockup periods, management fee, 
incentive fee, high-water mark provision, personal capital indicator, and the date of last 
audit. Variables reflecting hedge fund leverage usage in TASS are the average leverage 
ratio, a leverage indicator, and the maximum leverage ratio. Our study focuses on the 
average leverage ratio (which we refer to as ‘‘leverage’’ hereafter). 
The TASS data have been widely used in a large number of hedge fund studies. 
We believe, however, that we are the first to use the average leverage-change data over a 
ten-year period from 2002 to 2011. Moreover, the TASS data which we use are 
proprietary and track leverage changes by funds at a monthly level. The average leverage 
in TASS was changed from characteristic to numeric in February 2002. Since it is 
difficult to change all the characters to numbers without additional information, we 
decided to include only the hedge funds with observation date in TASS after January 
2002.3  As a result, our sample period spans from January 2002 to August 2011. The 
sample of our study includes only the hedge funds in the snapshots of TASS datasets 
downloaded each month over the period from February 2002 to August 2011 except for 
three months (September 2002, December 2006 and August 2007). Altogether, we have 
170 monthly snapshots of TASS data sets because for some months we have more than 
one snapshot. These monthly snapshots allow us to identify not only leverage change 
since the previously updated version, but also other characteristics at various points in 
                                                          
3
 The observation date of a fund in each snapshot is set to be the PerformanceEndDate in the file of 
ProductDetails of TASS. 
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time and the entire history of returns for each fund that experiences these leverage 
changes. We compare 170 monthly snapshots downloaded from February 2002 to 
September 2011. At each of these snapshots s {1,  2, , 170} , we track changes to 
leverage for all hedge funds. Not every hedge fund updates their information in TASS on 
the same date of each month, and the snapshots were not downloaded on the same date of 
the month either. For the months when a fund’s information is not updated, we simply 
compare leverage in the newer snapshot with that in the latest snapshot.   
An important issue on hedge fund leverage is how the leverage is calculated at the 
fund level. The basic form of hedge fund leverage is simply the unadjusted balance sheet 
leverage. But for those derivatives-specialized hedge funds, this may understate the true 
leverage, in some cases dramatically. Some funds may have estimated their leverage by 
adjusting derivative exposures. Like the data used by Ang, Gorovyy and Inwegen (2011), 
ours are self-reported. There may be the issue of inconsistency of leverage definition. But 
this issue may be attenuated through style fixed effects in our analysis. Moreover, our 
focus is on the commonality across hedge funds, not on the leverage of a specific hedge 
fund. 
We apply some standard filters to the data. First, we remove 149,659 fund/months 
that belong to one of the following situations: (1) the average leverage is missing; (2) the 
maximum leverage number is less than the average leverage; (3) the TASS data set 
indicates no use of leverage in a certain month but the average leverage is positive. 
Second, we remove 326 fund/months that report data on a quarterly basis. Third, we 
remove 1,750 fund/months that do not report net of fee returns. After these data filters are 
applied, a total of 9,389 unique hedge funds remain in our sample with 280,572 monthly 
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observations. Unlike many of the studies on hedge funds, we include hedge funds that are 
not denominated in US dollars. To facilitate meaningful comparison, we convert all 
returns, net asset values, and minimum investment requirement to US dollars using the 
corresponding currency exchange rates from Morningstar Direct. 
To attenuate the backfilled bias, we remove the first 12 months of return data 
from each fund. Among the 280,572 fund/months of leverage, the 99
th
 percentile is 500, 
while the maximum leverage is 6,000. To mitigate the impact from extreme values, we 
winsorize the leverage at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles (see Fung et al. (2008)) for all the 
analyses, except in the process to identify instances where the recorded leverage in any 
given month differs from those recorded in the previous month. 
 
1.2.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for 280,572 fund/month observations in 
our sample. The mean average leverage is 47, which means on average the amount of 
leverage is 47% of fund’s equity. While the use of leverage is central to the hedge fund 
industry, hedge funds vary substantially in the degree and the nature of leverage usage. 
Average leverage exhibits considerable dispersion with a standard deviation of 155.53%. 
The mean maximum leverage is 107.58%, while the standard deviation is about 260%. 
On average, over 73% of the fund/months indicate the use of leverage. The mean 
management fee and incentive fee are 1.46% and 15.96%, respectively. Approximately, 
68% of fund/month observations have high-water mark provision, while 29% involve 
personal capital investment by fund managers. The average minimum capital requirement 
is $0.74 million. The average redemption notice period is 37 days, while the average 
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lockup period is about 3 months. The average fund age and fund family age are about 71 
and 105 months, respectively. 74% of the fund/months are located offshore. The average 
of assets under management of all the fund/month observations is about $210 million. 
The fund governance measure GOV (see Ozik and Sadka (2014)) has an average of 1.31 
out of 4. The average time period since the last audit date is about 30 months.  
Table 2 breaks down the funds by investment style and reports the pattern of 
leverage changes over time. Panel A shows that out of the 9, 389 funds in our sample, 
246 funds had one change in leverage, 24 funds had 2 changes, and 4 funds had 3 or more 
changes, adding up to a total of 315 changes during our sample period between January 
2002 and August 2011. As shown in Panel B, more than 50% (163 out of 315 instances) 
of the leverage changes occurred in 2008 and 2009, each with approximately one quarter 
of the total change cases. The least leverage changes occurred in years 2006 and 2007, 
with only about 1% of all changes in each of the 2 years. In the rest of the years, except 
for 2011 when we have only the first 8 months of data, the number of leverage changes 
ranges from 6.35% to 10.48%. 
Panel C provides the breakdown of leverage changes by investment style. It 
shows that fund of funds accounts for more than 37% of leverage changes, followed by 
long/short equity which contributes over one-fifth of the leverage changes. Funds of 
funds many not use leverage directly but leverage changes at the underlying hedge fund 
level will result in the change at the fund of fund level. Accordingly, we take into account 
the style specific information of leverage changes in our analysis. 
Panels D and E show the level of leverage prior to the changes and the magnitude 
of the changes. A clear pattern emerges that leverage levels prior to an increase are, on 
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average, much lower than the leverage levels prior to a decrease. In Panels D and E, the 
average leverage prior to an increase (decrease) is 16.73% (133.05%) compared to the 
overall mean of 47.45% from Table 1. In terms of the magnitude of leverage changes, the 
average increase (decrease) is 41.18% (103.9%). The magnitude of these changes is 
economically significant given the average level of leverage before the change and the 
overall average of leverage. 
Admittedly, the leverage that hedge funds reported to the TASS database may not 
capture exactly the actual leverage levels used by the funds. Our variable is the average 
of leverage used by a hedge fund over a certain time period. The average process may 
smooth out the changes in the leverage to some extent. The changes in leverage identified 
in our study may just be the tip of the iceberg. However, such noise in the data will bias 
against finding any significant results. 
 
1.2.2 Variable Definitions 
 
1.2.2.1  Fund Performance, Volatility and Fund Flows 
We measure the performance of hedge funds using the mean-adjusted return. The 
mean return is computed each month as the equally weighted average return of the hedge 
funds in our sample. Then for each fund, we calculate the mean-adjusted return as the 
excess return relative to the benchmark return. We also use alpha based on the 7-factor 
model, as established in Fung and Hsieh (2001, 2004)), to measure hedge fund 
performance. We use monthly data over a three-year period to estimate the alpha. The 
seven factors comprise return on the Standard & Poor's 500 index (equity market factor), 
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return on the Russell 2000 index return less the Standard & Poor's 500 return (equity 
size-spread factor), monthly change in the 10-year treasury constant maturity yield (bond 
factor), monthly change in the Moody's Baa yield less the 10-year treasury constant 
maturity yield (credit spread factor), and returns on the trend-following risk-factors on 
bonds, currencies, and commodities. 
We use hedge fund flows to examine the relationship between leverage change 
and investor reactions as well as the impact of leverage changes on new money flows of 
the funds. We construct fund-level flows over the past three months using the return and 
AUM information from the following formula: 
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where Flowi,t,3 is the past 3-month flow in hedge fund i, AUMi,t-1 is assets under 
management of fund i at the end of month t-1, and Ri,t-j is the monthly return of fund i in 
month t-j. The flows over the past six months and last year are the products of two and 
four non-overlapping past 3-month flows, respectively. We also examine the effect of 
volatility, measured as the standard deviation of raw returns. We compute these measures 
using monthly data over either a six-month or a one-year period. 
 
1.2.2.2  Fund Governance 
We study herein the impact of fund governance on leverage change and leverage 
level. On one hand, strong fund governance may align managers’ interest with those of 
investors, leading the managers to undertake the best leverage decision for the investors’ 
interests. On the other hand, a fund with strong fund governance is more likely to have 
better access to credit. Inspired by the corporate-governance literature (La Porta et al. 
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(2002), Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), and Ozik and Sadka (2014)), we consider 
several fund characteristics to act as a proxy for fund governance: whether the fund had 
been audited in the past 12 months, whether it has a high-water mark, whether it as an 
onshore domiciliation, and whether registration with the SEC exist. Following Ozik and 
Sadka (2014), we aggregate these variables to devise a measure of fund governance. 
Taken as a group, the funds without a listed audit date have less oversight than the 
funds with an audit date listed (Liang (2003)). But for a lender, the updated or recent 
auditing may mean much more than an outdated one. A date for a completed financial 
audit reported by a fund may not be sufficient to indicate strong governance. We assign a 
fund a score of one only if the audit date is within the past 12-month time period, 
otherwise, a score of zero is assigned to the fund.  
The high-water mark contract allows the fund manager to receive the performance 
bonus only when the net asset value of the fund at the end of the evaluation period 
exceeds the high-water mark, not just when returns are positive during the evaluation 
period. The high-water mark contract more closely aligns managerial incentives with 
those of the limited partners in the hedge fund, and thus improves the governance 
structure. A fund is assigned a high-water mark score of one if it carries the high-water 
mark provision and zero otherwise. 
Offshore hedge funds enjoy a lighter regulation since offshore hedge funds are not 
registered in the United States (Aragon, Liang, and Park (2014)). Along the domiciliation 
dimension, we assign a value of one to onshore funds and zero to offshore funds. 
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Unlike mutual funds which are required to be registered with the SEC, hedge 
funds are lightly regulated investment vehicles4. Domestic and foreign hedge funds are 
required to fill out 13F forms quarterly for all U.S. equity positions worth over $200,000 
or consisting of more than 10,000 shares only if their AUM are over $100 million. Some 
hedge funds may choose to register with the SEC to signal better institutional quality (see 
Brown et al. (2008)). We assign a score of one to funds registered with the SEC and zero 
otherwise. 
 
1.2.2.3  Macro Variables 
We employ various macro variables designed to proxy for the economic environment in 
order to capture the relationship between the leverage of newborn hedge funds and the 
state of economy. Our macro variables are monthly returns on the S&P 500 Index, 
monthly VIX volatility index, the three-month Treasury over Eurodollar (TED) spread 
and the term spread, which is the difference between the 10-year Treasury bond yield and 
the yield on three-month Treasury. The TED spread represents the aggregate cost of 
short-term borrowing for large financial institutions. In turn, the cost of short term 
borrowing for hedge funds is the TED spread plus a spread imposed by the prime broker 
as a risk premium. 
The recent global financial crisis was a difficult time for all hedge funds. In order to 
assess the impact of this crisis on hedge fund leverage, we include an indicator which is 
one for the crisis period defined as the period between August 2007 and June 2009, and 
zero otherwise. 
                                                          
4
 The Dodd-Frank Act requires major hedge funds with $150 million under management to be registered 
with the SEC. 
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1.3 Dynamics of Hedge Fund Leverage 
 
1.3.1 Leverage Levels and Changes in Time Series 
First of all, we are interested in how the cross-sectional average leverage changes 
over time. We address this question in Figure 1 which displays the time series averages of 
monthly leverage across all funds and the averages for the funds that are newly added to 
the TASS datasets. The monthly averages of leverage across all funds can be divided into 
three periods. The first period spans from January 2002 to July 2007. During this period, 
the monthly cross-sectional means for hedge fund leverage stays in the range of 50% to 
60%. The second period is a declining period which is relatively short from August 2007 
to May 2008. The monthly averages of hedge fund leverage drop from over 50% to 
below 30% in only 10 months. The monthly averages became stable in the third period 
from June 2008 to August 2011, which is the end of our sample period. In the third 
period, the overall level of leverage stays in the range of 24% to 30%. At the end of our 
sample, in August 2011, we estimate the average of leverage across all hedge funds to be 
27.7%, while for the entire sample, the mean of the leverage is about 47.5%. 
The trend of monthly average of hedge fund leverage is consistent with that of 
Ang, Gorovyy and Inwegen (2011), who use a data set from a fund of hedge funds to 
track hedge fund leverage in time series from December 2004 to October 2009.  
Note that the monthly means of hedge fund leverage are well above those of the 
winsorized sample at the 1 and 99% leverage level, especially for the first period as 
shown by the solid line vs. the round dot line in Figure 1. The cross-sectional monthly 
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average of the original hedge fund leverage is about 15% higher than those of winsorized 
means in the first period. Therefore, in order to reduce the impact of the extremely high 
leverage levels on our analysis, we winsorize those outliers over the 99th percentile of 
leverage in our sample.  
Figure 1.A also presents the monthly means of leverage across the hedge funds 
that are newly added to TASS in each month. Comparing the lines for the monthly means 
of all funds with those of the newly added funds, we find that the general pattern of the 
lines is similar, with the line for added funds being more volatile. This pattern can be 
explained by the much smaller number of each month’s newly added funds compared to 
the number of the existing funds in each month. The decrease of the monthly average of 
leverage for the overall hedge funds in the second period is preceded by the rapid 
declining of that of the newly added funds. The decrease for the added funds began from 
January 2007. In the following six months, the leverage averages across newly added 
hedge funds dropped over 80%. This reconciles the contradiction seen in the decrease of 
leverage monthly mean of the overall hedge funds and the few unexpected cases of 
changes in the leverage. The decline of the leverage levels of newly added funds 
contributes to most of the decrease in the leverage monthly mean of overall hedge funds. 
Figure 1.B shows the monthly leverage averages across the hedge funds that have been 
newly added to TASS and those removed from TASS in each month. Both lines are 
volatile. The movement of the leverage averages for removed funds can largely be 
predicted by the changes in the leverage averages of the newly added funds.  
To summarize, hedge funds reduced their leverage usage prior to the latest 
financial crisis and the leverage remained lower compared to the first stage in our sample 
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period. This reduction of leverage usage may be the consequence of the volition of hedge 
funds themselves, or may be the result of brokers’ unwillingness to grant the credit 
considering the credit risk involved.  
 
1.3.2 Determinants of Hedge Fund Leverage Change  
What characteristics of hedge funds can predict future leverage changes? To 
address this question, we firstly compare the fund characteristics of each fund/month with 
changed leverage to those of a comparable fund/month. The peer or matched fund/month 
for the fund/month with changed leverage is assigned from within the same month, 
having the same strategy (investment style) and nearest asset size but having unchanged 
leverage from previous months. If the asset size of the fund/month with changed leverage 
is missing, we exclude it from this analysis. The match process results in 139 peers 
matched to the funds that increased their leverage and 108 to the fund/months that 
decreased their leverage.  
The comparisons between the matched pairs are reported in Table 3. We can see 
that many of the characteristics for funds with leverage increases are quite different from 
those of their peers. Funds with average leverage increases tend to have better past 
performance measured by raw returns or the mean-adjusted returns. Compared to their 
matched peers, the funds with leverage increases have lower average leverage usage 
previously. They also have shorter redemption frequencies and lockup periods (indicating 
higher liquidity), higher incidence of using the high-water mark provision. Moreover, the 
funds with leverage increases also show stronger governance evidenced by their higher 
aggregated governance score and more frequent audits as well as higher proportion of 
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funds that are audited in the past 12 months. In addition, funds that increase their 
leverage usage tend to be younger and from families with shorter history than their 
counterparts without leverage changes.  
In a strong contrast, results in Table 3 show that funds with leverage decreases 
tend to have higher leverage usage and longer notice period (less liquid) than their 
counterparts that do not change leverage. The differences between funds with leverage 
changes and those without changes showing from the last two columns are largely 
consistent with the differences between the funds with leverage increases. This may be 
because the number of funds with leverage increases matched with unchanged funds is 
more than that of the funds with leverage decreases. Interestingly, the minimum 
investment requirement for both the leverage-increased and decreased funds is 
significantly higher than those of the matched funds.  
While Table 3 compares funds with increased or decreased leverage to their peers 
in a univariate setting, Table 4 reports results from multivariate regressions that model 
the probability of leverage increases, decreases and changes. For comparability of 
estimating the marginal effects from the probit analysis of the determinants, all variables 
are standardized to have a zero mean and a unit variance across the funds with leverage 
increases, decreases and changes, respectively. In the first column of each fund group, we 
include the aggregated past governance variable, while in column 2 we include all the 
components of the governance, namely the domicile, high-water mark, audit, and SEC 
file indicators, to identify which governance factor really matters for the increase or 
decrease of the leverage. 
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Consistent with the univariate results, we find that superior past performance 
strongly predicts leverage increases. Specifically, the first column of Table 4 shows that 
the probability that a fund takes on more leverage increases by 0.35 per one standard 
deviation increase in the past month performance. We hypothesize that the fund manager 
increases leverage in order to amplify fund returns based on the existing good 
performance. The predictive relationship between the probability of leverage increases 
and the past month performance is consistent with that creditors are more willing to grant 
credit to funds with better performance.  
Reasonably, fund managers are more likely to enhance leverage usage in the next 
month only when the current leverage level is relatively low, which is evidenced by the 
negative relationship between the probability of leverage increase and the prior leverage 
level. Specifically, a one standard deviation reduction in leverage in the current month 
would predict a probability of leverage increase of 0.37 in the next month.  Moreover, 
levered funds are more likely to further increase leverage. This can be explained by the 
established relationship with lenders for these levered funds. 
Table 4 shows that younger funds are more likely to increase leverage. This may 
be explained by the difference in capital demand between the young funds and the more 
established funds. The longer the funds have been in business, the better their investing 
reputation may be, and the less dependable they would be on the leverage to take 
advantage of investment opportunities. In contrast, younger funds are more eager to 
establish the reputation (Chevalier and Ellison (1999)).  
Next, we turn to the governance characteristics. We find a significant positive 
relationship between the probability of fund leverage increase and its governance score. 
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The probability increases by about 0.3 per one standard deviation increase in the 
aggregated fund governance. Higher fund governance means lower credit risk/operational 
risk. Creditors are more willing to grant credit to borrowers with lower credit 
risk/operational risk, other things being equal.  In the second probit regression for the 
fund group with leverage increase, we replace the aggregated fund governance variable 
with its four components, namely, the dummy variables of domicile, high-water mark, 
indicators representing whether fund has audit in the past 12 months and whether the 
fund is registered with the SEC. The results show that out of the four variables that reflect 
fund governance from different perspectives, only the dummy variables of audit and SEC 
registration are significantly related to the probability of a fund leverage increase 
although other two coefficients have the correct signs. If the fund has an audit conducted 
in the past 12 months or the fund is registered with the SEC, the fund is more likely to get 
loans which result in a higher leverage. Funds that were audited or registered with the 
SEC go through the scrutiny of third parties. Facing the lack of transparency and high 
operational risk in the hedge funds industry, creditors value independent oversight5.  
The second group of funds in Table 4 is those that decreased their leverage. Their 
peer funds have the same style and are closest in size measured in the same month as 
when the decrease occurs. The variable specifications are the same as those for the group 
of funds with increased leverage and matched funds except that we exclude the dummy 
variable indicating the fund leverage usage,  because all the funds have a value of one on 
this variable. Clearly, only the funds currently using leverage have the possibility to 
decrease.  
                                                          
5
 See Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2008, 2012). 
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First, we find that the higher the fund volatility, the higher the probability that a 
fund will decrease its leverage. In particular, the probability of leverage reduction 
increases by 0.45 per one standard deviation increase in the volatility. This significantly 
negative relationship between return volatility and leverage is consistent with the finding 
in Ang, Gorovyy and Inwegen (2011).  Highly volatile funds may avoid using high 
leverage to enhance the risk further. 
Turning to the current fund leverage, we find a significant positive relationship 
between the probability of a fund leverage decrease in the next month and the current 
leverage. A one-standard deviation increase in the current leverage is associated with a 
0.7 increase in the probability of decrease in leverage, other things equal. This result 
suggests that hedge funds tend to reduce leverage-related risk when the leverage usage is 
already high.  
From Table 4, we further note that higher management fees lead to a higher 
probability of leverage decrease, which is consistent with the theoretical model of Lan, 
Wang, and Yang (2011). Management fees give the manager an “equity-like” stake in the 
fund and thus mitigate managerial risk seeking that could otherwise be induced by 
incentive fees. As a result, management fees encourage the manager to practice prudent 
risk management and hence reduce leverage, ceteris paribus.  
Interestingly, the coefficient on the aggregated fund governance in the first 
regression is approximately zero. The coefficients on each fund governance component in 
the second regression are all insignificant. This finding suggests that the reduction of 
leverage for our sample funds is not involuntarily deleveraging, resulting from poor fund 
governance. The coefficient on past performance is positive but insignificant. Our 
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findings suggest that hedge fund deleveraging may be a voluntary activity of fund 
managers undertaken to reduce risk following unstable performance. This voluntary 
deleveraging is probably induced by the relationship arising from the compensation 
contract between the managers and investors. The leverage reduction in our sample may 
also be involuntarily deleveraging because the prime brokers increase margins and/or 
reduced credit lines in light of the high volatility in the fund returns or in bad 
macroeconomic conditions. 
The only fund characteristic that has the same direction of significant effect on 
leverage increase and decrease is the minimum investment requirement. The higher the 
minimum investment requirement, the more likely a fund is to change its leverage.  By 
imposing a high minimum investment, fund managers can effectively weed out short-
term investors and regulate cash inflows to the fund, which gives managers more 
flexibility in managing the fund leverage.    
In conclusion, leverage change (either increase or decrease) can be predicted by 
hedge fund characteristics although the same predictor can serve an opposite role for a 
fund to increase or decrease its leverage. In addition to fund return volatility that can 
affect leverage increase or decrease as evidenced by Ang, Gorovyy and Inwegen (2011), 
other fund specific variables as detailed above also play important roles in predicting 
fund leverage change. All these fund characteristics explain the heterogeneity of fund 
leverage existing in the hedge fund industry. 
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1.3.3 Impact of Leverage Changes on Performance, Risk and Investor Flows  
Here, we examine how leverage change affects future fund performance and the 
risk-taking behavior of fund managers, and how investors respond to the leverage 
changes in terms of capital inflows. Specifically, we examine the mean-adjusted return, 
fund flows, and the standard deviation of returns, measured over the 6-month and one-
year periods using monthly observations. Table 5 reports the comparison of mean-
adjusted returns, standard deviation of returns and fund flows between the leverage 
changed funds and matched funds in 6 and 12 months after the leverage alterations. 
If the fund managers intend to attain higher returns by increasing fund leverage, 
the results from Table 5 suggest that the managers would be disappointed. The average 
mean-adjusted return of the changed funds in the 6 months following the changes is 
significantly lower than that of the matched funds, though the difference is negligible in 
the 12-month period after the leverage changes. For the deleverage funds, both the post 6-
month and 12-month period mean-adjusted returns are similar to those of the unchanged 
funds. This finding is not surprising since from the previous section we find that the main 
purpose of the fund managers to deleverage is to reduce risk instead of enhancing fund 
returns.  
The 6-month and 12-month risks, proxied by the standard deviation of fund 
returns, of the deleveraged funds are both lower than those of the matched funds. Even 
though statistically insignificant, the difference is economically significant, especially the 
6-month risk of the deleveraged funds which is over 10% lower than that of the matched 
funds. As expected, fund managers greatly increase fund risk by increasing leverage, 
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even though they may fail to enhance fund returns in doing so. The 6-month risk of 
leverage increased funds is not only economically higher, but also statistically 
(marginally) higher than the risk of their peers. The 12-month risk of the leverage 
increased fund is over 18% higher than that of the matched funds, even though the 
difference of the two risks is statistically insignificant, it is economically significant.  
Next, we proceed to explore the impact of leverage changes (increase or decrease) 
on fund flow. Although the differences between the fund flows of the leverage changed 
funds are not statistically significant, they are economically significant. Specifically, fund 
flows over the 6-month and 12-month periods after leverage changes are 3.84 times and 3 
times those of the fund flows of matched funds, respectively.  
Table 5 also presents the comparison of the changes in fund performance, risk and 
fund flows 6 or 12 months following and preceding the leverage changes. Compared to 
the matched funds, the leverage increased funds experience a much larger drop in the 
mean-adjusted returns over 6 or 12 months following the leverage changes from the 
returns prior to the leverage increase. This finding is not surprising since Table 3 shows 
that the mean-adjusted returns are significantly higher than those of the matched funds 
during the 6 or 12 month periods prior to the leverage increase, while the returns are 
much lower for the leverage increased funds 6 or 12 months following the leverage 
changes from the first two rows of Table 5. The increase in the 6-month fund flows for 
the leverage increased funds following leverage changes from the 6-month fund flows 
prior to leverage changes is marginally statistically larger than that for the matched 
leverage unchanged funds. For the deleverage funds, the decreases in fund performance, 
risk and fund flows are all larger than those of the matched funds. Though the difference 
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in the reduction of risks is not statistically significant, it is economically significant for 
both the 6-month and 12-month periods.  
To understand further the impact of leverage changes on fund performance, we 
next examine the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) of leverage-increased and 
decreased funds over an event window of 12 months prior to and 12 months after the 
changes. The abnormal fund returns are measured relative to Fung and Hsieh 7-factor 
model. They are calculated as fund excess returns minus the factor realizations times the 
estimated factor loadings. Figure 2.A shows that the CAARs of the increased funds and 
decreased funds run side by side until 3 months before the leverage changes. Then the 
CAAR of increased funds increases steadily and well above that of the deleveraged funds 
until 3 months following the changes. When the changes happen, the CAAR is 15.4% for 
the funds which have increased their leverage, contrasting to 8.45% for the deleveraged 
funds. But the CAAR of funds with increased leverage drop continuously in the 3 months 
following the leverage change to be even lower than the CAAR of deleverage funds. Our 
findings are consistent with Bares, Gibson, and Gyger (2003) who find that the 
persistence in hedge fund performance is short term (1 to 3 months) and decays rapidly. 
Figure 2.B. shows the CAARs of the leverage-increased and deleveraged funds 
over the 12- month event window since the leverage change. In 2 months after leverage 
changes, the CAAR of the funds with increased leverage is 5.73% which is 4.2 times that 
of the deleveraged funds in the same period. But since month 4 after the leverage change, 
the CAARs of the leverage increased funds are at least 3.5% less than that of the 
deleverage funds. 
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The CAAR pattern of the leverage increased funds is not a result of momentum, 
because the pattern persists even when we use the abnormal return adjusted by Fung and 
Hsieh 7 factors and the momentum factor. The pattern may result from mean reversal. 
The CAAR patterns for leverage increased funds and deleveraged funds are similar to 
those in Figure 2 where the CAARs are based on the mean-adjusted returns.  
To sum up, even though the funds increase their leverage based on better past 
performance than the deleveraged funds, the favorable performance persists only for a 
short period. Thus increasing leverage does not appear to help much to prevent the decay 
of performance persistence.  
 
1.4 Leverage of Newborn Hedge Funds 
As we indicated before, leverage may be determined endogenously based on past 
performance, risk, and the existing leverage level. To treat leverage more exogenously 
and understand how funds set up leverage from the inception, in this section we 
investigate the determinants of the leverage for newborn hedge funds and the relationship 
between their leverage and their performance in the 12 months after the newborn funds 
are added to TASS. Following the study of Deuskar et al. (2011), we define newborn 
funds as the funds with age less than two years in the first observed snapshots. Altogether, 
we have 4,678 newborn funds over our sample period. The average of the leverage of 
these new funds is 37.59% and the standard deviation is 84.44%. Compared to the data in 
Table 1, both the mean and standard deviation of the leverage of the new funds are much 
lower. 
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1.4.1  Determinants of the Leverage of Newborn Hedge Funds 
First, we investigate the determinants of the leverage of newborn hedge funds, 
after which we estimate the OLS regression models to examine the effects of macro and 
fund specific variables on the leverage level of the newborn funds. All the models are 
controlled for the style effect. The results are reported in Table 6. 
Table 6 shows a significantly positive relationship between the level of leverage 
and the incentive fee. The call optionality embedded in incentive fees encourages 
excessive managerial risk taking (Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003)). The managers 
tend to take on more leverage when the fund's AUM is close to its high-water mark. The 
closer the fund's AUM is to its high-water mark, the more leverage the managers use 
because the manager is more likely to be able to collect the incentive fees (Lan, Wang, 
and Yang (2011)). This is shown in the significantly positive relationship between the 
high-water mark dummy and the leverage level. To examine the interactive effect of 
incentive fee and high-water mark, we include the interactive term of the two items in 
Model (2). In this model, the coefficients of incentive fee and high-water mark are no 
longer significant. The significant coefficient of the interaction term means that the 
combination effect of incentive fee and high-water mark dominates the effect of incentive 
fee alone or high-water mark alone. No matter under what situation, with contractual 
incentive fee, manager is effectively risk seeking. The higher the incentive fees, the 
higher the fund leverage as shown in Table 6. 
Unlike the relationship between the probability of reduced fund leverage and the 
dummy of manager’s personal investment in Table 4, the relationship between the 
leverage level of newborn funds and manager co-investment is significantly positive. 
29 
 
From Table 4, we find that manager investment in her own fund aligns the interests of 
investors’ and that of managers and thus motivate managers to behave in a more prudent 
way by deleveraging when volatility is high.  Here, for the newborn funds, managers’ 
personal investment functions as a better fund governance structure. Funds with 
managers’ wealth have stronger governance than those without managers’ capital 
investment; as a result, brokers are more willing to grant credit to the newborn hedge 
funds.  
Table 6 shows that shorter notice periods and higher minimum investment 
amounts are associated with higher leverage for the newborn funds. For example, Model 
(1) shows that a 30-day longer notice period is associated with 6.6% lower leverage. The 
impact of minimum investment is also significant at the 1% significance level. A one 
million dollar increase in the minimum investment is associated with a 3.13% increase in 
fund leverage. Our results show that the leverage of new funds is negatively associated 
with family age. A fund that comes from a young family may rely more on leverage in 
order to take advantage of the investment opportunity since the young fund family has 
not built a reputation to attract investors yet. As a result, the young family is unable to 
provide a newborn fund with strong financial support. 
Model (3) includes the variable GFC to capture the global financial crisis effect 
on the leverage of newborn funds for the period of August 2007 to June 2009. As 
expected, the model reveals a negative and statistically significant coefficient on GFC. 
The global financial crisis significantly reduces fund leverage. Specifically, on average, 
newborn funds added to TASS during the global financial crisis have a 19% lower 
leverage, other things being equal.  
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Model (4) examines the impact of macro variables in the month prior to the 
addition of the newborn fund to TASS. Our result shows that all the macro variables, 
with the exception of term spread, significantly predict changes in leverage when 
controlled for the style effect. We observe that the higher the volatility (as measured by 
VIX), or the riskier the assets (as measured by the TED spread in one month before the 
newborn fund is added to TASS), the higher the leverage of the newborn fund. In fact, 
the largest coefficient in magnitude is on TED spread, where for a 1% increase in TED 
spread, the leverage of a newborn hedge fund shrinks by 13.7% on average. A widening 
of the TED spread is typically associated with higher borrowing costs (Gupta and 
Subrahmanyam (2000)). Hedge funds would borrow less when the borrowing cost is 
higher. A 1% movement in VIX predicts that leverage of a newborn fund would decline 
by 0.7% in the next month. This finding is consistent with the finding related to the 
economy-wide leverage. Fostel and Geanakoplos (1998) observed that economy-wide 
equilibrium leverage rises in times of normal state (low volatility) and falls in periods 
where uncertainty is high and agents have very disperse beliefs. In model (4), the sign on 
the S&P 500 Index is unexpectedly negative. We might expect higher S&P 500 returns 
predicting higher leverage of newborn hedge funds. Instead, the coefficient on the S&P 
500 Index is negative at -1.42. In fact, the S&P 500 returns, the TED spread, and VIX are 
highly correlated over our sample period. To alleviate multicollinearity, we only include 
VIX and the TED spread when combining the macro variables and fund specific 
characteristics in the same regression to examine their impact on leverage of new funds. 
In the joint regression, the two macro variables and fund specific variables have the same 
signs and remain in similar significance levels as the two categories of variables used 
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separately in the regressions except that the family age becomes marginally significant. 
Our results again demonstrate that not only macro variables but also the fund 
characteristics variables affect the leverage level of hedge funds.  
We also examine the leverage determinants of the newborn funds with age less 
than 1 year6. The impacts of the variables on the leverage of newborn funds are similar to 
those on the leverage of funds with age less than 2 years as detailed above except that the 
coefficient on family age is no longer statistically significant.  
 
1.4.2 Leverage and the Performance of Newborn Hedge Funds 
Next, we examine the relationship between leverage and the performance of the 
newborn funds in 12 months after they are added to TASS. On one hand, managers 
increase leverage to take advantage of investment opportunities in order to amplify 
returns. On the other hand, investors require higher returns because of bearing higher risk 
when managers take on higher leverage. As a result, we expect that hedge funds with 
leverage usage should achieve better performance than those that do not use leverage. But 
previous researches do not support this expectation. For example, Agarwal and Naik 
(2004) found out that levered funds do not necessarily perform better or worse compared 
to unlevered funds. Unlike the study of Agarwal and Naik (2004) which uses the leverage 
data in a single snapshot, in our study, we use the first snapshots of all the newborn funds 
in our sample period to investigate the impact of leverage on fund performance.  
Table 7 reports the results of the performance regressions on leverage usage of 
newborn funds based on the variable of leverage in TASS, after controlling for style and 
other fund characteristics. 
                                                          
6
 These results are not reported but are available from the authors upon request. 
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We find, as expected, a newborn fund with average leverage larger than zero 
earns approximately 5.2% more annual excess return than that of a fund with zero 
average leverage in the 12 months following the fund joining TASS.7 Measured by the 7-
factor alpha, a levered newborn fund on average outperforms an unlevered fund by about 
3.9% on an annual basis. Whether in excess return or 7-factor adjusted return, the 
differences between the performance of a levered and unlevered fund are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Our result showing that leverage may improve fund 
performance does not mean the higher the leverage, the higher the fund performance. In 
line with Schneeweis et al. (2004), in untabulated results we find that the difference in the 
risk-adjusted performance between funds with below median leverage usage and those 
with above median usage is statistically insignificant. The same is true for the difference 
in terms of excess returns. We also construct tercile portfolios using the levered newborn 
funds. We find that all the differences among the averages of 7-factor adjusted returns 
and the differences among the averages of excess returns for the three terciles are 
statistically insignificant. This finding is not surprising, since high leverage is not equal 
to high risk. The actual risk of a fund or the investor’s actual risk depends not only on the 
leverage the fund takes on, but also on the underlying or inherent risk of the assets held 
by the fund.8 In fact, a levered fund investing in low-risk assets may carry less risk than 
unlevered funds holding high-risk assets. Managers intend to magnify returns by using 
leverage, but sometimes, things do not turn out as they expect. Particularly, during a 
liquidity crunch, leverage amplifies the effect of losses (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
                                                          
7
 In this sub-section, we refer a fund with average leverage greater than zero as a levered fund and a fund 
with zero average leverage as an unlevered fund. 
8  “Measuring Off-Balance-Sheet Leverage,” by Peter Breuer, International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s 
Working Paper (WP/00/202), Pages 6-8.   
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(2009)), asset fire sales (Shleifer and Vishny’s (1992)), and decrease market efficiency 
(Cao et al. (2014)). In a volatile market, high level of leverage increases the likelihood 
that a levered fund will fail. As a result, leverage usage may enhance fund performance, 
but its relationship is not linear. This is where the management on optimal fund leverage 
can come into play. 
In addition to the finding that leverage usage augments newborn funds’ abnormal 
returns, we find that newborn funds with manager capital co-invested outperform the 
funds without managerial personal investment by more than 5% of annual 7-factor 
adjusted return and more than 3% of the annual raw return in excess of the risk free rate. 
The positive relationship between high-water mark and the 7-factor adjusted return of 
newborn funds is marginally significant. Both the manager co-investment and the high-
water mark provision align the manager interest with that of investors and motivate the 
manager to attain strong performance. We also find that offshore newborn funds 
outperform onshore funds by over 4% in terms of the 7-factor adjusted return. This is 
consistent with Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999) who use a sample containing 
only offshore hedge funds and find positive risk-adjusted performance. However, unlike 
Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999), we cannot attribute offshore fund performance 
to the style effects since we have already controlled for the style effect. The 
outperformance may be explained by the flexibility that offshore funds enjoy.  
 
1.5 Leverage and Hedge Fund Survival 
Finally, we examine the impact of leverage on hedge fund survival. Similar to 
Liang and Park (2010), we apply the Cox proportional hazard models controlling for 
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right-censoring for our sample period. The dependent variable is hedge funds’ lifetime or 
failure time, which is the length of time from when the fund enters the TASS database 
until its death or the time of our last snapshot in August 2011. Early hedge fund studies 
treat funds that were dropped out of the live fund database as failed funds because such 
funds on average have poor performance (Liang (2000), Gregoriou (2002), Malkiel and 
Saha (2005)). As indicated by the drop reason codes provided by TASS, liquidation is not 
the only reason why hedge funds are moved to the graveyard fund database. Other 
reasons include: stop reporting, unable to contact, closed to new investment, merged into 
another fund, and dormant funds (Getmansky, Lo, and Mei (2004), Baquero, Horst, and 
Verbeek (2005), and Rouah (2005)). We conduct survival analysis by defining a dead 
fund in two different ways: One is the graveyard fund and the other is the liquidated fund 
in the graveyard. Our primary independent variable is leverage. We also control fund 
characteristics including contractual fee structure, high-water mark provision, manager 
co-investment, share restrictions, fund domicile, and fund style as indicated in the 
snapshots in which they appear for the first time over our sample period.  
We investigate the effect of leverage on fund survival for the newborn funds and 
the funds newly added to TASS over our sample period.
9
 The estimates are presented in 
Table 8. To simplify the interpretation of the results, we report the hazard ratios rather 
than the coefficients. Table 8 shows that no matter which definition we use for dead 
funds, funds employing leverage are significantly more likely to survive longer than the 
unlevered funds. Moreover, highly levered funds will survive longer when compared 
with less levered funds. For example, the hazard ratio of 0.904 for all exits combined 
                                                          
9
 Newborn funds are the funds with age less than two years in the first observed snapshots. Newly added 
funds refer to funds that are added to TASS over our sample period as indicated by their “date added to 
TASS” and appear in the first observed snapshots. 
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suggests that one percent increase in leverage decreases the hazard of disappearance of 
the newborn funds by 9.6%. The hazard ratio of 0.856 indicates that one percent increase 
in the leverage of newborn decreases the risk of liquidation by 14.4%. Similarly, for 
funds newly added to TASS over our sample period, one percent increase in leverage 
decreases the risk of the hazard of all exit reasons by 6.6%, but decreases the hazard of 
liquidation by 13.2%. Investors are therefore more protected from liquidation by high 
leverage than suggested when all exit reasons are combined. Our findings are consistent 
with the operational risk literature (see Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz, 2008, 
2012) that hedge funds with low operational risk tend to have higher leverage since 
lenders are able to distinguish high operational risk funds from low operational risk funds. 
Our findings are different from those of Gregoriou (2002), who found that funds 
with low leverage survive longer than funds with high leverage. Gregoriou (2002) used 
the data provided by Zurich Capital Markets, spanning from January 1990 to December 
2001. The inconsistency may be explained by the different sample periods in the two 
studies. After the debacle of LTCM which happened in the sample period of the study of 
Gregoriou (2002), the hedge fund industry became more prudent in employing leverage 
as documented by Eichengreen and Park (2002). Creditor also became more critical when 
granting credit to hedge funds. Funds with better performance find credit easier to obtain 
and thus are more likely to have higher leverage, other things being equal. In turn, funds 
with higher leverage tend to last longer since better performance is associated with longer 
lifetime (Liang (2000), Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001) and Rouah (2005)). Brown 
et al. (2008) indicate that lenders are able to screen high operational risk funds from low 
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risk funds; as a result, high operational risk funds cannot get enough funding from the 
lender. They also find out that operational risk predicts future performance negatively. 
We further document that when we define dead funds as graveyard funds, we find 
that higher management fee, lower incentive fee, lower minimum investment requirement, 
and manager co-investment predict longer lifetime. When the death of funds is defined as 
liquidated funds, we find that onshore funds outlive domestic funds. Similarly, funds with 
longer lockup periods tend to survive longer.  
 
1.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we study the dynamics of hedge fund leverage using the average leverage 
ratio that managers report to the TASS data. Our comprehensive data sets include 170 
monthly snapshots of the TASS data, which provide us with both a time series of the 
leverage ratio from January 2002 to August 2011 and the cross-sectional information 
which allow us to investigate the determinants of hedge fund leverage. To the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to use such a long time series to study hedge fund leverage. 
We uncover several interesting and important results. 
First, we examine the time series pattern of hedge fund leverage. We find that, on 
average, hedge funds decrease leverage prior to the financial crisis in mid-2007. For the 
funds newly added to TASS, leverage decreases even seven months earlier than that of 
the overall hedge funds. Next, we investigate what causes the changes in leverage. We 
find that the factors determining hedge fund leverage increase are not the same as those 
that cause funds to delever. Fund characteristics can predict future fund increase/decrease 
in leverage in addition to fund performance and risk. Superior fund performance, lower 
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leverage ratio, younger fund age, stronger fund governance (specially representing recent 
audit and the SEC registration) are associated with an increase in fund leverage. However, 
higher return volatility, higher current leverage and higher management fee tend to be 
associated with fund deleveraging. According to the newborn funds, the factors that 
affect fund leverage include not only the micro economic factors but also fund specific 
factors. In particular, higher incentive fee, the existence of a high-water mark, managers’ 
co-investment, shorter notice period, higher minimum investments, and younger fund 
family age are all associated with higher fund leverage. Economy-wide factors that affect 
the leverage of newborn hedge funds are VIX and the TED spread.  Both are negatively 
related to fund leverage, which reflects deteriorated market environment when the 
volatility is high and the funding cost is also high. 
Our findings about fund leverage level and change are in line with the basic demand 
and supply theory. For hedge funds, leverage demand is motivated and constrained by the 
contractual relationship between managers and investors, taking into consideration of 
fund performance and risk. On the other hand, the willingness of creditors to supply 
leverage to hedge funds is associated with fund performance, risk and governance.  
We also examine the impact of fund leverage changes on fund performance, risk and 
investor flows.  We find that compared to their peers, funds with increased leverage do 
not perform well in the six months following the leverage change. Moreover, they also 
tend to become more risky than their peers although fund flows indeed increase in the 
half a year after the leverage change. On the contrary, the deleveraged hedge funds are 
not statistically different from their peers in fund performance, risk and fund flows, but 
their return volatility in the six months following deleveraging are economically lower 
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than that of their peers and lower than that of the volatility in the six months prior to the 
leverage decrease. We compare the CAARs of funds with increased leverage with those 
of the deleveraged funds over a 24-month event window from one year before to one year 
after the leverage change. We find that funds that increased their leverage have much 
higher CAARs than those of the deleveraged funds, but the better performance only 
persist for a short period after the leverage increase.  
When it comes to the impact of leverage on newborn funds, we find that on average 
the levered funds earn 3.9% higher abnormal return than unlevered funds in the 12 
months after being added to TASS, but do not find a linear relationship between leverage 
usage and fund performance. Moreover, we show that levered funds generally survive 
longer than unlevered funds and the higher the leverage, the less the probability of fund 
liquidation or disappearance.  
Overall, our results provide important insights into the determination of hedge fund 
leverage, and on the impact of leverage and/or leverage change on fund performance, risk, 
investor flows, and survival probability in the hedge fund industry.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
Number of 
Observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
P1 P50 P75 P99 
AVGLEV  280,572 47.45 155.53 0 0 18 500 
LEVID 280,572 0.73 0.45 0 1 1 1 
MAXLEV 280,572 107.58 259.64 0 0 150 1,000 
MININV   279,213 0.74 2.3 0 0.25 1 5 
MFEE 280,380 1.46 0.68 0 1.5 2 3.5 
IFEE 280,324 15.96 7.47 0 20 20 25 
WATERID 280,437 0.68 0.47 0 1 1 1 
OFF 280,572 0.74 0.44 0 1 1 1 
NOTICE 280,572 36.81 29.31 0 30 45 100 
LOCKUP 280,572 2.99 6.84 0 0 0 24 
PERSNCAPID 280,572 0.29 0.45 0 0 1 1 
AUM 194,284 209.92 11,884.13 0 46.43 151 2,237 
AUDITM 220,389 30.19 85.12 1 19 33 116 
GOV 220,315 1.31 0.87 0 1 2 3 
AGEFDM 280,551 70.75 52.38 4 58 96 237 
AGEFMM 280,572 104.97 64.58 8 95 141 305 
 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the hedge fund characteristics of our sample hedge funds 
over the period from January 2002 to August 2011. AVGLEV is the average leverage (in percentage) 
the fund uses. LEVID is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the fund uses leverage. MAXLEV is the 
maximum leverage (in percentage) the fund uses. MFEE and IFEE give the magnitude of management 
and incentive fees, respectively. WATERID is an indicator variable equal to 1 when there is a high-
water mark provision for charging incentive fee. MININV is the minimum amount (in millions of 
dollars) an investor has to invest in a hedge fund. PERSNCAPID is an indicator variable set to 1 when 
fund managers invest personal capital in the fund. LOCKUP is the period (in months) over which 
investors cannot withdraw their investment. The variables NOTICE denotes the fund’s redemption 
notice period (in days). The variable OFF is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is offshore. 
AUM is defined as the monthly reported estimated asset value (in millions of dollars). AUDITM is the 
number of months between its observation date and the date of last audit. GOV is calculated as the 
sum of four individual governance variables: auditing, high-water mark, country of domicile, and SEC 
registration. AGEFDM is defined as the number of months between a fund’s observation date and its 
inception date. AGEFMM is defined as the number of months between a fund’s observation date and 
the earliest inception date across all funds within the same fund family.  
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Table 2. Patterns of Leverage Changes 
 
Panel A 
  Number of Funds Percentage 
No Change           9,115 97.08% 
One Change            246 2.62% 
Two Changes              24 0.26% 
Three or More Changes                4 0.04% 
Total 9,389 100.00% 
 
 
Panel B        
  
Avg. lev. 
Increase 
Avg. lev.  
Decrease 
Avg. lev. 
Change 
Percentage 
2002 16 17 33 10.48% 
2003 14 10 24 7.62% 
2004 15 10 25 7.94% 
2005 14 6 20 6.35% 
2006 3 1 4 1.27% 
2007 1 2 3 0.95% 
2008 60 26 86 27.30% 
2009 23 54 77 24.44% 
2010 18 14 32 10.16% 
2011 1 10 11 3.49% 
Total 165 150 315 100% 
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Panel C. Investment Style 
  
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
Dedicated 
Short Bias 
Emerging 
Markets 
Equity Market 
Neutral 
Event 
Driven 
Fixed 
Income 
Arbitrage 
Avglev 
Increase 
19 0 2 8 4 5 
Avglev 
Decrease 
3 1 9 12 6 10 
Total 22 1 11 20 10 15 
  
Fund of 
Funds 
Global Macro 
Long/Short 
Equity Hedge 
Managed 
Futures 
Multi-
strategy 
Other 
Avglev 
Increase 
73 10 33 4 3 4 
Avglev 
Decrease 
45 11 34 14 3 1 
Total 118 21 67 18 6 5 
 
 
Panel D. Average Leverage Increase 
  Mean Median  Min Max 
Prior Avglev  16.73 0 0 250 
Avglev Change  141.18 100 1 1,600 
 
Panel E: Average Leverage Decrease 
  Mean Median  Min Max 
Prior Avglev  133.05 110 0.82 1,200 
Avglev Change  103.9 70.5 0.82 1,200 
 
 
This table reports leverage changes. Panel A reports the number of funds with different number of 
changes in average leverage. Panel B reports the number of instances of average leverage increase and 
decrease. Panel C reports the distribution of these changes over the styles (strategies). Panels D and E 
provide magnitude of average leverage prior to change and magnitude of change. The sample period is 
from January 2002 to August 2011. 
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Table 3. Comparison between Leverage Changed Funds and Matched Funds 
 
  
Increased Funds (1)                  
and Matched Funds (2) 
Decreased Funds (1)               
and Matched Funds (2) 
Changed Funds (1) and 
Matched Funds (2) 
Variable    Mean(1-2) t -Value     Mean(1-2) t -Value      Mean(1-2) t -Value 
RET1 0.016 ** 2.31 0.011 * 1.97 0.014 *** 2.99 
RET12 0.061 *** 3.13 0.057 
 
1.35 0.059 *** 2.69 
RETID1 0.016 ** 2.38 0.011 ** 2.10 0.014 *** 3.12 
RETID12 0.062 *** 3.34 0.049 
 
1.41 0.056 *** 2.99 
FLOW6 -0.059 
 
-0.65 -16.132 
 
-1.00 -6.777 
 
-1.00 
FLOW12 -0.206 
 
-1.35 -0.006 
 
-0.03 -0.125 
 
-1.04 
VOL12 0.116 
 
0.36 0.594 
 
1.23 0.333 
 
1.18 
AVGLEV -32.125 *** -3.13 84.314 *** 5.92 18.98 ** 2.09 
LEVID 0.222 *** 4.35 0.330 *** 7.19 0.269 *** 7.66 
MAXLEV 7.861 
 
0.38 124.475 *** 4.17 59.07 *** 3.32 
IFEE -0.186 
 
-0.20 1.223 
 
1.19 0.420 
 
0.61 
MFEE -0.053 
 
-0.83 0.085 
 
0.89 0.008 
 
0.14 
LOCKUP -1.422 ** -2.23 0.071 
 
0.11 -0.762 * -1.66 
NOTICE -11.801 *** -3.66 7.302 ** 2.11 -3.377 
 
-1.40 
LOGMIN 1.073 *** 5.29 0.921 *** 2.94 1.012 *** 5.61 
PERSNCAPID -0.024 
 
-0.43 0.086 
 
1.31 0.024 
 
0.55 
OFF 0.063 
 
1.20 -0.041 
 
-0.65 0.018 
 
0.44 
WATERID 0.189 *** 3.22 0.095 
 
1.44 0.146 *** 3.35 
LADTDTM -15.894 *** -5.86 12.17 
 
0.76 -4.597 
 
-0.68 
ADTID 0.351 *** 5.66 0.080 
 
1.19 0.245 *** 5.19 
GOV 0.451 *** 4.19 0.120 
 
0.85 0.318 *** 3.66 
AGEFDM -27.589 *** -5.17 -1.892 
 
-0.23 -16.514 *** -3.42 
AGEFMM -32.643 *** -5.51 3.391 
 
0.38 -16.934 *** -3.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
We match each hedge fund with size data which changed average leverage to the hedge fund which 
has the same strategy and the nearest asset size in the same calendar month according to TASS. This 
table provides the comparison of fund characteristics, fund returns, volatility, and fund flows between 
the matched funds and the funds are grouped based on whether a fund increases, decrease or changed 
its average leverage. RET1and RET12 are the buy-and-hold returns in the past 1 and 12 months, 
respectively. RETID1 and RETID12 are the buy-and-hold mean-adjusted returns in the past 1 and 12 
months, respectively.  FLOW6 and FLOW12 are the hedge fund flows over the past 6 and 12 months, 
respectively. VOL12 is the volatility of the hedge fund’s returns computed using monthly data over 
the past 12 months. All the variables mentioned below are the fund specific characteristics in the past 
month. AVGLEV is the average leverage (in percentage) the fund uses. LEVID is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 when the fund uses leverage. MAXLEV is the maximum leverage (in percentage) 
the fund uses. MFEE and IFEE give the magnitude of management and incentive fees, respectively. 
LOCKUP is the period (in months) over which investors cannot withdraw their investment. The 
variables NOTICE denotes the fund’s redemption notice period (in days). LOGMIN is the logarithm 
of the minimum amount (in millions of dollars) an investor has to invest in a hedge fund. 
PERSNCAPID is an indicator variable set to 1 when fund managers invest personal capital in the fund. 
The variable OFF is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is offshore. WATERID is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 when there is a high-water mark provision for charging incentive fee. 
AUDITM is the number of months between its observation date and the date of last audit. ADTID is 
an indicator variable equal to one if a fund reports a completed financial audit in the past 12 months. 
GOV is calculated as the sum of four individual governance variables: auditing, high-water mark, 
country of domicile, and SEC. AGEFDM is defined as the number of months between a fund’s 
observation date and its inception date. AGEFMM is defined as the number of months between a 
fund’s observation date and the earliest inception date across all funds within the same fund family. 
Statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 4. Determinants of Changes in the Average Leverage 
 
 
            Increased Funds  Decreased Funds Total Funds  
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
RET1 0.35 ** 0.00 
 
0.01 
 
0.05 
 
0.22 ** 0.26 ** 
 
(4.22) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(5.01) 
 
(6.34) 
 VOL12 -0.18 
 
-0.35 * 0.45 ** 0.51 ** 0.08 
 
0.15 
 
 
(-1.18) 
 
(-3.30) 
 
(4.72) 
 
(5.79) 
 
(0.64) 
 
(2.21) 
 FLOW6 0.34 
 
-0.1 
 
(0.38) 
 
-8.52 
 
-10.28 
 
-15.97 
 
 
(1.64) 
 
(-0.78) 
 
(-0.01) 
 
(-0.06) 
 
(-1.01) 
 
(-1.66) 
 AVGLEV -0.37 *** -0.4 *** 0.7 *** 0.72 *** 0.02 
 
0.06 
 
 
(-7.10) 
 
(-6.72) 
 
(15.1) 
 
(14.75) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.37) 
 LEVID 0.32 *** 0.31 ** 
    
0.41 *** 0.41 *** 
 
(7.37) 
 
(5.03) 
 
    
(18.88) 
 
(17.54) 
 IFEE -0.25 ** -0.16 
 
-0.1 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.14 
 
-0.07 
 
 
(-4.18) 
 
(-1.20) 
 
(-0.47) 
 
(-0.85) 
 
(-2.42) 
 
(-0.47) 
 MFEE -0.11 
 
-0.16 
 
0.39 *** 0.41 *** 0.15 * 0.15 * 
 
(-0.65) 
 
(-0.97) 
 
(7.11) 
 
(6.70) 
 
(2.89) 
 
(2.71) 
 LOCKUP -0.27 ** -0.29 * -0.28 * -0.26 * -0.19 ** -0.13 
 
 
(-4.14) 
 
(-3.69) 
 
(-3.79) 
 
(-2.96) 
 
(-4.40) 
 
(-1.78) 
 NOTICE -0.16 
 
-0.09 
 
0.19 
 
0.18 
 
-0.13 
 
-0.07 
 
 
(-1.46) 
 
(-0.33) 
 
(1.04) 
 
(0.94) 
 
(-1.81) 
 
(-0.46) 
 LOGMIN 0.86 *** 0.78 *** 0.43 * 0.51 * 0.53 *** 0.57 *** 
 
(20.82) 
 
(15.26) 
 
(3.17) 
 
(3.57) 
 
(16.79) 
 
(17.42) 
 PERSNCAPID 0.05 
 
0.03 
 
0.21 
 
0.25 * 0.09 
 
0.13 
 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(2.30) 
 
(2.96) 
 
(1.04) 
 
(1.95) 
 AGEFDM -0.59 *** -0.59 *** -0.11 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.27 *** -0.23 ** 
 
(-15.84) 
 
(-12.14) 
 
(-0.59) 
 
(-0.14) 
 
(-9.20) 
 
(-5.99) 
 OFF 
  
0.13 
 
  
0.05 
 
  
0.03 
 
 
  
(0.93) 
 
  
(0.09) 
 
  
(0.11) 
 WATERID 
 
0.04 
 
  
0.09 
   
0.00 
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(0.06) 
 
  
(0.28) 
   
(0.00) 
 ADTID 
  
0.41 *** 
  
0.16 
   
0.4 *** 
 
  
(8.26) 
 
  
(1.16) 
   
(16.23) 
 SEC 
  
0.43 *** 
  
-0.16 
   
-0.03 
 
 
  
(6.84) 
 
  
(-1.52) 
   
(-0.08) 
 GOV 0.29 ** 
  
-0.01 
 
  
0.15 * 
  
 
(5.80) 
 
  
(-0.01)     
 
(2.90) 
 
  Pseudo R
2
 0.405   0.435   0.319   0.336   0.271   0.306   
 
This table reports the effects of covariates on the probability of a hedge fund’s increasing, decreasing or changing its leverage. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the fund increase, decrease or change its leverage in the following month (that is, all covariates are 
lagged by 1 month except VOL12 and FLOW6) and zero for the fund matched to the former funds which has the same strategy and the nearest 
asset size in the same calendar month according to TASS. The matched fund does not change its leverage. RET1 is the raw buy-and-hold returns 
in the past month. FLOW6 is the hedge fund flow over the past 6 months. VOL12 is the volatility of the hedge fund’s returns computed using 
monthly data over the past 12 months. All the variables mentioned below are the fund specific characteristics in the past month. AVGLEV is the 
average leverage (in percentage) the fund uses. LEVID is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the fund uses leverage. MFEE and IFEE give the 
magnitude of management and incentive fees, respectively. LOGMIN is the logarithm of the minimum amount (in millions of dollars) an 
investor has to invest in a hedge fund. PERSNCAPID is an indicator variable set to 1 when fund managers invest personal capital in the fund. 
LOCKUP is the period (in months) over which investors cannot withdraw their investment. The variables NOTICE denotes the fund’s 
redemption notice period (in days). AGEFDM is defined as the number of months between a fund’s observation date and its inception date. The 
variable OFF is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is offshore. WATERID is an indicator variable equal to 1 when there is a high-
water mark provision for charging incentive fee. ADTID is an indicator variable equal to one if a fund reports a completed financial audit in the 
past 12 months. SEC is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a fund is registered with the SEC. GOV is calculated as the sum of four individual 
governance variables: auditing, high-water mark, country of domicile, and SEC. These variables are standardized to have a zero mean and 
variance of one across funds.  The Wald Chi-Square statistics are reported in the parentheses. Statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10% is 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 5. The Impact of Leverage Changes on Fund Performance, Risk and Investor Flows 
 
 
  
Increased Funds (1)                  
and Matched Funds (2) 
Decreased Funds (1)               
and Matched Funds (2) 
Changed Funds (1)               
and Matched Funds (2) 
Variable Mean (1-2) t-Value Mean (1-2) t-Value Mean (1-2) t-Value 
RETIDFD6 -0.036 ** -1.97 0.000 
 
0.00 -0.022 
 
-1.64 
RETIDFD12 0.003 
 
0.15 0.005 
 
0.14 0.003 
 
0.16 
VOLFD6 1.020 * 1.84 -0.321 
 
-0.86 0.499 
 
1.34 
VOLFD12 0.663 
 
1.35 -0.057 
 
-0.11 0.373 
 
1.03 
FLOWFD6 0.090 
 
1.15 0.000 
 
-0.01 0.058 
 
1.04 
FLOWFD12 0.104 
 
0.55 -0.024 
 
-0.24 0.059 
 
0.49 
RETIDCHNG6 -0.079 *** -3.35 -0.029 
 
-1.20 -0.006 *** -3.43 
RETIDCHNG12 -0.067 ** -2.27 -0.036 
 
-0.72 -0.055 ** -2.02 
VOLCHNG6 0.903 
 
1.43 -0.202 
 
-0.64 0.490 
 
1.21 
VOLCHNG12 0.263 
 
0.48 -0.760 
 
-1.21 -0.136 
 
-0.33 
FLOWCHNG6 0.212 * 1.88 -0.083 
 
-0.78 0.103 
 
1.27 
FLOWCHNG12 0.451 ** 2.04 -0.177   -0.91 0.215  1.38 
 
This table provides the comparison of fund performance, risk and fund flows following leverage 
change between the matched funds and the funds grouped based on whether a fund increased, 
decreased or changed its average leverage. A matched fund is a fund which has the same strategy and 
the nearest asset size in the calendar month as the hedge fund with size data which changed average 
leverage. RETIDFD6, VOLFD6, and FLOWFD6 are defined as the buy- and-hold mean-adjusted 
returns, standard deviations of fund returns and fund flows over the 6 months following leverage 
change, respectively. RETIDFD12, VOLFD12, and FLOWFD12 are the buy-and-hold mean-adjusted 
returns, standard deviations of fund returns and fund flows during the 12 months following leverage 
change, respectively.  RETIDCHNG6 is the difference between mean-adjusted returns for the 6 
months following the leverage change and the mean-adjusted returns during the 6 months preceding 
the leverage change. VOLCHNG6 is defined as the difference between the standard deviation of fund 
returns for the 6 months following the leverage change and the standard deviation of fund returns 
during the 6 months prior the leverage change. FLOWCHNG6 is the difference between the fund 
flows for the 6 months following the leverage change and the fund flows in the 6 months prior the 
leverage change. Similarly, RETIDCHNG12, VOLCHNG12, and FLOWCHNG12 are for 12-month 
period. Statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 6. Determinants of the Leverage of Newborn Hedge Funds 
 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
MFEE -0.26 
 
0.98 
 
-0.13 
  
-0.09 
 
 
(-0.16) 
 
(0.58 ) (-0.08) 
 
 
(-0.05) 
 IFEE 0.82 *** 0.26 
 
0.77 *** 
 
0.82 *** 
 
(3.99) 
 
(1.04) 
 
(3.72) 
 
 
(4.01) 
 
WATERID 18.12 *** -4.34 
 
16.71 *** 
 
16.22 *** 
 
(5.60) 
 
(-0.67) 
 
(5.16) 
 
 
(5.01) 
 
IFEEWATER 
 
1.51 *** 
  
 
 
 
(4.04 ) 
   
 
PERSNCAPID 7.61 ** 7.73 ** 8.42 *** 
 
6.60 ** 
 
(2.40) 
 
(2.44) 
 
(2.66) 
 
 
(2.08) 
 
NOTICE -0.22 *** -0.21 *** -0.22 *** 
 
-0.22 *** 
 
(-5.24) 
 
(-4.99) 
 
(-5.33) 
 
 
(-5.19) 
 
LOCKUP -0.25 
 
-0.27 
 
-0.27 
 
 
-0.27 
 
 
(-1.41) 
 
(-1.51) 
 
(-1.53) 
 
 
(-1.54) 
 
LOGMIN 3.13 *** 3.29 *** 3.05 *** 
 
3.01 *** 
 
(4.15) 
 
(4.37) 
 
(4.07) 
 
 
(4.01) 
 
OFF -1.90 
 
-1.85 
 
-1.91 
 
 
-0.12 
 
 
(-0.59) 
 
(-0.58) 
 
(-0.60) 
 
 
(-0.04) 
 
AGEFMM -0.05 ** -0.05 ** -0.05 ** 
 
-0.04 * 
 
(-2.35) 
 
(-2.08) 
 
(-2.18) 
 
 
(-1.86) 
 
GFC 
  
-19.18 *** 
  
 
 
  
(-5.78) 
 
  
 
LAGSP500 
   
-1.42 *** 
 
 
 
   
(-4.20) 
 
 
 
LAGVIX 
   
-0.74 *** -0.43 *** 
 
   
(-3.40) 
 
(-2.68) 
 
LAGTEDSPREAD 
   
-13.7 *** -10.32 *** 
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(-4.70) 
 
(-4.34) 
 LAGTERMSPREAD 
 
  
0.34 
 
 
   
  
(0.25) 
 
 STYLE EFFECT 
 
  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y   
ADJ.  R
2
   0.11  0.11  0.11  0.10  0.11   
 
 
This table provides the results of OLS regressions of the leverage of newborn hedge funds on fund-specific variables and macro variables. The 
sample consists of the first snapshots of average leverage for newborn hedge funds. The dependent variable is the average leverage of a hedge 
fund. MFEE and IFEE give the magnitude of management and incentive fees, respectively. WATERID is an indicator variable equal to 1 when 
there is a high-water mark provision for charging incentive fee. IFEEWATER is defined as the product of IFEE and WATERID.  PERSNCAPID 
is an indicator variable set to 1 when fund managers invest personal capital in the fund. The variables NOTICE denotes the fund’s redemption 
notice period (in days). LOCKUP is the period (in months) over which investors cannot withdraw their investment. LOGMIN is the logarithm of 
the minimum amount (in millions of dollars) an investor has to invest in a hedge fund. The variable OFF is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the fund is offshore. AGEFMM is defined as the number of months between a fund’s observation date and the earliest inception date across all 
funds within the same fund family. GFC captures the global financial crisis fixed effect between August 2007 and June 2009. All the variables 
with the first three letters as “LAG” are the macro variables in the month before a hedge fund appears in the first snapshot. SP500 is the monthly 
total return on the S&P500 index. VIX is the monthly level of the VIX volatility index. TEDSPREAD represents TED spread which is the 
difference between the three-month LIBOR yield and the three-month T-bill yield. TERMSPREAD is defined to be the difference between the 
10-year Treasury yield and the three-month T-bill. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10% is 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
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Table 7.  Relation between the Leverage of Newborn Funds and Fund Performance 
 
 
  7-factor Adjusted 12-Month Return 
12-Month Return in Excess of the 
Risk-Free Rate 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
AVGLEVID 3.88 *** 3.86 *** 5.22 *** 5.24 *** 
 
(2.94) 
 
(2.92) 
 
(3.05) 
 
(3.06) 
 
MFEE 0.50 
 
0.48 
 
0.77 
 
0.80 
 
 
(0.72) 
 
(0.69) 
 
(0.86) 
 
(0.88) 
 
IFEE -0.03 
 
-0.01 
 
0.37 *** 0.36 *** 
 
(-0.25) 
 
(-0.13) 
 
(2.69) 
 
(2.59) 
 
NOTICE 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(-0.09) 
 
(-0.08) 
 
(0.00 ) 
LOCKUP 0.20 
 
0.20 
 
0.37 ** 0.36 ** 
 
(1.58) 
 
(1.58) 
 
(2.29) 
 
(2.29) 
 
LOGMIN 0.04 
 
0.04 
 
0.75 
 
0.75 
 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(1.48) 
 
(1.48) 
 
PERSNCAPID 5.42 *** 5.52 *** 3.36 * 3.26 * 
 
(3.73) 
 
(3.80) 
 
(1.78) 
 
(1.73) 
 
WATERID 2.62 * 2.34 
 
3.60 * 3.87 * 
 
(1.72) 
 
(1.52) 
 
(1.82) 
 
(1.94) 
 
OFF 4.18 *** 4.29 *** 0.27 
 
0.16 
 
 
(2.72) 
 
(2.79) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.08) 
 
GFC 
 
-4.01 
 
  
3.97 
 
 
 
(-1.25) 
 
  
(0.95 ) 
STYLE EFFECT Y Y Y Y 
ADJ. R
2
 0.051  0.052  0.089  0.089  
 
This table reports the Determinants of newborn fund performance in 12 months after appearing in the 
first snapshots of our sample. The dependent variable is hedge fund Fung and Hsieh 7-factor adjusted 
12-month returns and 12-month raw returns in excess of risk free return. They are both in percentage. 
AVGLEVID is the dummy variable which is one if average leverage is positive, zero otherwise. 
MFEE and IFEE give the magnitude of management and incentive fees, respectively. The variables 
NOTICE denotes the fund’s redemption notice period (in days). LOCKUP is the period (in months) 
over which investors cannot withdraw their investment. LOGMIN is the logarithm of the minimum 
amount (in millions of dollars) an investor has to invest in a hedge fund. PERSNCAPID is an 
indicator variable set to 1 when fund managers invest personal capital in the fund. WATERID is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 when there is a high-water mark provision for charging incentive fee. The 
variable OFF is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is offshore. GFC captures the global 
financial crisis fixed effect between August 2007 and June 2009. The t-statistics are reported in the 
parentheses. Statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 8. Leverage and Fund Survival 
 
 
Failure: Graveyard Funds Failure: Liquidated Funds 
  Added Funds New Funds Added Funds New Funds 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
AVGLEV 0.93 *** 
 
0.90 *** 
 
0.87 *** 
 
0.86 *** 
 
 
(7.81) 
  
(12.87) 
  
(10.48) 
  
(10.76) 
  AVGLEVID 
 
0.84 *** 
 
0.80 *** 
 
0.74 *** 
 
0.73 *** 
  
(15.98) 
  
(17.51) 
  
(16.29) 
  
(13.12) 
 MFEE 0.93 ** 0.94 
 
0.86 *** 0.87 *** 1.014 
 
1.02 
 
1 
 
1.01 
 
 
(6.23) 
 
(5.64) 
 
(14.77) 
 
(13.41) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.06) 
 IFEE 1.01 *** 1.01 *** 1.02 *** 1.02 *** 1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
(20.52) 
 
(20.06) 
 
(13.49) 
 
(13.11) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.19) 
 NOTICE 1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
(0.45) 
 
(0.81) 
 
(0.27) 
 
(0.53) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.23) 
 LOCKUP 1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0.99 *** 0.99 
 
0.98 ** 0.99 ** 
 
(1.50) 
 
(0.88) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(6.78) 
 
(5.70) 
 
(6.35) 
 
(5.36) 
 LOGMIN 1.05 *** 1.05 *** 1.04 ** 1.04 ** 1.02 
 
1.02 
 
1.03 
 
1.03 
 
 
(18.95) 
 
(19.96) 
 
(5.83) 
 
(5.67) 
 
(1.21) 
 
(1.41) 
 
(1.48) 
 
(1.36) 
 PERSNCAPID 0.81 *** 0.82 *** 0.81 *** 0.81 *** 0.81 ** 0.83 ** 0.89 
 
0.90 
 
 
(15.27) 
 
(13.27) 
 
(12.09) 
 
(11.24) 
 
(5.13) 
 
(4.09) 
 
(1.33) 
 
(1.11) 
 WATERID 1.05 
 
1.06 
 
1.02 
 
1.02 
 
1.06 
 
1.07 
 
1 
 
1.01 
 
 
(1.27) 
 
(1.71) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.65) 
 
(0.87) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.01) 
 OFF 1.24 *** 1.24 *** 1.10 
 
1.10 
 
1.63 *** 1.63 *** 1.33 *** 1.32 *** 
 
(17.27) 
 
(16.69) 
 
(2.48) 
 
(2.25) 
 
(25.84) 
 
(25.27) 
 
(7.14) 
 
(6.78) 
 STYLE EFFECT Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 OBSERVATIONS 5,728   5,728   3,540   3,540   5,728   5,728   3,540   3,540  
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This table reports results of a Cox proportional hazards model investigating the impact of hedge fund 
leverage on their survival. The dependent variable is the right-censored lifetime of a hedge fund. The 
independent variable AVGLEV is the average leverage (in percentage) the fund uses. AVGLEVID is 
the dummy variable which is one if average leverage is positive, zero otherwise. MFEE and IFEE give 
the magnitude of management and incentive fees, respectively. The variables NOTICE denotes the 
fund’s redemption notice period (in days). LOCKUP is the period (in months) over which investors 
cannot withdraw their investment. LOGMIN is the logarithm of the minimum amount (in millions of 
dollars) an investor has to invest in a hedge fund. PERSNCAPID is an indicator variable set to 1 when 
fund managers invest personal capital in the fund. WATERID is an indicator variable equal to 1 when 
there is a high-water mark provision for charging incentive fee. The variable OFF is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the fund is offshore. The table displays hazard ratio for each explanatory 
variable with the chi-square statistics in the parenthesis. Statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10% is 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
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Figure 1. Time Series of the Average Leverage 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1(A) shows the dynamics of the monthly means of original average leverage (blue solid line), 
the monthly means of average leverage winsorized at 1% and 99% levels (red  round dot line), and 
monthly means of original average leverage for the funds newly added to TASS (green dashed line). 
Figure 1(B) displays the dynamics of the monthly means of original average leverage for the funds 
newly added to TASS (blue dashed line), and monthly means of original average leverage for the 
funds removed from TASS (red solid line).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(A) 
(B) 
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Figure 2. CAARs of Funds with Changes in the Average Leverage 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2(A) presents the cumulative average abnormal returns over a 24-month event window for 
funds increased their leverage (red solid line) and deleveraged funds (blue dashed line). The abnormal 
return is Fung and Hsieh 7-factor adjusted return. Figure 2(B) presents the cumulative average 
abnormal returns over a 12-month event window for funds increased their leverage (red solid line) and 
deleveraged funds (blue dashed line). The abnormal return is Fung and Hsieh 7-factor adjusted return.  
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ESSAY  2 
PERFORMANCE OF EMERGING MARKET HEDGE FUNDS  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Emerging markets with the potential for high investment returns have generated 
much investor interest in recent years. Increasingly, emerging markets are becoming 
important engines of the global economic growth. These countries make up 82% of the 
world's population
10
 and 36% of the world's economic output
11
. According to an April 
2012 International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimate, emerging market economies are 
expected to grow two to three times faster than their developed counterparts. Emerging 
markets are rising in importance as investment destinations because returns in mature 
markets like the U.S. and Europe are likely to stay low in the near future. Another benefit 
for investors is the diversification that the emerging markets can provide. The emerging 
markets generally tend to be less correlated with developed markets since the former is 
less integrated with the latter due to economic, legal, and political reasons. Therefore, 
from the perspective of an international investor, emerging markets are ideal candidates 
for portfolio diversification to achieve optimal risk-return trade-offs.  
The financial liberalization and improvements in market infrastructure and 
transparency, combined with better corporate governance have facilitated foreign investor 
participation in many emerging markets that were previously not accessible to outside 
investors. For example, China opened its stock exchanges to foreign investors in 2002 by 
                                                          
10
 The United Nations, as of June 2012. 
11
 The International Monetary Fund, December 2011. 
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launching the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program. Since then China 
has revised QFII regulation several times with the purpose to make it easier for QFIIs to 
invest in China, part of the nation's efforts to free up capital flows and accelerate the 
opening of domestic capital markets.  
As one of the fastest growing sectors in finance, hedge funds have played major 
roles in the price formation process and providing liquidity to the market. Cao et al. 
(2013) demonstrate that as arbitragers hedge funds trade underpriced securities and help 
restoring market efficiency through their trading activities. Given the strong competition 
in the domestic markets, hedge funds should have strong incentive and be well equipped 
to take advantage of the opportunities in emerging markets due to their flexibility in 
investment strategies and lockup provisions. As a result, the last decade has witnessed 
tremendous growth in hedge fund assets and emerging market investments, which has 
been driven particularly by international investors and tax-exempt US institutions. As of 
December 2012, hedge funds managed about $2.25 trillion assets globally with 6.17% 
belonging to emerging market hedge funds.
12
 
In this paper, we try to address the following questions: What is the appropriate 
model to capture emerging market hedge fund performance? How did emerging market 
hedge funds perform in absolute terms and risk-adjusted settings? What are the sources of 
performance of these emerging market hedge funds? Is a physical presence of the 
investment company in the investment region important? What are investors’ reactions to 
the performance of emerging market hedge funds through capital flows? What is the 
optimal fund size for emerging market hedge funds and have they reached their capacities 
yet? Finally, how did investor flows affect the future performance of emerging market 
                                                          
12
 Hedge Fund Research, Inc., December 2012. 
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hedge funds? In other words, is there a “smart money” effect in emerging market hedge 
funds? 
To address these questions, we use a comprehensive dataset by combining the 
TASS database with the Barclay hedge fund database from January 2000 to December 
2010.  We study the performance of emerging market hedge funds by examining the 
sources of performance, the relationship between performance and investor flows, as well 
as the relationship between performance and asset size of emerging market hedge funds.  
We employ a five-factor model to adjust for risk which can account for about 
95% of the variations in portfolio returns of emerging market hedge funds. Among the 
five factors is the emerging market factor, which is identified through principal 
components analysis. We find that the presence of the management companies in their 
investment region is the most important characteristics that affect emerging market risk-
adjusted performance in our model. The funds with a presence in their investment region 
outperform other funds by 4.2 % per year. The local information advantage is significant 
for all major geographical regions. Indeed, it may be the single most important source of 
performance for Asian emerging market hedge funds. We find that, on average, 18% of 
the emerging market hedge funds deliver positive and statistically significant alpha. 
Funds producing significant alpha (have-alpha funds) experience greater capital inflows 
than the remainder (beta-only funds). Have-alpha funds that experience high capital 
inflows do not have higher probabilities of being classified as beta-only funds in the 
future.  
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. Most specifically, our 
paper contributes to the study on the performance of emerging market hedge funds. Even 
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though there are a large number of hedge fund studies including the ones on hedge fund 
performance
13
, research on the combination of emerging markets and hedge funds is 
scarce, partly due to lack of data. The two earliest papers dealing with this issue are 
Eichengreen, Mathieson, Chadha, Jansen, Kodres and Sharma (1998) and Fung and 
Hsieh (2000). Strömqvist (2007) finds that at the strategy level emerging market hedge 
funds have, on average, only been able to provide a risk-adjusted return in the last three 
years during their sample period from 1994 to 2004. Kotkatvuori-Örnberg et al. (2008) 
suggest that emerging market hedge funds are able to beat their benchmarks but do not 
show market timing ability. Füss and Kaiser (2009) analyze the short- and long-term 
relationships between hedge funds and traditional financial assets and find that emerging 
market hedge funds in general are redundant securities for long-term investment 
horizons. Cao and Jayasuriya (2011) reveal that the stock and bond market volatility do 
not have a significant impact on the returns of emerging market hedge funds. Cao (2012) 
finds little evidence of volatility timing in the stock markets for these hedge fund indices. 
Furthermore, only the Eastern Europe hedge fund index demonstrates statistically 
significant volatility timing ability in the bond market. Caglayan and Ulutas (2012) argue 
that hedge funds are better off by increasing their exposures to emerging market 
securities.   
Our paper also contributes to the study on home bias in investment and fund 
performance. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that U.S. mutual fund managers earn 
abnormal returns from their local investments relative to their nonlocal holdings. Ivkovi´c 
and Weisbenner (2005) find a similar pattern with U.S. retail investors. Hau (2001) 
                                                          
13
 See, for example, Ackermann et al. (1999), Brown et al. (1999), Liang (1999), Edwards and Caglayan 
(2001), Fung and Hsieh (2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2004), Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), Agarwal and Naik 
(2004), Gatev et al. (2006), and Fung et al. (2008). 
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demonstrates that local traders outperform foreign traders in the German market. Teo 
(2009) analyzes the relationship between the risk-adjusted performance of hedge funds 
and their proximity to investments using data on Asia-focused hedge funds. He finds that 
hedge funds with a physical presence (head or research office) in their investment region 
outperform other hedge funds by 3.72% per year.  
Our study is also related to the literature of hedge fund size and performance. 
Liang (1999) finds a positive relationship between AUM and performance. Hedges 
(2003) shows that smaller funds outperform larger funds, while mid-sized funds 
underperform both smaller funds and larger funds. Gregoriou and Rouah (2003) find 
little-to-no correlation between size and performance. Ammamm and Moerth (2006) 
provide evidence that asset size and performance have a concave relationship for hedge 
funds. In contrast, Teo (2010) finds a convex relationship between fund size and future 
performance. Getmansky (2012) shows that the asset size-performance relationship varies 
among different hedge fund categories, most of which are concave, indicating that an 
optimal asset size can be obtained.  
In addition to performance-size relationship, this paper contributes to the studies 
of the interaction of fund performance and fund flows. Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross 
(2003) studied offshore hedge funds and report that money flows out of the top-
performing hedge funds. Both Agarwal et al. (2004) finds that hedge funds with better 
performance experience greater money inflows. Xiong et al. (2007) confirm that funds of 
hedge funds that have better performance experience greater capital inflows. They find 
that the worst-performing funds experienced net capital outflows and top-performing 
funds experienced net capital inflows. Fung, et al. (2008) classify the fund of hedge funds 
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universe into two categories: Have-Alpha funds and Beta-Only funds. They find that 
Have-Alpha funds experience larger capital inflows than Beta-Only funds. Fund flows 
also affect future fund performance. Agarwal et al. (2004) show that hedge funds with 
greater inflows perform worse in the future. Fung et al.  (2007) report that have-alpha 
funds of hedge funds which experience above-median capital inflows are less likely to 
produce positive abnormal returns in the future than the have-alpha funds that experience 
below-median capital inflows. Zhong (2008) finds that fund-level inflows have a positive 
(negative) impact on the future performance of small (large) funds, while inflows at the 
strategy level are negatively related to future fund performance. Finally, Getmansky et al. 
(2012) find that the flow-performance relation is affected by share restrictions; with share 
restrictions the relation is concave while it is convex without restrictions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the data 
and methodology. Section II presents the performance evaluation and analyzes the 
determinants of risk-adjusted performance of emerging market hedge funds.  Section III 
examines the relationship between performance and investor flows as well as the 
relationship between performance and fund size. Finally, Section IV concludes. 
 
2.2 Data and Methodology 
In order to expand sample size, we combine hedge fund data from Lipper TASS 
database with those from BarclayHedge database.  For our specific analysis on emerging 
markets, we use information on hedge funds that classify themselves as Emerging Market 
(as their investment style) to the TASS database or BarclayHedge database.   We use both 
the live and dead hedge fund databases to mitigate survivorship bias in our sample. Only 
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funds that provide monthly net of fee returns and denominated in US dollars are retained. 
To minimize backfill bias, we drop the returns of funds in TASS prior to the “date added 
to database.” Since BarclayHedge does not provide ‘‘date added to database”, we drop 
the first 24 months to control for backfill bias. In addition, we also delete all the returns 
of the funds in Barclay database before January 2000 because Barclay did not include any 
defunct funds in the database prior to 2000. Our data from BarclayHedge ends in 
December 2010. To be consistent, we select January 2000 as the start of our sample 
period and employ our analyses on hedge fund returns only for the period from January 
2000 to December 2010, even though our TASS data extends coverage to 2012. 
The sample also includes data on a host of fund characteristics including 
management fee, incentive fee, high-water mark provision, advanced notice period, lock-
up period, investment geographical region, fund registration location and manager 
address, fund size, and minimum investment. The investment region information is from 
“Geographic Focus” in TASS and from “Fund Geographical Focus” in BarclayHedge. 
Our main results in this paper reflect only funds with the investment region information. 
In the end, 802 out of 1,729 funds survived our data cleaning process and remained in our 
sample.  
 
2.2.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 9 provides the summary statistics of the 802 hedge funds on the number of 
funds, returns, assets under management (AUM), ages, and fee structures. Panel A 
reports, for each year from 2000 to 2010, the number of hedge funds, total AUM at the 
end of the year (in billion dollars), and the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, 
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and maximum monthly returns on an equally-weighted portfolio of emerging market 
hedge funds.  
From Panel A we observe a steady increase in the number of emerging market 
hedge funds from 2000 to 2009. This is a reflection on the growth in the hedge fund 
industry and the increasing attraction of emerging markets. But in 2010, the number of 
emerging market funds decreased for the first time after continuous growth over a 
decade. This drop in the number of emerging market funds reflects the aftermath of the 
latest financial crisis.  
One important feature in Panel A is the sharp reversal in the growth of emerging 
market hedge fund AUM in 2008, the year when the extreme negative effects of the 
financial crisis were felt heavily in the hedge fund industry. In particular, from 2000 to 
2007, the number of hedge funds increased on average by 15.4% per year while the AUM 
grew on average by 49% per year. However, this big surge came to a sudden halt in 2008 
even though the number of hedge funds continues to grow in years 2008 and 2009. The 
total AUM dropped by 45.5% just in 2008. The pattern of the change in AUM is the same 
even when we expand our number of sample funds by relaxing the entry requirements. 
Figure 3 vividly shows the dramatic change in the AUM for all funds and funds with 
different geographical focuses. Unlike Table 9, the total AUM in Figure 3 is for the funds 
without considering their return denomination and the availability of geographical focus 
information. This figure shows that the average annual growth rate from 2000 to 2007 is 
52.3% for all funds, and 46.6%, 67.2%, 41.1% and 52.3% for funds with a geographical 
investment focus in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Global area, respectively. 
In 2008, the total AUM for all funds fell by 58.8%. While the funds invested in Asia, 
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Eastern Europe, Latin America and Global area experienced a decrease of 60.9%, 67.5%, 
49.3% and 57.1%, respectively. Compared to the change in total AUM for the 802 funds 
we actually use in our main analysis, the change for the expanded sample is more 
dramatic.  
The equally-weighted portfolio return in each year shows that in 6 out of the 11 
sample years, the average monthly return of the emerging market hedge funds is in the 
range of 1% and 2%. The worst return appeared in 2008 with an average of -3.85% per 
month. This partly explains why the amount of total asset under management was slashed 
almost in half in 2008, from $110.14 billion to $60.08 billion, even though the number of 
emerging market hedge funds continued to grow in the same year. 
Panel B of Table 9 reports the cross-sectional mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum, and maximum statistics for emerging market hedge fund characteristics 
including returns, size, age, management fee, and incentive fee.  
For the sample period, the best performed fund experienced an average monthly 
return of 6.82% over its life, while the worst performed fund had an average monthly 
return of -12.43%. The mean of the average monthly returns of all emerging market 
hedge funds is only 0.71%. The median is lower than one-tenth of the average monthly 
return of the best performed fund. From Panel B we can also observe the large size 
variation among all funds, where size of a fund is measured as the average monthly AUM 
over the life of the fund. Based on our data, the median size is only $48.88 million, while 
the mean size is $142.2 million. This shows the existence of very few emerging market 
hedge funds with very large assets under management in the hedge fund industry. The 
largest fund in our sample is four times the size of the median-sized fund. Interestingly, 
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the median fund age (number of months in existence since inception) is only 73 months, 
approximately 6 years, while the average age of emerging market funds in our sample is 
about 7 years. The short life span may partly be explained by the existence of a high-
water mark provision. The manager of a hedge fund with high-water-mark provision may 
choose to close his/her fund when recent fund performance is poor or the current superior 
performance is unlikely to continue in a foreseeable future. The mean (median) incentive 
fee is 17.71% (20.00%) in our sample, and goes up as high as 30.00% for a few emerging 
market hedge funds.  
Panel C of Table 9 provides the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and 
maximum of eight risk factors over our sample period of 2000 to 2010. The eight risk 
factors are Morningstar MSCI index, market factor, size factor, term spread and credit 
spread factors, and three trend-following factors on bonds, currencies, and commodities. 
We will describe the eight factors in detail in Section 2.2. 
 
2.2.2 Risk-Adjusted Factor Model 
To adjust for risk, we come up with a model that can explain most of the 
variations in the portfolio returns of emerging market hedge fund. Following Fung and 
Hsieh (1997), we employ a principal components analysis to locate a factor that can 
account for most of the variations in the returns of nine emerging market hedge fund 
portfolios. The nine portfolios are formed by the funds based on their source of database 
and their geographical investment focus. They are Africa funds, Asia funds, Eastern 
Europe funds, Latin American funds and Global funds in TASS; Asia funds, Eastern 
Europe funds, Latin American funds, and Global funds in BarclayHedge.  As 
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BarclayHedge provides a direct classification of emerging market hedge funds into 
regions, it is straightforward to classify the funds into different portfolios. However, it is 
challenging to classify the TASS funds since some funds provide more than one 
geographic focuses in emerging market. In this case, we classify these funds as emerging 
market funds that invest in global markets. Table 10 reports the R-squares from the 
regression of fund regional returns on each of the principal components, as well as the 
percentage of the total variation explained by each principal component. It indicates that 
the first principal component alone can account for about 75.85% of the variations in 
fund regional returns. This compares favorably with Fung and Hsieh (1997), who find 
that the top five principal components can account for 43% of the variations in onshore 
and offshore fund returns. Each of the second and third components only accounts for 
about 7.2% of the variations in the nine portfolio returns. 
Next, we find an index whose returns that have the highest correlation with the 
returns of the factor identified in the principal component analysis. We sort the 
correlations between the returns of more than 13,000 economic indexes from Morningstar 
Direct and the first principal component returns, and find that Morningstar MSCI index 
achieves the highest correlation of 0.969. The highest correlations between the indexes 
and the second and third principal components are only 0.4 and 0.31, respectively. 
Considering the low explanation power of the second and third principal components as 
well as the weak correlations between the indexes available and the two components, we 
decide to only retain the index that has the highest correlation with the first principal 
component as one of the risk factors.  
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Then we combine the risk factor identified above with the most frequently used 
risk factors in hedge fund research to construct different risk factor models. Specifically, 
we use the following factors: Emerging market factor which is the excess return on 
Morningstar MSCI index; Market factor which is the excess return on the value-weighted 
return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill 
rate; Size factor which is as in Fama and French (1993); Term spread factor which is the 
excess return on Fama Treasury bond portfolio with maturities greater than ten years (as 
in Jagannathan et al. (2010)); Credit spread factor which is the excess return on the Citi 
group corporate BBB 10+ year index minus TERM (as in Jagannathan et al. (2010)); 
TFBD, TFFX, and TFCOM which are the excess returns on the portfolios of look back 
straddle options on bonds, currencies, and commodities, respectively (as in Fung and 
Hsieh(2001)). In addition, we include the two lags of the emerging market factor and the 
market factor. We construct five different risk factor models from the above factors. 
Table 11 presents the comparison of the explanatory power of these models. 
The results in panel A of Table 11 indicate that the 5-factor model, which 
includes the emerging market factor, market factor, size factor, term spread, and credit 
spread, explains most of the variations in the portfolio returns of all emerging market 
funds. The adjusted R-square for the 5-factor model is 95% or a meaningful 29% more 
than that for the 7-factor model. Also, it is not surprising that the factor loading on the 
emerging market factor is statistically significant at the 1% level with a t-statistic above 
23, given the high correlation of the Morningstar MSCI index with the first principal 
component. When we estimate similar regressions for fund portfolios stratified by 
investment regions (Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Global), we also find that 
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the 5-factor model well explains the variation in the returns of the four regional 
portfolios. The results by fund regions indicate that the 5-factor model explains at least 
65% of the variation in returns for each regional portfolio. All of the four regions load 
significantly on the Morningstar MSCI emerging market factor, with the t-statistic 
ranging from 5.2 to 22. In sharp contrast, none of the four regional portfolios and the 
portfolio of all emerging market hedge funds loads significantly on any of the three trend-
following factors on bonds, currencies, and commodities. The weak explanatory power of 
the trend-following risk-factors may simply reflect the relatively less developed nature of 
the emerging market. The securities traded in the emerging market are generally simpler 
relative to those in the developed market. As a result, funds investing in the emerging 
market usually do not have option-like payouts for which trend following factors have 
high explanatory power
14
. Based on the above comparison, we decide to employ the 5-
factor model to adjust for the risk in this paper.  
 
2.3 Performance of Emerging Market Hedge Funds 
Employing the 5-factor risk model, we can compare the risk-adjusted returns for 
the four different regional portfolios and the overall performance of the emerging market 
hedge funds. From Table 11, we can see that on average the Eastern Europe funds earn an 
annual risk-adjusted return of 4.56% which is the highest among all regional funds, 
followed by the Latin America funds whose annual return is 2.16%.  The Asian fund has 
a negligible alpha of 0.12% per year, and the risk-adjusted return for the Global emerging 
market fund is -1.1% per year. The insignificant alphas of all the four regional portfolios 
may be explained by the significant loading on the emerging market factor and the 
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 Fung and Hsieh(2001) 
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market factor. Compared from the perspective of raw return, Easter European funds are 
the best performer with the global funds being the worst. The emerging market hedge 
funds, on average, earn a significant raw return of 9.72% per year over our sample 
period, but the risk-adjusted return is only 0.65 per year based on the 5-factor model.  
Admittedly, we are interested in the performance of emerging market funds, but 
we are more interested in the question as to what factors significantly affect their 
performance.  To address this question, we firstly calculate monthly abnormal return for 
each fund as fund excess returns minus the factor realizations times loadings estimated 
over the entire sample period (See equation (1)).  
1 2 3 4 5( )     (1)im im im im im im imALPHA r b MMSCIEM b MKTRF b SMB b TERMSPREAD b CREDITSPREAD       
where i= 1, . . . , n funds, m = 1, . . . , M months, 
imALPHA is the abnormal return of fund i 
for month m, 
imr  is fund return in excess of the risk-free rate, and the other variables are 
as defined in the 5-risk factor model. 
Then we estimate a pooled regression of hedge fund alpha obtained using 
Equation (1) on variables that may be associated with emerging market hedge fund 
performance. We create an indicator variable for investment region presence. Investment 
region presence is set equal to 1 if the management company is in any of the constituent 
countries underlying the MSCI Emerging Markets Index
15
 as of June 2012 and the 
constituent countries are in its investment region. Otherwise, investment region presence 
is set equal to 0. In order to explore the relationship between fund asset illiquidity and 
                                                          
15
 The constituent countries underlying the MSCI Emerging Markets Index as of June 2012: Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Morocco, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, 
China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand. These countries are classified 
into emerging markets regions: Africa (Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa), Asia Pacific (Turkey, China, 
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand), Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Russia), and Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru). 
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fund performance, we measure fund asset illiquidity using 
0 in Equation (2) developed in 
Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004).  
0
0 1 1
0 1
                   
[0.1],  0, ,                                   (2)
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Table 12 reports the results of the pooled regression. We only include results for 
funds with at least twenty-four months of return data. The second column of Panel A 
shows that the high-water mark provision is associated with high risk-adjusted 
performance. This is consistent with the findings of Agarwal and Naik (2009) who study 
all hedge funds, not limited to the emerging market hedge funds. With the high-water 
mark provision, managers collect incentive fees only if they can make up previous losses. 
The existence of the high-watermark provisions effectively make the incentive fee 
contract a call option or a sequence of options written by the investors on the assets under 
management16. Such features motivate hedge fund managers to improve performance. 
This design seems to achieve its purpose: Emerging market hedge funds with high-water 
mark provisions delivered superior performance. 
Results in Panel A of Table 12 also show that funds with lockup restrictions have 
greater performance than funds without such restriction.
17
 According to Aragon (2007) 
funds with lockups may take on greater liquidity risk and achieve higher expected 
returns. Aragon (2007) also finds a positive relation between a fund’s underlying asset 
illiquidity and the use of share restrictions, while we find a negative but insignificant 
                                                          
16 Goetzmann and Ross (2003) and Panageas and Westerfield (2009) 
17
 When we replace the lockup dummy variable with lockup period, we obtain a similar result: The longer 
the lockup period, the better the fund performance. 
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relation between the two. Aragon et al. (2012) find that onshore hedge funds have stricter 
share restrictions than their offshore counterpart. However, onshore funds trade more 
liquid assets than offshore funds as onshore funds impose lockups may be for reasons 
other than illiquidity (like avoiding registration) and the funding costs for onshore funds 
are high due to limited partnership structure.  Although lockup period can effectively 
prevent early redemption, provide more flexibility in investment, reduce cash holdings, 
and allow managers to focus on relatively long horizons, managers do not necessarily 
trade more illiquid securities depending on the legal structure of the hedge funds (see 
Aragon et al. (2012)). Panel A also shows a negative relation between fund age and the 
risk-adjusted returns. This finding is consistent with Liang (1999), Boyson (2008), and 
Aggarwal and Jorion (2008) who study the performance of all hedge funds, not only 
emerging market funds. One explanation is that managers of young funds have 
particularly strong incentives to create performance in order to build up their reputation 
and to attract more investors. In addition, younger funds may be more nimble than 
established ones.   
While high-water mark provisions, lockup restrictions, fund asset illiquidity and 
age are significantly associated with the risk-adjusted performance of all emerging 
market funds in our sample, only the coefficients of two factors mentioned above are 
significant at the 1% level over the whole sample and for most regional funds. These two 
factors are fund presence and fund size. Next, we investigate the relationship between 
fund performance and these two factors in detail. 
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2.3.1 The Presence Effect 
There are two effects for the presence of management company in the investment 
region. On one hand, the proximity to investments may be helpful for emerging market 
hedge funds. According to Coval and Moskowitz (2001), investors possess significant 
information advantages in evaluating nearby investments. Malloy (2005) also finds that 
geographically proximate analysts are more accurate than other analyst. The information 
advantage of proximity is even crucial for emerging market investors. The information 
disclosed in emerging market is often being late or even misleading. Investors in 
emerging markets often make their investment decision basing upon poor quality 
information disclosed by companies and governments in emerging markets
18
. While 
information disclosure requirements have become more stringent globally, the rules still 
require much less information be disclosed in emerging markets than in developed 
markets. In fact, it is not unusual for significant and material information to be withheld 
in some emerging markets19. To overcome the information gap, investors and analysts in 
emerging markets often obtain pertinent information through non-public informal 
channels. This practice likely gives some investors a competitive advantage. Being close 
to their investments or target firms allows emerging market hedge funds to maintain close 
contact with senior management and stay abreast of the latest developments. Fund 
managers can learn valuable information not only from the target firms but also from 
their suppliers and customers, which is otherwise unavailable through the public channel 
because of being far away from the investments in the emerging markets where 
                                                          
18
 See Levich (1998). 
19
 See Damodaran (2010). 
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information asymmetry is stronger. Therefore, emerging market hedge funds with a 
presence in the investment region may outperform funds without such a presence.  
On the other hand, fund management companies in developed markets have 
access to better resources and expertise than those in proximity with their investments, 
which may allow them to overcome any informational disadvantage. Management 
companies located in distant, more developed markets are close to their business partners. 
This proximity facilitates the cultivation of close relationships with prime brokers and 
administrators. In addition, it is easier for the management companies located in 
developed countries to hire and retain top talent. Therefore, there is a trade-off between 
local informational advantage and resource advantage in the choice of the presence in the 
investment region. 
Table 12 shows that funds with their management companies in their investment 
region outperform other funds. The coefficient estimate on the investment region 
presence variable for all the emerging market hedge funds with their management 
companies in their investment region outperform other funds by 5.88% per year after 
adjusting for other fund characteristics. The effect is statistically significant at the 1% 
level (t-statistics = 7.82).  
The coefficient estimates on the investment region presence variable for regional 
funds are statistically and economically significant except for Eastern Europe funds. 
After adjusting for other fund characteristics, funds with their management companies in 
the investment regions of Asia, Latin America, and Global area outperform other funds 
by 5.4%, 9.48%, and 6.72% per year, respectively.  
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Since hedge funds claim to focus on raw returns, it is important to show that the 
results hold for raw returns as well. The coefficients reported in Panel B of Table 12 for 
the regressions on raw returns suggest that funds with presence in their investment region 
outperform other funds no matter one compares raw returns or risk-adjusted returns. 
 To further estimate the economic implication of the local informational 
advantage, we construct portfolios of funds based on fund investment region presence 
and compare their risk-adjusted performance. Specifically, we form an equally-weighted 
portfolio of funds with investment region presence (portfolio A) and an equally-weighted 
portfolio of funds without it (portfolio B). Then, we measure the performance of the 
spread between portfolios A and B relative to the 5-factor model. The alpha of the spread 
portfolio represents the value added to investors of investing in emerging market hedge 
funds with investment region presence and avoiding funds without it. The results are 
displayed in Table 13.  
From the results of all emerging market hedge funds in our sample, we find that 
the funds with investment region presence outperform the funds without investment 
region presence by 4.20% per year (t-statistic = 2.68). This suggests that shrewd 
emerging market hedge fund investors can benefit from the local informational advantage 
of funds with investment region presence. The investors of the funds with their 
geographical focus in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, or Global area would earn 
3.12%, 6.6%, 8.28%, and 5.52%, respectively, if the funds’ management companies are 
in the same regional emerging market countries than if they are not. The t-statistics for 
the spreads are 2.13, 2.12, 3.02, and 2.6, respectively. They are all statistically significant 
at least at the 5% significance level. Teo (2009) find a presence spread of 9.97% per year 
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for 43 Asian emerging market hedge funds. This spread is also significant at the 5% level 
(t-statistics is 2.02). Collectively, our results suggest that emerging market hedge funds 
with a presence in their investment regions enjoy a local informational advantage. 
 
2.3.2 The Size Effect 
The effect of fund size on performance is one of the debated issues in studies on 
hedge funds. On one hand, we can conjecture that small hedge funds, being more flexible 
to concentrate the capital under management on their best investment ideas, are more 
nimble to take advantage of the limited profitable opportunities. On the other hand, we 
can also argue that larger hedge funds may outperform smaller funds because of lower 
expense ratio and they are also less distracted by concerns over their financial well-being.  
We have seen in Panel A of Table 12 a positive relation between fund size and 
risk-adjusted returns for all emerging market hedge funds and for Eastern Europe and 
Global emerging market funds. The fund size in Table 12 is measured at the end of each 
month, contemporaneous with the measure of fund return.  
Berk and Green (2004) set up a model in which rational investors chase past 
performance but investor flows can adversely impact future fund performance. Therefore, 
in the next step we investigate whether an increasing asset base of emerging market 
hedge funds will dilute future performance. To do so, we first construct five quintile 
portfolios of emerging market hedge funds based on past month’s fund size and compare 
their risk-adjusted performance. Specifically, in each month from January 2000 to 
December 2010, we sorted all emerging market funds in the order of past month’s AUM  
and then assigned them into quintiles. As a result, Quintile 1 contains the smallest 20% of 
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the emerging market hedge funds and Quintile 5 contains the largest 20% of the funds. 
The number of emerging market hedge funds during any given month may or may not be 
perfectly divisible into five portfolios. The quintiles which get one extra fund than the 
others are selected randomly. Next, we calculate the equally-weighted portfolio monthly 
returns of each quintile. Every month, the five quintile portfolios are rebalanced and the 
return calculation process is repeated.  
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the size of emerging market hedge funds 
and their future performance. It presents the histograms of the 131 monthly risk-adjusted 
returns and raw returns for each of the 5 portfolios. The distribution of monthly risk-
adjusted returns in Panel A shows that more funds earn positive risk-adjusted returns in 
the top quintile than in the bottom quintile. Quintile 1 has more spread and has a longer 
left tail, while quintile 5 is more right skewed. Examining the distribution of raw returns 
of five portfolios in Panel B of Figure 3 leads us to the same conclusion. The portfolio in 
larger size performs better than the portfolio with smaller funds.  Our results are 
consistent with the findings of Liang (1999), Amenc and Martellini (2003), and Ibbotson 
and Chen (2006) who found that larger hedge funds outperform smaller ones.  
Some of previous literature found a concave relation between fund size and fund 
performance using fund of hedge funds or funds in different investment strategies 
(Ammamm and Moerth (2006), Getmansky (2012), Xiong et al. (2007)), while others 
found a largely convex relationship between fund size and future returns (Hedges (2003) 
and Teo (2007)). To further check whether the relationship between size and the risk-
adjusted performance of emerging market hedge funds, we again construct 20 portfolios 
of funds based on fund size following Getmansky (2012) since the number of quintile 
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portfolios are not sufficient to carry out the effective analysis. The process to form the 20 
portfolios is the same as that described in the construction of five portfolios except in 
each month the emerging market hedge funds are assigned into 20 portfolios rather than 
into 5 portfolios. Thus we have 131 monthly equal-weighted averages of fund size and 
risk-adjusted returns and raw returns for each of the 20 portfolios. We then calculate the 
averages of the 131 monthly size and performance for each portfolio. Figure 5 presents 
the average of monthly sizes and monthly risk adjusted-returns for the 20 size-based 
portfolios from January 2000 to December 2010. The points illustrate the relationship 
between fund size and average monthly returns. We attempt to fit a non-linear function to 
the data points. Using a polynomial curve with an order of smoothing function of two, we 
get the best-fit curve that is concave. The coefficient on the lagged asset size is positive 
and that of the square of lagged size is negative.  
The fitted curve peaks around the 70th percentile corresponding to Portfolio 13. 
According to the polynomial curve, the average monthly risk-adjusted return increases 
with assets under management to this point and then decreases with assets under 
management. Theoretically this point represents the optimal fund size which would 
provide the best risk-adjusted performance. From Figure 5, we can also see that for the 
first three portfolios which represents the smallest 15% of the funds, the curve is steep 
and the increase in asset under management is followed by rapid improve of 
performance. The largest 10% of funds suffer from apparent diseconomies of scales. The 
deterioration of performance of the funds between the 70
th
 percentile and 90
th
 percentile 
is gradual.  The averages of the monthly fund size in the smallest three portfolios are all 
below $10 million. It is suggested that a fund needs a critical mass of $10 million to $20 
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million to support its operating expenses. Most of the emerging market hedge funds are 
below the optimal size. They can still take advantage of economies of scale.  
The change in asset size is mainly driven by fund performance and investor flows. 
Hence, we explore the relationship between the two driving factors of the size of 
emerging market hedge funds in the next section. 
 
2.4 Fund Performance and Investor Flows 
Fund performance and investor flows interact with each other. The conclusions of 
previous literature on the relationship between the two are mixed. To explore the 
interactions between fund performance and investor flows, we first examine the impact of 
performance of emerging market hedge funds on investor flows. That is how the 
investors react to the realization of fund performance by infusing or withdrawing capital. 
Then, we investigate the effect of investor capital inflow on the fund’s future 
performance.  
 
2.4.1 Impact of Fund Performance on Investor Flows 
To examine the impact of fund performance on investor flows, following Fung, et 
al. (2008), we break the emerging market hedge funds into two categories: “Have-Alpha 
funds” and “Beta-Only funds.” The “have-alpha” funds are defined as the emerging 
market hedge funds whose alpha is positive and statistically significant. The critical 
values used to decide whether an alpha is statistically significant are generated through 
bootstrap experiment using the nonparametric procedure of Kosowski et al. (2006). The 
bootstrap helps us to relax the assumptions of independence, normality, and zero serial 
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correlation for the residuals from the factor regressions and enables us to find the correct 
critical values. We require all funds included in the bootstrap experiment should have 24-
month return history in the 2-year classification period. The number of funds that satisfy 
this requirement is reported in the first column of Table 14. The second and third 
columns of the table report the percentage of the total number of funds in the have-alpha 
and beta-only categories. 
From Table 14, first we see a steady increase in the number of funds selected in 
each of the 2-year period over time. This is a reflection both of the growth in the hedge 
fund industry and the increasing interest in investment in emerging markets. Second, on 
average across our sample period, more than four-fifths of the emerging market hedge 
funds are classified as beta-only funds, while a much smaller percentage of funds are 
classified as have-alpha funds. Another interesting feature to note is that the lowest 
percentage of total funds allocated to the have-alpha group happened in the classification 
periods of 2002 to 2003 and 2003 to 2004, but not in the periods of 2008 to 2009 or 2009 
to 2010 as we might have expected. The highest percentage appeared in the 2001 to 2002 
classification period with a percentage of 24%, which almost double that of the lowest 
level of 13% at the end of 2003 and 2004. The averages of fund risk-adjusted return for 
have-alpha funds and beta-only funds are shown in the fourth and fifth columns. 
Averages fund alpha in the 10 classification periods are all above 12% per year. This 
alpha level is high compared to the 0.6% of alpha for the portfolio comprising all our 
sample funds. This sharp difference results from the stringent requirement of funds being 
classified as have-alpha funds. Only the funds with positive and statistically significant 
alpha can be classified as have-alpha funds.  
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The last three columns of Table 14 report the equally-weighted average annual 
flows into have-alpha and beta-only funds in each year following their classification. On 
average, the have-alpha funds experience a statistically and economically significant 
inflow of 24% per annum in the year following the classification. While the capital 
inflow experienced by the beta-only funds is only 1%, which is significantly insignificant 
and negligible compared to the inflow experienced by the have-alpha. Table 14 shows 
that both have-alpha funds and beta-only funds experienced the highest inflows in 2004. 
The have-alpha funds experienced an average inflow of 90% of end-2003 AUM over the 
subsequent year, the average inflow is 38% for the beta-only funds. Moreover, the only 
years in which beta-only funds received significant net inflow are 2003 and 2004. In 
2008 and 2009, the years of the financial crisis, both the have-alpha group and beta-only 
group experienced net outflows, but the outflows of beta-only funds were much higher 
and statistically significant. The outflows from beta-only funds continued even in the 
year following the financial crisis, while have-funds funds experienced significantly 
investor inflows in 2010.
20
  
Figure 6 confirms this analysis. The figure displays the equally-weighted 
quarterly flows in each year for each group, created by scaling December 2001 to 100 
and multiplying this level by the compounded growth in out-of-sample. The figure shows 
that the have-alpha flow index reaches a level of 442 at the end of December 2010. In 
sharp contrast, the beta-only flow index drops to a level of 74. Figure 6 also shows that 
the two quarters that have-alpha funds receive the most of investor capital are the last 
quarter of 2004 and the first quarter of 2005. The cumulative quarterly flows for the 
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 The average hedge fund regained its high-water mark by October 2010, according to “AIMA’s Roadmap 
to Hedge Funds”, the 2012 Edition. 
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have-alpha group jump from an index level of 250 to 390 in these two quarters. Since the 
second quarter of 2005, the cumulative quarterly flows of the have-alpha group have been 
fluctuating around 400. The line for the cumulative quarterly flows of the beta-only group 
is relatively flat. The highest cumulative quarterly flows are only about 140, compared to 
a level of 471 at the peak of the line for the have-alpha group. Therefore, from Figure 6, 
we observe a sharp contrast between the capital inflows to the two groups of emerging 
market hedge funds.  
Both Table 14 and Figure 6 report investor flows using the average flows across 
funds. Next, we further explore the impact of fund performance on investor flows by 
regressing the flows of each fund in the year following classification on its previous 
classification in the univeriate approach and control for other fund characters in the 
multivariate regressions. Table 15 reports the results of regressions which further confirm 
that the funds’ performance classification helps explain investor flows. The coefficient 
from the regression of flows on the performance classification dummy alone is 0.24, with 
a t-statistics of 3.76. This reliable positive relation persists no matter what other 
explanatory variables are included in the regressions; the coefficients on the previous 
classification dummy are always more than 3.7 standard errors from 0. The explanatory 
powers of the fund characteristic variables are all statistically insignificant except the 
variable notice which is marginally significant. The coefficient of the variable presence is 
insignificant, but the negative sign of the coefficient is consistent with Teo (2009) who 
finds that distant funds are able to raise more capital.  
The results in Tables 14 and 15 as well as Figure 6 collectively confirm that better 
performed emerging market hedge funds experience greater investor flows. This is 
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consistent with the findings of Agarwal et al. (2004) and Getmansky (2012) that study all 
hedge funds and the findings of Xiong et al. (2007) and Fung, et al. (2008) that study 
funds of hedge funds. 
The previous results of the impact of risk-adjusted return on investor flows 
suggest that some investors can differentiate have-alpha funds from beta-only funds and 
invest more capital in the former. These investors are sophisticated investors. But how do 
those unsophisticated investors who cannot detect the presence of alpha choose to invest? 
The intuition is to put money into the funds that have earned high raw returns or to follow 
the trend. To address the question, we inspect the flow–performance relationship for each 
group using the following regression: 
 
 
 
 
We employ the Newey and West (1987) covariance matrix using four quarterly 
lags to account for any possible autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the residuals. 
The regression results are reported in Table 16 which shows that for the beta-only group, 
both of the coefficients of lagged quarterly returns and lagged quarterly flows are positive 
and statistically significant. For the beta-only funds, high (low) returns, high (low) flows 
over a quarter precede statistically significant increases (decreases) in capital flows in the 
subsequent quarter. The flows into beta-only funds show evidences of return-chasing 
and/or trend following behavior. However, this is not true for the flows into the have-
alpha funds. For the have-alpha funds, the coefficient on lagged quarter flows is 
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insignificant. The coefficient on lagged quarterly return is only marginally significant. 
This may be resulted from the correlation between raw return and alpha. These results are 
consistent with a scenario in which unsophisticated investors are attracted to beta-only 
funds by chasing returns and following flow trend while sophisticated investors such as 
smart high net worth individuals, pension funds, and university endowments
21
 who are 
able to detect the presence of alpha provide capital to have-alpha funds.  
 
2.4.2 Impact of Investor Flows on Future Fund Performance  
In the previous subsection, we found that an emerging market hedge fund with 
better performance attract more investor flows. It seems like it is beneficial to a fund if it 
can attract investors’ favor, but capacity constraint can be a major concern in the hedge 
fund industry. One issue closely related to the concern is that investor inflows would 
have an adverse effect on their future performance. To investigate whether investor 
inflows affect the ability of have-alpha funds to deliver alpha in the future, we examine 
the 2-year transition probabilities of have-alpha funds conditional on the inflows 
experienced in the final year of the classification period. Table 17 presents the results of 
this exercise.  
Over all our sample years, a have-alpha fund that experienced an above-median 
investor flows has a 25 percent probability of being classified as a have-alpha fund in the 
subsequent period (non-overlapping) if they still report to the databases. The result shows 
the lack of long term persistence in performance, at least in the 2-year period.  While for 
the below-median flow and have-alpha funds, there is a 21 percent probability of being 
classified as a have-alpha fund in the subsequent period. The results indicate that the 
                                                          
21
 See Cohen et al. (2001) and Froot and Ramadorai (2008). 
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probability of being classified as a have-alpha fund in the subsequent period is higher for 
an above-median flow and have-alpha fund than for below-median flow and have-alpha 
fund, even though these differences are not statistically significant.  
The last two columns of Table 18 present the future t-statistic of alpha and the 
future level of alpha conditional on the level of capital flows experienced by the have-
alpha funds.  As we can expect that for the have-alpha funds, average future alpha and 
future t-statistic of alpha are both below those of the classification period since most of 
the have-alpha funds are classified as beta-only funds in the subsequent period as shown 
in the third column.  Above-median-flow have-alpha funds exhibit an average alpha t-
statistic of 0.66, while for the below-median-flow have-alpha funds, the comparable 
number is only 0.38. Similarly, have-alpha funds experiencing high inflows appear to 
have higher future levels of alpha, but this difference is statistically insignificant.  
Panel B of Table 18 repeats the same analysis for the beta-only funds. Panel B 
reveals, akin to the results for the transition probabilities in Panel A, that the ability of 
above-median-flow beta-only funds to transition to the have-alpha group is higher than 
that of below-median-flow beta-only funds, even though the difference is statistically 
insignificant.  Finally, Panel B shows that the beta-only funds receiving above-median 
flows have higher level of alpha and t-statistic in the subsequent classification period than 
the funds experiencing below-median flows.   
Collectively, our findings indicate that investor flows have primarily been 
directed toward have-alpha funds. Even though the beneficiary effect of these inflows on 
the future risk-adjusted performance of the have-alpha funds is not consistently 
statistically significant, at least we can conclude that these inflows have had no 
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significant adverse effect on their risk-adjusted performance. Our findings contrast with 
those in Agarwal et al. (2004) and Fung, et al. (2007)   who find an adverse impact of 
greater inflows on the future performance of hedge funds or funds of hedge funds. The 
difference can be explained by the fact that many emerging market hedge funds are still 
relatively small and have not reached the optimal capacity yet. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we study emerging market hedge fund performance by looking at 
the sources of performance, the relationship between performance and investor flows as 
well as the relationship between performance and fund size. The data we employ is a 
combination from the TASS database and the Barclay hedge fund database covering the 
period from January 2000 to December 2010. 
The 5-factor model we employed to adjust for risk can account for about 95% of 
the variations in portfolio returns of the emerging market hedge funds. The emerging 
market factor among the five risk factors is identified through principal components 
analysis, which is the most important risk factor among all. We find that the presence of 
the management companies in their investment region is the most important fund 
characteristic that affect emerging market performance. The hedge funds with a presence 
in their investment region outperform others by 4.2 % per year. The local information 
advantage is significant for all major geographical regions. Indeed, it may be the single 
most important source of performance for Asian emerging market funds..  
We find that, on average, 18% of the emerging market hedge funds deliver 
positive and statistically significant alphas. We separate these alpha-producing funds 
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(have-alphas) with the remainder (beta-only), and explore the impact of performance on 
investor flows by analyzing the differences of flows between these two groups. We find 
that have-alpha funds experience greater capital inflows than beta-only funds. Capital 
flows into beta-only funds significantly respond to past returns and past flows. 
Furthermore, have-alpha funds that experience high capital inflows do not have higher 
probabilities of being classified as beta-only funds in the future. This finding is in 
contrast to the widely documented deteriorating effect that capital inflows into have-
alpha funds have on their future performance. This finding may indicate that the overall 
emerging market hedge funds can still benefit from economies of scale. Capacity 
constraint is not an issue for emerging market hedge funds, at least over our sample 
period.  
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A: Summary statistics year by year (2000–2010) 
Year 
Year 
End 
Total AUM 
(billions $) 
Equal-weighted hedge fund portfolio monthly returns (%) 
 Mean Median  Std. dev.  Minimum Maximum 
2000 167 6.78 -0.38 0.84 4.2 -5.77 5.52 
2001 189 8.97 1.22 2.58 4.13 -6.21 6.57 
2002 207 12.26 0.33 1.73 3.09 -4.6 4.28 
2003 211 22.54 2.97 3.17 2.13 0.09 6.13 
2004 253 36.9 1.32 2 2.3 -3.46 3.98 
2005 316 60.35 1.66 1.85 2.67 -2.95 5.45 
2006 358 74.98 1.88 1.99 2.78 -4.42 6.27 
2007 454 110.14 1.87 2.18 2.3 -2.38 5 
2008 542 60.08 -3.85 -4.07 5.31 -15.43 2.41 
2009 575 66.62 3.1 1.92 3.94 -2.32 11.32 
2010 515 73.02 1.03 0.71 2.89 -5.49 4.94 
 
Panel B: Cross-sectional statistics (Over sample period: 2000–2010) 
  N Mean Median Std.dev Minimum Maximum 
Average monthly return over 
the life of the fund (%) 
798 0.71 0.72 1.45 -12.43 6.82 
Average monthly AUM over 
the life of the fund(millions$) 
711 142.20 48.88 267.56 0.10 2,188.30 
Age of the fund(# of months 
in existence) 
798 87.29 73 47.3 13 326 
Management fee (%) 798 1.62 1.50 0.41 0 2.5 
Incentive fee (%) 798 17.71 20 5.59 0 30 
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Panel C: Time-series statistics (Over sample period: 2000–2010) 
  N Mean Median Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
MMSCIEM 132 0.65 1.06 2.8 -12.1 9.46 
MKTRF 132 0.06 0.9 5 -18.55 11.04 
SMB 132 0.53 0.24 3.9 -16.62 22.06 
TermSpread 132 0.47 0.69 2.94 -8.59 12.85 
CreditSpread 132 0.04 0.31 2.83 -10.56 9.58 
TFBD 132 -3.28 -6.51 13.88 -25.61 43.4 
TFFX 132 0.39 -3.52 18.53 -30.25 68.97 
TFCOM 132 -0.99 -3.31 13.73 -23.29 40.34 
The sample period is from January 2000–December 2010, Panel A reports the number of hedge funds, 
total assets under management (AUM) at the end of each year by all hedge funds (in billions$), and 
the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum monthly returns on the equal-
weighted hedge fund portfolio. Panel B reports the cross-sectional mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum, and maximum statistics for hedge fund characteristics including returns, size, age, 
management fee, and incentive fee. Panel C reports the time-series mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum, and maximum monthly returns of the 8 financial and macroeconomic risk factors. MMSCI 
is the emerging market factor which is the excess return on Morningstar MSCI index; MKTRF is the 
market factor which is the excess return on the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rate3; SMB is the size factor which is as in Fama 
and French (1993); Term spread is the excess return on Fama Treasury bond portfolio with maturities 
greater than ten years (as in Jagannathan et al. (2010)); Credit spread factor is the excess return on the 
Citi group corporate BBB 10+ year index minus TERM (as in Jagannathan et al. (2010)); TFBD, 
TFFX, and TFCOM are the excess returns on the portfolios of look back straddle options on bonds, 
currencies, and commodities, respectively (as in Fung and Hsieh(2001)).  
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Table 10. Explaining Emerging Market Hedge Fund Returns: A Principal Components Analysis 
      Principal components 
Investmen
t region 
 
Numbe
r of 
funds 
Return 
months 
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 
FT 10 428 0.52 0.02 0.32 0.1 0.04 0 0 0 0 
AT 105 4,119 0.77 0.01 0.06 0.12 0 0.01 0.03 0 0 
AB 102 5,970 0.83 0.01 0.03 0.09 0 0 0.04 0 0 
ET 51 2,964 0.74 0.16 0.08 0 0.01 0 0 0.01 0 
EB 64 4,010 0.78 0.15 0.06 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 
LT 48 1,807 0.55 0.27 0.1 0.03 0.05 0.01 0 0 0 
LB 25 1,558 0.75 0.01 0 0.1 0.14 0 0 0 0 
GT 208 10,437 0.94 0 0 0.01 0 0.04 0 0 0 
GB 189 12,539 0.97 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.01 
Percentage of the total variance 
explained (%) 
75.85 7.26 7.23 4.98 2.58 0.92 0.77 0.25 0.16 
 
R-squares from regressions of equity long/short hedge fund region portfolio returns on their principal 
components. The equal-weighted portfolio of the region returns is constructed for each region. FT is 
the portfolio returns of emerging market funds from TASS with the geographic investment focus in 
Africa; AB is the portfolio returns of emerging market funds from Barclayhedge with the geographic 
investment focus in Asia. AT, ET, LT, and GT represent the portfolio returns of emerging market 
funds from TASS with the geographic investment focus in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and 
Global area, respectively.  EB, LB, and GB represent the portfolio returns of emerging market funds 
from Barclay with the geographic investment focus in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Global area, 
respectively.  Principal components analysis is used to break the returns of the region portfolios into 
orthogonal principal components. The returns of each region portfolio are then regressed on each 
principal component, and the R-squares from the regressions recorded. PC1 denotes the top principal 
component; PC2 denotes the second principal component, etc. R-squares that are greater than or equal 
to 0.50 are in bold for convenience. The sample period is from January 2000 to December 2010. 
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Table 11. Explaining Emerging Market Hedge Fund Returns 
Panel A. All Emerging Market Hedge Funds 
Return 
(%/month) 
Alpha 
(%/month) MSCIEM MKTRF SMB 
Term 
Spread 
Credit 
Spread TFBD TFFX TFCOM EL1 EL2 ML1 ML2 
Adj. 
R
2
 
0.81 0.05 1.12 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.00 
       
0.95 
(2.48) (0.62) (25.92) (5.68) (0.53) (1.18) (0.08) 
        0.81 0.67 
 
0.5 0.05 0.18 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    
0.66 
(2.48) (3.26) 
 
(10.05) (0.97) (2.42) (3.61) (0.24) (0.00) (0.02) 
     0.81 0.04 1.12 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 
    
0.95 
(2.48) (0.52) (25.84) (5.67) (0.41) (1.17) (0.37) (0.02) (1.4) (-0.43) 
     0.81 0.07 1.11 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.95 
(2.48) (0.78) (23.76) (5.75) (0.45) (1.21) (0.24) (0.28) (1.11) (0.44) (0.32) (-0.94) (0.38) (1.03)   
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Panel B. Regional Emerging Market Hedge Funds 
Portfolio 
Return 
(%/month) 
Alpha 
(%/month) MSCIEM MKTRF SMB 
Term 
Spread 
Credit 
Spread TFBD TFFX TFCOM Adj. R
2
 
Asian 
Pacific 
0.70 0.01 1.17 0.14 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 
   
0.81 
(1.89) (0.04) (12.76) (2.84) (1.04) (-0.45) (-0.30) 
    0.70 0.01 1.17 0.15 0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.82 
(1.89) (0.04) (13.13) (3.01) (0.77) (-0.64) (0.47) (1.8) (1.35) (1.12) 
 
Eastern 
Europe 
1.75 0.38 2.05 0.12 -0.15 -0.01 -0.26 
   
0.74 
(3.10) (1.19) (12.47) (1.35) (-1.93) (-0.10) (-1.75) 
    1.75 0.38 2.06 0.12 -0.14 0.00 -0.29 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.74 
(3.10) (1.19) (12.49) (1.31) (-1.84) (0.02) (-1.89) (-1.05) (0.55) (-1.27) 
 
Latin 
America 
0.59 0.18 0.52 0.18 0.00 0.05 0.26 
   
0.65 
(2.05) (0.95) (5.29) (3.43) (0.10) (0.74) (2.93) 
    0.59 0.18 0.51 0.18 0.01 0.06 0.24 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.65 
(2.05) (0.95) (5.22) (3.36) (0.16) (0.80) (2.63) (-0.56) (-0.31) (-0.18) 
 
Global 
0.56 -0.09 0.91 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.05 
   
0.94 
(1.98) (-1.10) (21.96) (5.55) (2.34) (1.65) (1.22) 
    0.56 -0.09 0.91 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.93 
(1.98) (-1.10) (21.71) (5.49) (2.27) (1.59) (1.25) (-0.03) (0.52) (-0.28)   
 
The performance on emerging market hedge fund portfolio is estimated relative different combinations of risk factors.  MMSCI is the emerging 
market factor which is the excess return on Morningstar MSCI index; MKTRF is the market factor which is the excess return on the value-
weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rate; SMB is the size factor which is as in Fama 
and French (1993); Term spread is the excess return on Fama Treasury bond portfolio with maturities greater than ten years (as in Jagannathan et 
al. (2010)); Credit spread factor is the excess return on the Citi group corporate BBB 10+ year index minus TERM (as in Jagannathan et al. 
(2010)); TFBD, TFFX, and TFCOM are the excess returns on the portfolios of look back straddle options on bonds, currencies, and 
commodities, respectively (as in Fung and Hsieh(2001)). The sample period is from January 2000 to December 2010. 
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Table 12. Regressions of the Performance of Emerging Market Hedge Funds on Fund Characteristics 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Monthly Alpha 
 
Dependent Variable: Monthly Alpha 
Independent 
Variables 
All EM Funds Asian EM Funds 
Eastern Europe 
EM Funds 
Latin America 
EM Funds 
Global EM 
 Funds 
presence 0.49 *** 0.45 *** 0.57 
 
0.79 *** 0.56 *** 
 
(7.82) 
 
(3.85) 
 
(1.43) 
 
(4.08) 
 
(6.83) 
 mfee 0.10 
 
0.18 
 
-0.29 
 
0.02 
 
-0.10
 
 
(1.62) 
 
(0.94) 
 
(-1.24) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(-1.35)
 ifee -0.003 
 
0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.03 
 
0.00
 
 
(-0.7) 
 
(1.41) 
 
(-0.89) 
 
(-1.23) 
 
(0.08)
 min 0.01 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.03 
 
0.05*** 
 
(0.61) 
 
(-0.76) 
 
(-0.6) 
 
(-0.28) 
 
(2.63) 
 water 0.17 ** -0.09 
 
0.39 * -0.02 
 
0.09
 
 
(2.14) 
 
(-0.46) 
 
(1.65) 
 
(-0.04) 
 
(0.97)
 size 0.11 *** -0.02 
 
0.19 *** 0.11 
 
0.16*** 
 
(6.54) 
 
(-0.47) 
 
(3.05) 
 
(1.80) 
 
(8.44) 
 age -0.15 ** 0.01 
 
0.01 
 
-0.66 
 
-0.24*** 
 
(-2.01) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.02 ) (-1.75) 
 
(-3.23) 
 notice -0.16 * 0.07 
 
0.14 
 
-0.93 
 
-0.16* 
 
(-1.89) 
 
(0.41) 
 
(0.38) 
 
(-2.84) 
 
(-1.81) 
 lockup 0.20 *** -0.03 
 
0.18 
 
0.3 
 
0.02
 
 
(3.10) 
 
(-0.21) 
 
(0.79) 
 
(1.02) 
 
(0.26)
 theta0 0.46 *** -0.59 
 
1.57 * 1.25 
 
0.48** 
 
(2.52) 
 
(-1.06) 
 
(1.93) 
 
(1.18) 
 
(2.48) 
 year dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
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Panel B: Dependent Variable: Monthly Returns 
 
Dependent Variable: Monthly Return 
Independent 
Variables 
All EM Funds 
Asian EM 
Funds 
Eastern Europe 
EM Funds 
Latin America 
EM Funds 
Global  
EM Funds 
presence 0.47 *** 0.33 ** 1.28 ** 0.81 *** 0.53 *** 
 
(5.26) 
 
(2.11) 
 
(2.21) 
 
(3.53) 
 
(4.53) 
 mfee 0.26 *** 0.14 
 
-0.27 
 
0.5 
 
0.08
 
 
(2.85) 
 
(0.55) 
 
(-0.76) 
 
(1.49) 
 
(0.78)
 ifee -0.01 * 0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.05 * -0.01
 
 
(-1.69) 
 
(0.35) 
 
(-0.82) 
 
(-1.96) 
 
(-0.9)
 min -0.05 ** -0.04 
 
-0.13 
 
0.06 
 
0.01
 
 
(-2.01) 
 
(-0.73) 
 
(-0.96) 
 
(0.58) 
 
(0.4)
 water 0.12 
 
-0.16 
 
0.67* * 0.46 
 
0.02
 
 
(1.15) 
 
(-0.63) 
 
(1.91) 
 
(1.36) 
 
(0.19)
 size 0.14 *** 0.09 
 
0.38 *** 0.07 
 
0.15*** 
 
(6.24) 
 
(1.62) 
 
(4.33) 
 
(0.91) 
 
(5.79) 
 age -0.01 
 
-0.05 
 
0.25 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.04
 
 
(-0.15) 
 
(-0.31) 
 
(0.66 ) (-0.35) 
 
(-0.42)
 notice -0.16 
 
-0.22 
 
0.23 
 
0.28 
 
-0.11
 
 
(-1.54) 
 
(-1.03) 
 
(0.43) 
 
-0.73 
 
(-0.91)
 lockup 0.29 *** 0.14 
 
0.28 
 
-0.25 
 
0.03
 
 
(3.17) 
 
(0.60) 
 
(0.87) 
 
(-0.68) 
 
(0.28)
 theta0 0.55 ** -0.85 
 
3.06 *** -0.46 
 
0.47* 
 
(2.25) 
 
(-1.36) 
 
(2.98) 
 
(-0.59) 
 
(1.75) 
 year dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Pooled OLS regressions are estimated on the cross-section of hedge fund performance. The dependent 
variable is monthly return or monthly alpha measured relative to the 5-risk factor model. The five risk 
factors are: Emerging market factor MMSCI which is the excess return on Morningstar MSCI index; 
market factor MKTRF which is the excess return on the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, 
and NASDAQ stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rate; size factor SMB which is as in Fama 
and French (1993); Term spread is the excess return on Fama Treasury bond portfolio with maturities 
greater than ten years (as in Jagannathan et al. (2010)); Credit spread factor is the excess return on the 
Citi group corporate BBB 10+ year index minus TERM (as in Jagannathan et al. (2010)). The 
independent variables are hedge fund characteristics. Presence denotes investment region presence 
which is an indicator variable that equals 1 when the fund has a physical presence (management 
company) in the geographical region it invests in and equals 0 otherwise; mfee represents 
management fee; ifee is performance fee; min is minimum investment; water is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 when there is a high-water mark provision for charging incentive fee; size represents fund 
size which is the logarithm of fund asset under management; age is defined as the number of months 
between a fund’s performance date and its inception date; the variable notice denotes the fund’s 
redemption notice period (in days); lockup is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the period (in 
months) over which investors cannot withdraw their investment is greater than 0. Theta0 denotes fund 
asset liquidity which is measured using the equation developed in Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov 
(2004). The t-statistics are in parentheses. The sample period is from January 2000 to December 2010. 
*Significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level. ***significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 13. Portfolios Based on the Investment Region Presence of Emerging Market Hedge Funds 
Variable Alpha 
t statistic 
of Alpha MMSCIEM MKTRF SMB 
TERM 
SPREAD 
CREDIT 
SPREAD 
Adj. 
R
2
 
 
All EM Funds 
Portfolio A 0.31 2.35 1.00 0.16 -0.01 0.01 0.09 0.95 
Portfolio B  -0.03 -0.42 1.12 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.86 
Spread (A-B) 0.35 2.68 -0.12 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.09 0.01 
 
Asian EM Funds 
Portfolio A 0.10 0.52 1.10 0.11 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.75 
Portfolio B  -0.16 -0.96 1.22 0.17 0.08 -0.03 -0.01 0.82 
Spread (A-B) 0.26 2.13 -0.12 -0.07 -0.10 -0.01 -0.03 0.23 
 
Eastern Europe EM Funds 
Portfolio A  0.56 1.22 2.66 -0.12 0.07 -0.13 -0.43 0.68 
Portfolio B  0.00 0.01 2.15 0.06 0.08 -0.02 -0.36 0.82 
Spread (A-B) 0.55 2.12 0.51 -0.18 -0.01 -0.11 -0.07 0.07 
 
Latin America EM Funds 
Portfolio A  0.84 3.67 1.05 0.07 -0.14 -0.01 0.22 0.81 
Portfolio B  0.16 1.01 0.47 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.74 
Spread (A-B) 0.69 3.02 0.57 0.00 -0.16 -0.03 0.10 0.54 
 
Global EM Funds 
Portfolio A  0.32 1.73 0.78 0.22 0.02 0.05 0.19 0.74 
Portfolio B  -0.15 -2.01 0.90 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.94 
Spread (A-B) 0.46 2.60 -0.12 0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.16 0.06 
 
 
Emerging market hedge funds are sorted based on whether they have a presence in the geographical 
region they invest in. Portfolio A is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds with investment region 
presence. Portfolio B is the equal-weighted portfolio of funds without investment region presence. 
Alpha is estimated relative to a 5-factor model. The five risk factors are: Emerging market factor 
MMSCI which is the excess return on Morningstar MSCI index; market factor MKTRF which is the 
excess return on the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks minus the one-
month Treasury bill rate; size factor SMB which is as in Fama and French (1993); Term spread is the 
excess return on Fama Treasury bond portfolio with maturities greater than ten years (as in 
Jagannathan et al. (2010)); Credit spread factor is the excess return on the Citi group corporate BBB 
10+ year index minus TERM (as in Jagannathan et al. (2010)). The sample period is from January 
2000 to December 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
Table 14. Investor Flows into Have-Alpha and Beta-Only Emerging Market Hedge Funds 
    Proportion  Alpha                   Fund Flows (t+1) 
Classification 
period 
# of 
Funds 
Have-
Alpha 
Beta-
Only 
Have-
Alpha 
Beta-
Only 
Have-Alpha Beta-Only 
Stat. 
Sig. 
Diff.? 
2000-2001 131 0.19 0.81 1.77 -0.38 0.58 *** -0.03 
  
*** 
2001-2002 144 0.24 0.76 1.81 -0.6 0.75 * 0.22 ** 
 
 
2002-2003 163 0.13 0.87 1.35 -0.29 0.9 ** 0.38 ** 
 
 
2003-2004 179 0.13 0.87 1.16 -0.35 0.32 ** 0.06 
  
* 
2004-2005 197 0.15 0.85 1.06 -0.33 0.02 
 
0.05 
  
 
2005-2006 228 0.2 0.8 1.3 -0.12 0.18 ** 0.1 
  
 
2006-2007 276 0.2 0.8 1.62 -0.09 -0.03 
 
-0.2 *** 
 
*** 
2007-2008 286 0.21 0.79 1.3 0.07 -0.08 
 
-0.2 *** 
 
* 
2008-2009 372 0.19 0.81 1.37 -0.32 0.27 ** -0.05 * 
 
*** 
2009-2010 446 0.16 0.84 1.34 -0.37 
      Overall 242 0.18 0.82 1.4 -0.26 0.24 *** 0.01     *** 
 
The first column is the classification period; the second column is the total number of funds with 2 full 
years of return history in each of the classification periods; the third and fourth columns are the 
percentage of the total classified as have-alpha funds and as beta-only funds, respectively; The fifth 
and sixth columns are average alpha for have-alpha funds and beta-only funds, respectively. The 
seventh and eighth columns are average annual flows for the subsequent year across all funds in the 
have-alpha fund group and beta-only fund group, respectively. The final column reports the results 
from a hypothesis test that the have-alpha and beta-only flows are the same for each time period 
denoted in rows. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **∗, and *, 
respectively. 
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Table 15. Regression on the Annual Investor Flows Subsequent to the Classification Period 
  pgroup mfee ifee min water notice lockup presence theta0 
Model 1 
0.240 *** 
         (3.76) 
 
         
Model 2 
0.246 *** 0.066 -0.01 0.016 0.043 -0.001 * 0.050 0.049 
 (3.78) 
 
(0.88) (-1.05) (0.99) (0.91) (-1.96) 
 
(0.62) 
  
Model 3 
0.265 *** 0.079 -0.01 0.018 0.051 -0.001 * 0.048 -0.029 0.365 
(4.02)   (1.15) (-1.12) (1.06) (1.03) (-1.95)   (0.60) (-0.52) (0.90) 
 
The dependent variable is annual investor flow of a fund in the year subsequent to the classification 
period. The independent variable pgroup is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the fund is classified 
as a have-alpha fund in the previous classification period, and equals 0 if the fund is classified as a 
beta-only fund;  mfee represents management fee; ifee is performance fee; min is minimum 
investment; water is an indicator variable equal to 1 when there is a high-water mark provision for 
charging incentive fee;  the variable notice denotes the fund’s redemption notice period (in days); 
lockup is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the period (in months) over which investors cannot 
withdraw their investment is greater than 0; presence denotes investment region presence which is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 when the fund has a physical presence (management company) in the 
geographical region it invests in and equals 0 otherwise; theta0 denotes fund asset liquidity which is 
measured using the equation developed in Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004). The t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **∗, and *, 
respectively. 
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Table 16. Return Chasing and Trend Following in Have-Alpha and Beta-Only Funds 
 
  Have-Alpha Flows Beta-Only Flows 
Intercept 0.017 -0.007 
 
(1.09) (-0.70) 
Ret (L1) 0.457* 0.276** 
 
(2.03) (2.36) 
Flow (L1) 0.248 0.342** 
 
(0.98) (2.66) 
Number of Quarters 36 36 
 
The quarterly investor flow is regressed on lagged quarterly flows and lagged quarterly returns. The 
column headings indicate the subgroup (have-alpha or beta-only) for which the regression equation is 
estimated. The Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
presented below the coefficients, estimated using four quarterly lags. *Significant at the 10% level; 
**significant at the 5% level. ***significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 17. Transition Probabilities and Measures of Alpha for Above- and Below-Median Flows into 
Have-Alpha Funds or Beta-Only Funds 
 
Panel A. Have-Alpha Funds 
 
   
P (2-year Transition) Measures of Alpha 
Classification 
period 
Flow         
Group 
Number 
of Funds 
Have-
Alpha 
Beta-
Only 
Stop 
Reporting 
Level of 
Alpha 
t-statistic 
of Alpha 
2000-2001 Above median 10 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.12 0.59 
 
Below median 11 0.20 0.80 0.09 0.38 0.83 
2001-2002 Above median 15 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.62 1.19 
 
Below median 15 0.18 0.82 0.27 0.03 0.02 
2002-2003 Above median 14 0.78 0.22 0.00 0.71 2.37 
 
Below median 15 0.57 0.43 0.30 0.24 1.48 
2003-2004 Above median 10 0.44 0.56 0.10 0.35 1.27 
 
Below median 11 0.50 0.50 0.27 0.27 1.28 
2004-2005 Above median 14 0.08 0.92 0.07 0.16 0.36 
 
Below median 15 0.50 0.50 0.33 -0.08 0.82 
2005-2006 Above median 21 0.21 0.79 0.10 0.32 0.62 
 
Below median 22 0.05 0.95 0.14 -0.04 0.06 
2006-2007 Above median 25 0.19 0.81 0.08 -0.38 -0.13 
 
Below median 25 0.10 0.90 0.16 0.24 0.35 
2007-2008 Above median 27 0.21 0.79 0.27 -0.11 0.30 
 
Below median 27 0.10 0.90 0.22 -0.04 -0.30 
Overall Above median 164 0.25 0.75 0.11 0.16 0.66 
  Below median 170 0.21 0.79 0.22 0.10 0.38 
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Panel B. Beta-Only Funds 
   
P (2-year Transition) Measures of Alpha 
Classification 
period 
Flow           
Group 
Number 
of Funds 
Have-
Alpha 
Beta-
Only 
Stop 
Reporting 
Level of 
Alpha 
t-statistic 
of Alpha 
2000-2001 Above median 41 0.10 0.90 0.27 -0.27 -0.24 
 
Below median 42 0.00 1.00 0.21 -0.17 -0.36 
2001-2002 Above median 46 0.08 0.92 0.15 -0.24 -0.09 
 
Below median 46 0.03 0.97 0.24 -0.28 -0.25 
2002-2003 Above median 57 0.00 1.00 0.05 -0.41 -0.75 
 
Below median 58 0.14 0.86 0.12 0.02 0.11 
2003-2004 Above median 66 0.17 0.83 0.12 0.12 0.03 
 
Below median 67 0.20 0.80 0.18 0.08 0.04 
2004-2005 Above median 70 0.22 0.78 0.16 0.40 0.36 
 
Below median 70 0.08 0.92 0.27 -0.06 -0.17 
2005-2006 Above median 75 0.18 0.82 0.20 0.32 0.51 
 
Below median 76 0.16 0.84 0.43 0.19 0.23 
2006-2007 Above median 94 0.23 0.77 0.22 0.14 0.20 
 
Below median 94 0.19 0.81 0.39 0.32 0.30 
2007-2008 Above median 94 0.25 0.75 0.16 0.10 0.38 
 
Below median 95 0.19 0.81 0.23 -0.19 0.02 
Overall Above median 543 0.17 0.83 0.17 0.06 0.10 
  Below median 548 0.14 0.86 0.27 0.00 0.02 
 
The rows correspond to the 2-year period in which funds are classified as have-alpha funds. The 
columns are: The group affiliation, that is, whether the average fund classified as a have-alpha 
experienced inflows (in the second year of the classification period) that were above or below the 
median have-alpha inflow in that year; the number of have-alpha funds in each group; the percentage 
of the flow group members classified as have-alpha funds in the subsequent classification period; the 
percentage of the flow group members classified as beta-only funds; the percentage of stopped 
reporting funds; the annual average magnitude of alpha for the survived funds in the subsequent 
classification period; and the average t-statistic of alpha for the survived funds in the subsequent 
classification period. Panel A is for have-alpha funds and Panel B is for beta-only funds. 
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Figure 3. The Assets of Emerging Market Hedge Funds 
Panel A. The Assets of Emerging Market Hedge Funds by Geographic Focus 
 
  Number of Funds 
Assets under Management 
(AUM, US$ billion) 
  Jan-00 Dec-10 Jan-00 Dec-10 
All EM Funds 294 964 11.06 95.90 
Asian EM Funds 38 253 2.21 18.14 
Eastern European EM Funds 45 122 0.65 13.68 
Latin American EM Funds 23 91 1.05 7.49 
Global EM  156 422 6.67 54.12 
African EM Funds 3 14 0.01 0.06 
Other EM Funds 29 69 0.47 2.45 
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Panel B. The Assets of USD Denominated Emerging Market Hedge Funds by Geographic Focus 
 
  Number of Funds 
Assets under Management 
(AUM, US$ billion) 
  Jan-00 Dec-10 Jan-00 Dec-10 
All EM Funds 239 720 10.93 85.46 
Asian EM Funds 30 206 2.21 16.28 
Eastern European EM Funds 37 91 0.60 11.40 
Latin American EM Funds 19 81 1.05 6.57 
Global EM  127 299 6.65 49.87 
African EM Funds 2 4 0.01 0.06 
Other EM Funds 24 42 0.40 1.32 
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Figure 4. Distribution of Monthly Equal-Weighted Alphas and Raw Returns 
Panel A: Distribution of Monthly Equal-Weighted Alphas 
 
Panel B. Distribution of Monthly Equal-Weighted Raw Returns 
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Emerging market hedge funds are sorted based on their size in each month. In each month from 
January 2000 to December 2010, all of the emerging market hedge funds are sorted by asset size and 
then assigned them into quintiles. Alpha is estimated relative to a 5-factor model. The five risk factors 
are: Emerging market factor MMSCI which is the excess return on Morningstar MSCI index; market 
factor MKTRF which is the excess return on the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rate; size factor SMB which is as in Fama and 
French (1993); Term spread is the excess return on Fama Treasury bond portfolio with maturities 
greater than ten years (as in Jagannathan et al. (2010)); Credit spread factor is the excess return on the 
Citi group corporate BBB 10+ year index minus TERM (as in Jagannathan et al. (2010)).  
 
 
Figure 5. Average Risk-Adjusted Returns in Size Percentile  
 
Hedge funds are sorted based on their size in each month. In each month from January 2000 to 
December 2010, all the emerging market hedge funds are sorted in order of asset size and then 
assigned into 20 bins. PAlphat is the equal weighted averages of fund risk-adjusted returns in month t. 
Psizet-1 is the equal weighted averages of fund size in month t-1. The diamond in the graph represents 
the mean of monthly equal-weighted averages of risk-adjusted returns for the funds in each bin. Alpha 
is estimated relative to a 5-factor model. The five risk factors are: Emerging market factor MMSCI 
which is the excess return on Morningstar MSCI index; market factor MKTRF which is the excess 
return on the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks minus the one-month 
Treasury bill rate; size factor SMB which is as in Fama and French (1993); Term spread is the excess 
return on Fama Treasury bond portfolio with maturities greater than ten years (as in Jagannathan et al. 
(2010)); Credit spread factor is the excess return on the Citi group corporate BBB 10+ year index 
minus TERM (as in Jagannathan et al. (2010)).  
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Figure 6. Cumulative Flows for Have-alpha and Beta-only Funds 
 
The X-axis shows the quarters for which the flow index is plotted on the Y-axis. The index begins at a 
value of 100 in December 2001 and successive values are given by 1 *(1 )gq gq gqIndex Index F  where 
Fgq is the flow percentage for group g (g is have-alpha or beta-only) for quarter q. 
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ESSAY 3 
HEDGE FUND RETURNS: BELIEVE IT OR NOT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In contrast to a regulated mutual fund or exchange-traded fund, hedge funds are lightly 
regulated financial institutions that are generally not required to report information about 
their characteristics, strategies, and performance to regulatory authorities or databases.
22
 
Hedge funds are protective of their trading positions and models because they regard 
revealing these information would be precarious both to the funds and the investors. As a 
result, hedge funds are among the least transparent market participants, even though some 
hedge funds choose to voluntarily report to a commercial database as a cheap way to 
reach the potential investor groups. One important piece of information that is self-
reported by thousands of hedge funds to one or more commercial databases is their 
monthly performance. However, the substantial discretion hedge fund managers have in 
reporting performance concerns the regulators, academics, investors, and the media. Due 
to the light regulatory environment where hedge funds operate in and their secretive 
nature, there is long-standing disbelief of hedge fund performance disclosure to the 
public due to the voluntary reporting nature. 
In this paper, we investigate the dynamics in the performance report of hedge 
funds and try to shed light on the determinants of return revisions. We track changes to 
the statements of historical performance of about 9,500 hedge funds recorded in publicly 
available databases (TASS), at different points in time between 2002 and 2013. We find 
                                                          
22
 New regulations introduced in the US and the EU as of 2010 require hedge fund managers to report more 
information, leading to greater transparency. 
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that as many as two-thirds of hedge funds (over 6,500 individual funds) have revised 
their previously reported performance, with more than two-fifths of funds later changing 
a previous monthly return by at least 0.5%. On average, more than one-fifth of monthly 
returns were revised after being first reported. Positive revisions are more common.  
We find that the uneven distribution of revisions to the returns in 12 calendar 
months occurred in the early half of our sample period. We also find that the average 
number of revisions to increase the returns of December is significantly larger than that to 
decrease the returns of December. This finding may provide an alternative explanation 
for the December spike detected in the literature on hedge fund misreporting. 
We find an obvious decreasing time trend in both the number and proportion of 
return revisions, even after adjusting for performance report recency. The declining trend 
is accompanied by the strengthening of hedge fund governance. We find that revisions 
are more common among larger funds with stronger governance, higher incentive fee, 
and better past performance. At the micro-level, the returns are more likely to be revised 
for older funds with stronger governance and managers’ co-investment in funds prior to 
the return being first reported, while the return revisions tend to occur in the next month 
when a fund with higher governance score has better past performance. Return revisions 
also tend to happen when a fund have stronger governance and become more liquid and 
more volatile compared to the fund in the month when the return was first reported. 
These drivers of return revisions are significant no matter the revisions are to increase or 
decrease the previously reported returns. Therefore, we find a strong connection between 
return revisions and desirable fund characteristics at the overall fund level, the individual 
fund level, and the individual revision level. The comparisons between the hedge funds 
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that have revised their returns with those that have not show that revised funds 
outperform the unrevised funds no matter the comparisons are at fund level or at revision 
level.  
Our paper contributes to the growing body of literature on the reliability of self-
reported hedge fund returns. The fact that hedge fund managers voluntarily report returns 
to hedge fund databases means that they are able to choose if and when to start reporting, 
and when to stop reporting. This leads to potential biases not seen in traditional databases. 
Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999), Fung and Hsieh (2000), Fung and Hsieh 
(2009) and Liang (2000) provide an overview of these biases such as survivorship, self-
selection, and backfill biases. 
Self-reporting also leads to the possibility of using different models to value 
assets, as well as the possibility of return smoothing. Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) 
document high serial correlation in reported hedge fund returns relative to other financial 
asset returns, and consider various reasons such as underlying asset illiquidity to explain 
this pattern. Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001) argue that the presence of serial correlation 
leads reported returns to appear less risky and less correlated with other assets than they 
truly are, thus providing an incentive for hedge fund managers to intentionally smooth 
their reported returns. Cassar and Gerakos (2011) match due diligence reports with 
smoothing measures, and find that smoother returns are associated with managers who 
have greater discretion in sourcing the prices used to value the fund’s investment 
positions.  
Bollen and Pool (2008) extend Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) to consider 
autocorrelation patterns that change with the sign of the return on the fund. They find 
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evidence that hedge fund managers have a greater incentive to smooth losses than gains. 
This finding is reinforced using a different approach in Bollen and Pool (2009), who 
document that the amount of small gains far exceeds that of small losses. They show that 
these discontinuities are a result of deliberate return misreporting. Jylha (2011) extends 
Bollen and Pool (2009) on misreporting by conditioning the search for pooled 
distribution discontinuities on various fund attributes. In a recent study, Bollen and Pool 
(2012) propose a variety of flags for potential fraudulent activity based just on reported 
returns, and link these to an indicator for whether the fund has been charged with legal or 
regulatory violations. 
In addition to Bollen and Pool (2009), Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2011), Cici, 
Kempf, and Puetz (2011), Patton and Ramadorai (2013), and Patton, Ramadorai, and 
Streatfield (2013) provide evidence of return misreporting in hedge funds. Agarwal, 
Daniel, and Naik (2011) find that hedge fund returns in December are suspiciously higher 
than during the rest of the year. They conclude that this December spike is evidence of 
return management and link it to the managerial incentives induced by performance 
based compensation. They find strong evidence that funds inflate December returns by 
underreporting returns earlier in the year but only weak evidence that funds borrow from 
January returns in the following year. At higher frequencies, Patton and Ramadorai (2013) 
find that the estimated hedge fund risk exposures appear to be the highest at the 
beginning of the month, and lowest just prior to the end of month reporting periods. Cici, 
Kempf, and Puetz (2011) provide more direct evidence on misreporting by showing that 
hedge funds systematically mis-value their stock positions. Finally, Patton, Ramadorai, 
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and Streatfield (2013) find that hedge funds rewrite history by restating reported returns 
in some systematic ways. 
However, disagreeing with Bollen and Pool (2009) who infer misreporting based 
on a kink at zero, Jorion and Schwarz (2013) provide plausible non-manipulation 
explanations for the observed discontinuities in the distributions of the net returns of 
hedge funds. These include the effect of the incentive fee accrual process, the boundary at 
zero for fixed income yields, and the impact of asset illiquidity. In particular, they show 
that incentive fees can mechanistically create a kink in the net return distribution and 
conclude that the observed hedge fund return discontinuities are not direct proof of 
manipulation. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and provides 
summary statistics for all hedge funds in our sample and the summary statistics for return 
revisions. Section 3 presents the calendar distribution and time trend of return revisions. 
Section 4 examines the determinants of return revisions at the overall fund level, the 
individual fund level, and the individual revision level. Section 4 also examines the 
determinants of revision direction and revision magnitude. Section 5 presents the impact 
of return revisions on future performance of hedge funds. Section 6 presents robustness 
checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Data  
We obtain data from Lipper TASS (hereafter TASS). The main database consists 
of historical returns, asset under management (AUM), and fund characteristics such as 
the inception date, redemption frequency and lockup period, management fee, incentive 
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fee, high-water mark provision, personal capital investment, leverage, and the date of last 
audit.   
The TASS data has been widely used in a large number of hedge fund studies. To 
the best of knowledge, we are the first to compile monthly downloaded data and use these 
return data over a twelve-year period from 2002 to 2013. The TASS data which we use 
are proprietary and track changes in reported returns by funds at a monthly level. The 
sample of our study includes the hedge funds in the snapshots of TASS datasets 
downloaded each month over the period from February 2002 to January 2014 except for 
three months (September 2002, December 2006, and August 2007). Altogether, we have 
219 monthly snapshots of TASS data sets because for some months we have more than 
one snapshot. These monthly snapshots allow us to identify not only changes in returns 
since the previously updated version, but also other characteristics at various points in 
time and the entire history of returns for each fund that experiences these reported return 
changes. Not every hedge fund updates their information in TASS on the same date of 
each month, and the snapshots were not downloaded on the same date of the month either. 
We define each return data Ri,t,s in our overall dataset by three dimensions: fund i, return 
month t, and return reported month s, where return month t is set to be the Date in the file 
of ProductPerformance and return reported month s is set to be the PerformanceEndDate 
in the file of ProductDetails of TASS.  We compare the returns for each fund and each 
return month reported in consecutive months to locate the revisions in returns. We track 
changes to return of each month for all hedge funds. For the months when a fund’s 
information is not updated, we simply compare the returns for all the previous months for 
each fund reported at later time with those reported in the latest point in time. Therefore, 
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the return revisions is defined as 
, , , , , , -1-i t s i t s i t sRV R R . If , , 0i t sRV   there is a return revision to 
the return of month t for fund i. The return reported month s is also called revision month 
if 
, , 0i t sRV  . If , , 0i t sRV  , the revision is to increase the initially reported return; If , , 0i t sRV  , 
the revision is to decrease the initially reported return. 
We apply some standard filters to the data. Only funds that provide monthly net 
of fee returns and denominated in US dollars are retained. To minimize backfill bias, we 
drop the first 12 months’ returns for each fund. We remove the returns with extremely 
large or small numbers to eliminate a possible source of error (truncating between 
monthly return limits of -90%, and +200%). In addition, we remove the observations that 
are for the months prior to January 2002. In the end, 9,494 funds survived our data 
cleaning process and remained in our sample.  
 
3.2.1  Summary Statistics of All Hedge Funds 
Table 18 provides the summary statistics of the 9,494 hedge funds on the number 
of funds, returns, assets under management (AUM), age, and fee structure. Panel A and 
Panel B report, for each year from 2002 to 2013, the number of hedge funds and the 
mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum monthly returns on an 
equally-weighted portfolio of hedge funds. The summary statistics in Panels A and B are 
calculated using the first reported returns and last reported returns, respectively. 
From Panel A we observe a steady increase in the number of hedge funds from 
2000 to 2007. This is a reflection on the growth in the hedge fund industry and the 
increasing attraction of hedge funds to the investment community. But in 2008, the 
number of hedge funds decreased and this drop coincides with the financial crisis. In fact, 
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during the financial crisis not only the number of hedge funds reported to TASS 
decreased, but the average monthly return also plummeted in 2008. The equally-weighted 
portfolio return calculated using the first reported returns in each year shows that the 
worst return appeared in 2008 with an average of -1.64% per month. In 10 out of the 12 
sample years, the average monthly return is positive with 4 years in the proximity of 1% 
or above.  
The summary statistics of monthly returns on an equally-weighted portfolio of 
hedge funds reported in Panel B are calculated between January 2002 and December 
2013, but these numbers are the last reported returns in all our snapshots. We can see that 
the statistics for returns in Panel A are quite close to those in Panel B. In 8 out of the 12 
years, the average monthly returns calculated using the last reported values are slightly 
higher than those calculated using the originally reported returns. This may indicate that 
the average revision magnitude of monthly return was to increase the originally reported 
return. 
Panel C reports the cross-sectional mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, 
and maximum statistics for the 9,494 hedge fund characteristics including returns, size, 
age, management fee, and incentive fee. For the sample period, the best (worst) 
performed fund experienced an average monthly return of 17.4% (-22.09%) over its life, 
based on the last reported returns. The mean (median) of the average monthly returns of 
all hedge funds is only 0.33% (0.4). From Table 18 we can also observe the large size 
variation among all funds, where size is measured as the average monthly AUM over the 
life of the fund. Based on our data, the mean (median) size is only $149.04 million 
($38.09 million). This shows the existence of very few emerging market hedge funds 
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with very large assets under management in the hedge fund industry. The largest fund in 
our sample is more than 400 times the size of the median-sized fund. Interestingly, the 
average (median) fund age (number of months in existence since inception) is only 80.6 
(66) months. The short life span may partly be explained by the existence of a high-water 
mark provision. The manager of a hedge fund with high-water mark provision may 
choose to close his/her fund when the recent fund performance is poor or the current 
superior performance is unlikely to continue in a foreseeable future. The mean (median) 
management fee is 1.45% (1.5%) in our sample with a maximum of 22% for a few hedge 
funds. The mean (median) incentive fee is 15.1% (20%) in our sample, and goes up as 
high as 50% for a few hedge funds.  
 
3.2.2 Summary Statistics of Return Revisions 
Table 19 shows the summary statistics of return revisions occurred during our 
sample period. Panel A shows that out of the 9,494 funds in our sample, less than one-
third (2,927 funds) have never changed their originally reported returns in the month after 
the returns were first reported to TASS. About one-tenth (1,059 funds) had one return 
revision. About one-fourth (2,439 funds) had 3 to 13 revisions. One-tenth of funds had 
more than 38 return revisions. The fund with most revisions made changes to its 
previously reported returns by 398 times!  
Panel B reports summary statistics on the size of revisions observed in our 
sample. We observe that 43.7% (4,145 funds) of funds revise their returns at least once 
by 50 basis points or more, and 33% of funds revise at least once by 1 percent or more. If 
we only count the revisions happened more than 3 months after they were first reported, 
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14.6% of funds revise at least once by at least 1 percent.  Panel C reveals that altogether 
we have observed 119,017 return revisions during our sample period. The mean absolute 
revision is 64.5 basis points. To provide an appropriate comparison, the mean monthly 
return across hedge funds, as reported in Table 18, is approximately only half of the mean 
absolute monthly revision. Therefore, the revisions that we have detected are substantial. 
The total number of positive revisions is larger than that of negative revisions, which 
means, on average, more revisions were to increase the previously reported returns.  
Panel D further shows that the average number of monthly revisions in the direction of 
increase is significantly higher than that of decrease. The difference is more dramatic in 
the early half of our sample period.  This explains why the average monthly returns in 
most of the years are higher when calculated using the last reported returns than using the 
initially provided returns. The larger number of positive revisions indicates that the 
conjecture of overstating returns in the literature of hedge fund misreporting is not 
confirmed by the large number of negative revisions, if the overstating really exists.   
Panel E of Table 19 reports the “recency” of revisions which is defined as the 
number of months k between the month in which a revision was detected and the month 
of the return. For example, if the return for the month of January 2005 was revised in the 
report month July 2005, then this revision recency would be 6 months. Each of the 
columns of Panel D shows the proportion of revising funds remaining once we exclude 
revisions near the report month. For example, for k > 3, we ignore revisions of returns 
that occurred within three months of the return. As we increase k, the proportion of funds 
that are lagged as having revised their returns declines, from 56% in total revised funds 
when we ignore the revision in three months down to 16% when we ignore any revision 
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within a 24 months of the return month. Based on revisions, 34.5% of revisions occurred 
more than 3 months after they are originally reported and about 13% of revisions 
occurred more than 2 years after they are originally reported.  
Panel F reports the status of the returns for the revisions before and after the 
changes. Among all the revisions, 39% of the revisions which occurred within 3 months 
of the returns and the numbers were changed from “estimated” to “actual” returns. Or 
about 60% of revisions which happened in 3 months of the returns were made because 
managers could figure out the actual returns to replace the previously estimated returns 
which were inaccurate.  Therefore, most of the revisions within 3 months of the return 
month may be motivated by correcting a return report. Our study for the motivation of 
revising returns thus focuses on the revisions occurred more than 3 months after the 
return month. 
Panel G shows return revisions defined by the fund and return month in each 
investment style as the percentage of the number of return month of all the funds in each 
style and as the percentage of all the revisions. 23.56% of returns of fixed income 
arbitrage funds were revised after originally reported. This is the highest percentage 
among all the 12 categories, while the smallest percentage is from the multi-strategy 
category, which is only 13.86%. Fixed income arbitrage is one of the most illiquid hedge 
fund categories. It is surprising that 22.74% of the fund returns in managed futures 
category were revised even though this style is among the most liquid. This tells us that 
illiquidity may be one of the factors that affect return revisions, but some other factors 
may also play important roles.  The return revisions in the fund of funds category account 
for more than one-third of all revisions. This is not only because the large percentage of 
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funds of funds, but also because the returns of funds of funds are directly related to the 
returns of the constituent hedge funds. If the returns reported by the underlying hedge 
funds are revised, so are the returns of the funds of funds.  
 
3.2.3 Time Trend of Fund Characteristics 
Our unique dataset enables us to document the time series of fund characteristics 
over the entire sample period. To present the time trend of fund characteristics, we 
calculate the annual averages of fund characteristics as the means of the monthly 
averages of the values of each characteristic across all the funds alive in that month.  
We also consider a variety of fund characteristics. The lockup and advanced 
notice periods are restrictions imposed by the fund on its investors. These restrictions 
provide liquidity safeguards for fund managers but may also allow managers to hide the 
reputational consequences from changing data within the lockup period. We also include 
an indicator variable which takes one if a fund manager invests personal capital in her 
own fund. The fee structure variables, such as management fee and especially incentive 
fee, tie the managers’ incentive directly to fund performance and penalize them for 
losses. A dummy variable of 1 if a fund takes on leverage and 0 otherwise is also 
included. Finally, four fund characteristics deserve special mention. The aggregate of 
these four variables, called governance variable in our paper, helps us better understand 
the incentives for fund managers to revise returns (see Ozik and Sadka (2011)).  
We study herein the impact of fund governance on return revisions. On one hand, 
strong fund governance may align managers’ interest with those of investors, leading the 
managers to undertake the best decision for the investors’ interests. Inspired by the 
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corporate-governance literature (see La Porta et al. (2002), Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003), and Ozik and Sadka (2011)), we consider several fund characteristics to act as a 
proxy for fund governance: whether the fund had been audited in the past 6 months or in 
the next 6 months, whether it has a high-water mark, whether it is an onshore 
domiciliation, and whether registration with the SEC exists. Following Ozik and Sadka 
(2011), we aggregate these variables to devise a measure of fund governance. 
Taken as a group, the funds without a listed audit date have less oversight than the 
funds with an audit date listed (Liang (2003)). But for a lender, the updated or recent 
auditing may mean much more than an outdated one. A date for a completed financial 
audit reported by a fund may not be sufficient to indicate strong governance. Hence, we 
assign a score of one only if the audit date is within the past 6-month or next 6-month 
time period, otherwise, a score of zero is assigned.  
The high-water mark provision more closely aligns managerial incentives with 
those of the limited partners in the hedge fund, and thus improves the governance 
structure. It requires the manager to make up the previous losses before charging an 
incentive fee. A fund is assigned a high-water mark score of one if it carries the high-
water mark provision and zero otherwise.  
Offshore hedge funds enjoy a lighter regulation since offshore hedge funds are not 
registered in the United States or with the SEC (Aragon, Liang, and Park (2012)) and 
they are largely tax-free jurisdictions. Along the domiciliation dimension, we assign a 
value of one to onshore funds and zero to offshore funds. 
Unlike mutual funds which are required to be registered with the SEC, hedge 
funds are lightly regulated investment vehicles . Domestic and foreign hedge funds are 
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required to fill out Form 13F on a quarterly basis for all U.S. equity positions over 
$200,000 or consisting of more than 10,000 shares only if their AUM are over $100 
million. We assign a score of one to funds registered with the SEC and zero otherwise. 
In addition to the fund characteristics listed above, we also examine the effect of 
return volatility on performance revision, measured as the standard deviation of returns. 
We compute these measures using monthly data over a one-year period. 
Figure 7 shows the time series of fund characteristics from funds that have revised 
their returns three months after the first report and those have never revised their returns. 
We see that the aggregate governance variable for both the revised funds and unrevised 
funds are largely in an upward time trend, with the curve for revised funds always above 
that of the unrevised funds.  
 
3.3 Calendar Distribution and the Time Trend of Return Revision 
 
3.3.1 Return Revision in Calendar Months 
Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2011) find that hedge fund returns in December are 
suspiciously higher than during the rest of the year. They conclude that this December 
spike is an evidence of return management and link it to the managerial incentives 
induced by performance- based compensation. They also find strong evidence that funds 
overstate December returns by underreporting returns earlier in the year but only weak 
evidence for funds to borrow returns from January in the following year. Their sample 
period extends from January 1994 to December 2006.  
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To explore whether there is an overstatement in December returns and 
underreporting of returns in other calendar months, we test the equality of return 
revisions in number and percentage among the 12 calendar months. The results of the 
comparisons using one-way GLM are shown in Table 20. Panel A reports the test results 
for all the revisions and Panel B for the revisions that occurred more than 3 months after 
they are initially reported. From Panel A, we find that the revisions to January returns are 
higher than those of the rest of the year both in number and in percentage. Based on the 
numbers of revisions, we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal means of revisions across 
all 12 months. But in terms of the percentage, the hypothesis of equal means of revisions 
among the 12 months are rejected at the 10% significance level over the entire sample 
period and are rejected at the 1% significance level for the period from 2002 to 2007.  
From Panel B, using the revisions that occurred more than 3 months after they are first 
reported, we reject the hypothesis of equal means of revisions in number and in 
percentage across the 12 months from 2002 to 2007 at the significance levels of 1% and 
10%, respectively. Therefore, the uneven distribution of return revisions mainly 
happened over the first half of our sample period which is part of the sample period of 
Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2011).  
Next we move on to compare the revisions in increase and decrease directions in 
January, February, November, and December. The results of comparison for all return 
revisions and the revisions that occurred more than 3 months after their first report are 
reported in Panel C of Table 20.  From Panel C we see that when all revisions are 
considered, over the full sample period and the sub-period from 2002 to 2007, the 
numbers of positive revisions are much higher than the numbers of negative revisions. 
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For the revisions that occurred more than 3 months after their initial report, the numbers 
of positive revisions and those of negative revisions are quite close during the full sample 
period and the two sub-periods except in December of the first sub-period. Therefore, the 
higher percentage of revisions in January may not be the result of return reversal because 
of the inflation of returns reported in December. One interesting feature in Panel C is that 
over the period of 2002 to 2007, the positive revisions significantly outnumber the 
negative revisions no matter all revisions are considered or only the revisions occurred 
more than 3 months after their initial report are considered. The number of positive 
revisions is 48% higher than that of the negative revisions when all revisions are 
considered. It is reasonable to doubt whether the December spike identified by Agarwal, 
Daniel, and Naik (2011) would still be significant or even exist if only the initially 
reported returns are used in their analysis. It is hard to link the larger number of positive 
revisions to the managerial incentives induced by performance based compensation as 
argued by Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2011). Positive revisions significantly outnumber 
negative revisions even when only the revisions happened more than three months after 
their first report. The public have access to the increased returns of December after May 
of the next year.  This would hardly affect the managers’ performance-based 
compensation in a timely manner.   
 
3.3.2 The Time Trend of Return Revisions 
To find out the time trend of return revisions, we first calculate the total number 
of returns that have been revised more than 3 months after they are initially perceived for 
each month during our sample period. Based on these total revision numbers for each 
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month, we obtain the total number of revisions as a percentage of the number of returns 
for each month. Then, we average the monthly total number of revisions and the 
percentage of revisions in each year. The results are shown in Table 21 of Panel A. The 
monthly average numbers of return revisions in the first four years from 2002 to 2005 are 
around 360. The largest number of return revision happened in 2007 which is coincident 
with the peak of number of funds as we have seen in Table 18. From 2008 to 2013, the 
average numbers of return revisions in each year appeared to be linearly decreasing. The 
overall average monthly percentage of return revisions during our sample period is 
7.57%. The average monthly percentages of return revisions from 2002 to 2007 are all 
above the overall average percentage, while those from 2008 to 2003 are the same as or 
below the overall percentage. Figure 1 Panel A shows the almost linearly declining line 
representing the average monthly percentages of return revisions in each year when only 
the revisions happened more than 3 months after they are originally reported are 
considered. When all revisions are considered, the line for average monthly percentage of 
revisions is largely declining, but no longer monotonously.  
It is natural to question whether the smaller number of average monthly revisions 
and lower percentage of revisions in the latter half of our sample period result from the 
fact that the more recent month of return, the less likely the return would be detected 
revised in our sample period. To address the issue, we first find out the actual distribution 
of return revision recency using the recency data of the 119,017 revisions we have 
detected. Then we multiply the monthly total numbers of return revisions actually 
observed in our dataset by an adjustment factor as shown in Figure 8 Panel B. The 
adjustment factor is defined as “2-cumulative percentage of revision recency”.  The 
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average monthly total numbers of return revisions adjusted by the adjusted factor in each 
year are shown in Panel B of Table 21 along with the average monthly percentages of 
return revisions calculated using the adjusted average monthly total numbers of return 
revisions in each month. We can see that the time trend of the adjusted average monthly 
total numbers and percentages of return revisions in each year are similar to those of the 
unadjusted numbers. 
 
3.4 The Determinants of Return Revisions  
Among the characteristics of funds, we begin by identifying the factors that are 
related to the time trend. Next, we analyze the determinants of return revisions for 
individual hedge funds. Then we go on to the even micro-level to investigate the drivers 
of return revisions at the individual reported return level. These analyses at different 
levels help us to shed light on the incentives for funds to engage in their revising 
behavior. Last, we analyze the determinants of the size and sign of revisions, 
documenting the differences between initially perceived and final histories.  
 
3.4.1 Relation between Time Series Return Revisions and Fund Characteristics 
To examine the relation between time series return revisions and fund 
characteristics, we regress the average monthly percentage of return revisions on the 
average monthly characteristics of all the funds in each year. As most of the time series 
of average monthly fund characteristics in each year are highly correlated, to avoid 
collinearity, we only carry out the univariate regressions. The results of the regressions of 
the unadjusted average monthly percentage of return revision are shown in Table 22. 
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From this table we can see that the decrease of percentage of return revisions is 
accompanied by the strengthening of overall fund governance. The stronger governance 
in hedge funds may have improved the quality of performance reporting and results in 
fewer return corrections. We also find that there is a significant negative relation between 
the time series of return revisions and management fee, lockup period, advanced notice 
period, fund age, and high-water mark provision, respectively; while the relationship 
between the return revisions and incentive fee, the dummy variables indicating funds’ use 
of leverage, and fund manager’s own wealth in the fund is significantly positive. The 
latter set of variables generally signals the quality of a fund manager. They vary in the 
same direction as that of average monthly percentage of return revision. The observed 
significant relations listed above are the same when we regress the adjusted average 
monthly percentage of return revisions on these fund characteristics.  
 
3.4.2 Which Funds Revise? 
To investigate the determinants of return revisions at the individual fund level, we 
employ different sets of probit regression. Among the explanatory variables in these 
probit regressions, for a fund that has revised its returns, the variables representing 
management fee, incentive fee, notice and lockup periods, dummies indicating leverage 
usage and manager personal capital in the fund are defined by the characteristics in the 
months prior to the first return revision, while these variables of an unrevised fund are 
defined by the characteristics in the months prior to the final histories.   The variables of 
mean return and mean size of a fund that has revised its returns are the average of all 
returns and average of all sizes in the months prior to the first return revision.  The 
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variable of return volatility of a revised fund is the standard deviation of all the returns 
prior to the first return revision. The definitions of the mean return, mean size, and return 
volatility of an unrevised fund are similar to those for the revised fund, except that for the 
unrevised fund, the returns or sizes used are from the months prior to the last reported 
month captured in our dataset. We use a measure of fund illiquidity suggested by 
Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004), namely the first-order autocorrelation coefficient 
of all available returns. In each regression, we include the style fixed effects in our 
specifications to control for the possibility that differences in volatility and liquidity 
occasioned by the use of these different strategies, as well as differential access to 
information about these strategies might lead to differences in the propensity to revise 
returns.  
As shown in Panel A of Table 19, there is a wide variation in the number of return 
revisions among funds which experienced revisions. 11.15% of all funds only revised 
their returns once, while 1.98% of all funds had more than 90 times return revisions. To 
take this difference into consideration, we use ordered probit regression to examine the 
effects of covariates on the probability of a hedge fund’s return revisions. In the ordered 
probit regression, the dependent variable is 4 if the number of revision n is more than 20 
times, 3 if n is between 7 and 20, 2 if n is between 3 and 6, 1 if n is 1 or 2, and 0 if no 
revision.  The first two columns in Table 22 report the results of ordered probit 
regression. When we only examine the impact of fund governance, we find a significant 
positive relation between fund governance and its return revisions. The stronger the 
governance, the higher is the probability a fund to revise its previously reported returns. 
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When we control for other fund characteristics, we find that the variable governance is 
still statistically significant at the 1% significance level.  
In the probit regression, the dependent dummy variable equals to one if the fund 
has revised its returns at least once, and 0 otherwise. In the probit increase regression, the 
dependent variable is 1 if all the return revisions of a fund sum up to be positive, and 0 if 
the fund has never revised its returns. In the probit decrease regression, the dependent 
variable is 1 if all the return revisions of a fund sum up to be negative, and 0 if the fund 
has never revised its returns. The results are reported in Table 23.  
In these four sets of regressions, the coefficients of governance are all 
significantly positive. Funds which experienced return revision(s) seems to have higher 
governance score compared with the unrevised funds. Stronger governance leaves funds 
less latitude to manipulate performance reporting. It may be the case that strong 
governance such as auditing could trigger corrections in returns.  Other variables that 
have significant coefficients in all the four probit regression settings are incentive fee, 
average fund return, average fund size, and the dummy variable for manager’s personal 
investment in the fund. The higher the incentive fee, the more likely the fund revises its 
return. Better performed funds tend to revise their returns. This excludes the possibility 
that funds with poor performance overstate their historical returns through return revision 
after they are initially reported in order to show a rosier set of past performance numbers 
to prospective investors. Larger funds have higher probability to revise their returns.  
This may be because larger funds usually have larger number of different holdings. The 
revelation of the value of any of the investments after the returns are initially reported 
may require a return revision for the purpose of correction.  
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3.4.3 Determinants of Return Revision at Individual Revision Level  
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 examine the determinants of return revisions of hedge funds 
at the overall fund level and individual fund level, respectively. Next, we explore the 
factors that drive return revisions at a more micro level-the individual revision level. The 
number of return revisions captured in our sample period accounts less than 1% of all our 
basic return observations defined by fund, return month, and report month. To make the 
probit regression more meaningful, we match each hedge fund with size data which 
revised its return at month s to the return of month t to the hedge fund which has the same 
strategy and the nearest asset size in the same return month and same month as the fund 
revised its return but did not revise its return at month s to the return of month t. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a fund revised its return at month s 
to the return of month t and 0 for the matched fund.  We use three sets of explanatory 
variables in our probit regressions. The first set of variables is defined by the funds’ 
characteristics at return month t.  The second set of variables is defined by the funds’ 
characteristics at return revision month s, and the third set is the differences between the 
variables corresponding to variables defined by the funds’ characteristics at return month 
t and return revision month s.  To examine whether there is any difference in the impact 
of these variables on return revisions between different time periods, we run the probit 
regression over our whole sample period and two sub-periods, one is from 2002 to 2007 
and the other is from 2008 to 2013. 
Panel A of Table 24 reports the results of probit regressions on the variables 
defined by the funds’ characteristics in return month t. We find that the coefficients of 
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governance is strongly significant in any of the periods no matter in the univariate 
regression specification or in the specification controlled for other fund characteristics. 
The higher the governance score a fund has in the return month, the more likely the 
return of the month would be revised more than three months after its initial reporting. 
This is consistent with the finding of Dimmocka and Gerkenb (2014) who use the SEC 
rule changes to show that regulatory oversight reduces return misreporting by hedge 
funds. Hoffman (2013) also finds that audit regulation stifles the misreporting of returns 
by hedge funds. We also find that funds which revised their returns have better past 
performance than unrevised funds. One posit about hedge fund performance misreporting 
is that fund managers overstate their returns in order to collect performance fees and/or to 
reduce the risk of fund outflows as investors withdraw funds from poorly performing 
investments (Green (2010)). If this is true, we would expect higher probability of return 
revision for funds with poorer governance and poorer past performance in the return 
months. Therefore, we have not found direct evidence that hedge fund managers 
manipulate returns in initial return reporting. 
Panel B of Table 24 reports the results of probit regressions on the variables 
defined by the funds’ characteristics at return revision month s. The variables are the 
values of funds’ characteristics in the month prior to the revision month. The mean 
return, return volatility, and the first order autocorrelation are calculated using the returns 
in the past 12 months. Similar to Panel A, we find that the coefficients of governance are 
strongly significant in any of the periods no matter in the univariate regression 
specification or in the specification controlled for other fund characteristics. Stronger 
governance leaves less room for return report manipulations such as downward revision 
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to the return history to lower the high-water mark with the intention of inflating 
performance fee reward, or upward revision to make the return history more attractive to 
potential investors. The finding that funds with higher governance score are more likely 
to revise returns leads us to conclude that correction may be a plausible explanation for 
the return revisions instead of manipulations.  
We also examine the effect of the changes in characteristics from the return 
month to revision month on return revisions. We use the probit regressions with the 
independent variables as the difference between the variables in the regressions in Panel 
B and those in Panel A.  The results are shown in Panel C of Table 24. We find that when 
a fund has stronger governance score in the month before the report month than the score 
in the return month, the fund tend to revise its previously reported return. This finding 
again confirms the important role of governance in hedge fund return revisions. We also 
find that the probability of return revision is higher if funds’ returns become more volatile 
in the return reporting month compared to the fund in the month when the return was first 
reported. There is significant negative relation between the increase in the first order 
autocorrelation of fund returns and the probability of return revisions. Funds tend to 
revise their returns when the funds become more liquid in the months of return reporting 
than in the return months. The improvement in fund liquidity may help funds to evaluate 
the correct value of their investment and make correction to the previously reported 
returns.  
3.4.4 Determinants of the Direction and Size of Return Revisions 
Having determined the factors that drive the revisions in return reporting without 
considering the direction of the revisions, we turn next to understanding the impact of 
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these factors on the direction of return revisions. In Section 4.2, we explore the 
determinants of return revisions at the individual fund level, where we examine the effect 
of fund characteristics on the revision direction which is defined as the sign of the sum of 
all the revisions that a fund have experienced. Since a fund may have experienced 
multiple revisions in different directions, the direction of revision at the fund level 
defined in this way may not be representative. Using our unique dataset, we can examine 
the determinants of revision direction at the individual return revision level. The samples 
we use to run the probit regressions are the same as those in Section 4.3. We use the 
revisions in both directions and the matched returns without return revision. In the 
regression for positive revisions, the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
a fund reported its return at month s to the return of month t is greater than what it 
previously reported, and 0 for the matched fund. In the regression for the revisions to 
decrease returns, the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a fund reported 
its return at month s to the return of month t is smaller than what it previously reported, 
and 0 for the matched fund. As in Section 4.3, we examine three sets of explanatory 
variables: the variables defined by the characteristics in return month, in revision month, 
and the difference between the two months.  
Results of the analysis described above are reported in Table 25. One eye-
catching feature in the results is that the positive coefficients for governance in all the 
probit regressions are all strongly significant no matter the revisions are upward or 
downward. If funds manipulate return reporting, the funds with poor governance in the 
return month are more likely to decrease return after their initial reporting because they 
have more latitude to report higher than actual returns when the returns are initially 
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reported. Likewise, if funds manipulate return reporting through return revisions, funds 
with poorer governance and poorer past performance would tend to increase their 
previously reported returns, while funds with poorer governance and higher incentive 
fees would tend to decrease their historical returns. But in reality we find that funds with 
stronger governance and better past performance are more likely to increase their returns 
and funds with higher governance scores and lower incentive fees are more likely to 
decrease previously reported returns. Therefore, we have not found any direct evidence 
that hedge funds misreport their returns in the return month or manipulate their returns 
through revisions to their previously reported returns. Correction may be a plausible 
explanation about return revisions of hedge funds.  
We also examine the determinants of the magnitude of return revisions. The 
dependent variables in the OLS regressions are the absolute values of the individual 
return revisions. The independent variables are the three sets of characteristics described 
above. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 26. We find that funds with 
stronger governance, lower incentive fee, shorter notice period and lockup period, higher 
return volatility, and with leverage usage are related to larger revision magnitude. 
 
3.5 Impact of Return Revision on Future Performance  
Admittedly, we care about what factors are related or drive the revisions of previously 
reported returns in hedge funds. We are more concerned about the impact of such 
revisions on the future performance of funds experienced return revisions. As in Section 
4, we investigate the impact of return revisions from the perspectives of fund level and 
revision level.  
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3.5.1 Performance Comparison at the Fund Level 
First, we follow the approach adopted by Patton, Ramadorai, and Streatfield 
(2013). In each month, we allocate funds to unrevised group vs. revised group. If a fund 
has never revised its returns up till a point in time, then the fund is classified as unrevised 
fund at this time point. A fund is categorized as revised fund at the point when it revises 
its returns for the first, and would remain in the revised group ever since. Therefore, at 
each time period, the unrevised portfolio includes the returns of all funds that have never 
revised their returns and the returns of the revised funds prior to their first revisions. The 
revised portfolio contains the returns of the revised funds after their first revisions. For 
each portfolio, we equally weight all monthly returns of funds, and obtain two time series 
of portfolio returns. Next, we compare the performance of the two portfolios by 
computing the differences of the two time series of portfolio returns and regressing the 
differences on the Fung-Hsieh 7-factor model. The two numbers in the upper left corner 
of Table 27 Panel A are the results of this process. The alpha is negative but insignificant, 
which means that the risk-adjusted performance of the unrevised funds is poorer than that 
of revised funds, but the difference is not significant. We also define unrevised funds and 
revised funds in a slightly different way.  From Table 19 Panel F we know that over 70% 
of the revisions occurred within 3 months of initial reporting are revisions to previously 
estimated returns. We then treat funds with all the revisions occurred in 3 months of first 
reporting always as unrevised funds. The effective revised funds are those funds after 
their first return revisions that occurred more than 3 months after they are initially 
reported (Revised Funds 2 in Table 27).  The alpha is negligibly small at 0.4% and 
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statistically insignificant. There, unlike Patton, Ramadorai, and Streatfield (2013), we 
have not found that funds experienced revision would underperform unrevised funds 
when we employ the same approach to compare their performance. From the results we 
obtained thus far we may conclude that the revisions are innocuous and provide no 
information about future performance. In the following, we provide reasons on why we 
find different results from Patton et al. (2013). 
We first compare the performances of revised funds before and after their first 
revisions to further examine the impact of return revision on fund performance. 
Unfortunately we find that, compared to the performance prior to their first revisions, the 
performance of those same funds become significantly worse after their first return 
revisions. Is a return revision an omen of deleterious future fund performance? Or is this 
a coincidence of the trend that hedge fund alpha decrease over time documented by Fung, 
Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2007), Naik, Ramadorai, and Stromqvist (2007), and Zhong 
(2008)? One possible explanation of the decreasing alpha is capacity constraint 
hypothesis. In fact we find that the average size of the revised funds after their first 
revisions are significant larger than the average size of the funds prior to their first 
revisions.  
Next, we compare the performance of revised funds prior to their first revisions 
with that of the unrevised funds which only contain the funds that have never revised 
their returns. We find that the former significantly outperforms the latter funds. In a 
different comparison, we also find that the unrevised funds when only contain the funds 
that have never revised their returns significantly underperform revised funds after their 
first revisions. But previously we found that the unrevised funds when defined as the 
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funds including all funds that have never revised their returns and the funds prior to their 
first revisions show no significant difference in performance compared to the revised 
funds after their first revision. It is reasonable for us to wonder whether the significant 
overperformance of the unrevised funds evidenced in Patton, Ramadorai, and Streatfield 
(2013) is driven by the super performance of the revised funds prior to their first revision.  
As mentioned above, we cannot draw a conclusive conclusion that the 
underperformance of revised funds after their first revisions compared to that prior to first 
revisions result from the revisions. We would like to compare the performance of the 
unrevised funds and revised funds in the same period. But we cannot classify the 
unrevised funds into earlier period and post-revision period as we classify the revised 
funds since the unrevised funds have never revised their returns. To address this issue, we 
firstly calculate the percentage time point of lifecycle for funds in each month over our 
sample period. For example, if fund A reported returns from January 2002 to December 
2008. It revised its return(s) in March 2003 which is the 15
th
 month of its lifecycle in our 
sample period. The percentage time point of this revision is 25% or 0.25. Similarly, we 
can calculate the percentage time point of lifecycle for each fund in each month. We 
calculate the average percentage points in time for all the first revision of the revised 
funds and use this average percentage time point to allocate funds into unrevised funds 
and revised funds prior to or after their first revisions. Then we compare their 
performances. The alphas and t-statistics are reported in Panel B of table 27. Like the 
revised funds, unrevised funds after their first hypothetical first revisions significantly 
underperform the unrevised funds prior to the hypothetical revisions. The revised funds 
prior to their average first revision time point significantly outperform unrevised funds 
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prior to the same average revision time point. The same is true for the funds after their 
hypothetical revisions. In addition to the average percentage points in time of revision, 
we also employ different hypothetical revision percentage time points. The results always 
hold that the revised funds outperform the unrevised in the same period of their lifecycle. 
The positive impact of revisions on the future performance of revised funds leads us to 
conclude that the revisions are a sign of honesty, in the sense that funds correct their past 
errors or inaccuracy in return evaluation. 
 
3.5.2. Performance Comparison at Revision Level 
Our unique dataset allows us to investigate the impact of return revisions at the 
individual revision level. Specifically, we carry out event study to compare the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) of the revised funds and matched 
unrevised funds in 12 months before the revisions and 12 months after the revisions. Our 
focus is on the 12-month event window after revisions.    
To avoid the compounding effect of multiple revisions, we dropped the revisions 
with other revisions 12 months before or 12 months after the revisions. We require the 
funds that experience the revisions have all the 24 months in our 24-month event window. 
The requirement is the same for the matched funds. In the end, we obtain 7,072 revisions 
that occurred more than 3 months after they are initially reported and 7,072 matched 
revisions. We first calculate monthly abnormal return for each fund revision as fund 
excess return minus the Fung-Hsieh 7-factor realization times loadings estimated over the 
36-month estimation period prior to the revision. Based on the monthly abnormal return 
for each fund, we compute the cumulative average abnormal returns over the 24-month 
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event window and 12-month after revision window for the revised funds and matched 
unrevised funds, respectively. The results are presented in Figure 9.  
Similar to the comparison at the fund level, we find that in the 24-month event 
window and in the 12-month after revisions, the CAARs of the revised funds are higher 
than those of the matched unrevised funds, no matter the revision is upward or 
downward. The higher performance of revised funds at the revision level again signifies 
that the revisions are not indicators of either poor operational controls or dishonesty. On 
the contrary, it may indicate a motivation to correct past inaccuracy in the return 
estimation following standard hedge fund operation.   
 
3.6 Robustness Checks 
In this section, we present the results of a series of robustness checks to our main 
findings reported in Sections 3, 4, and 5.  
 
3.6.1 Different Governance Measure 
As presented in Section 3, we find that funds with stronger governance are more 
likely to revise past returns. We posit that stronger governance restrains funds from 
manipulating performance. Our governance is measured by the aggregated variable 
composed of dummy variables of audit, high-water mark provision, country domicile, 
and SEC registration. Even though high-water mark provision closely aligns managerial 
incentives with those of the limited partners in the hedge fund, and thus improves the 
governance structure, it may also provide managers with strong incentives to manipulate 
return report in order to collect higher or collect earlier incentive fees, as evidenced by 
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Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2011) and Patton, Ramadorai, and Streatfield (2013). 
Therefore, we construct another governance measure which excludes high-water mark 
provision from our original governance measure. We carry out the probit and OLS 
regressions with the new governance variable and high-water mark provision as 
explanatory variables in order to locate the determinants of revision, revision direction, 
and revision magnitude. The results are shown in Panels A of Tables 28, 30, and 31, as 
well as Panels A1, B1, and C1 of table 29. Our main finding hold true with this new 
governance measure. It worth pointing out that from Table 30 Panel A, we see that funds 
with high-water marks are more likely to revise past returns both upward and downward. 
Unlike Patton, Ramadorai, and Streatfield (2013), we haven’t found the evidence that the 
funds with high-water marks intend to revise downward, whereas funds without high-
water marks revise upwards. 
 
3.6.2 Exclude Funds of Funds 
Funds of funds invest in hedge funds of different strategies. They revise their past returns 
whenever their holding hedge funds revise their past returns. In this case, the revisions of 
funds of funds are corrections of past returns. Funds of funds may also have stronger 
governance as they perform due diligence in their investment. It is possible that our main 
findings are dominated by funds of funds. To check whether our findings are affected by 
funds of funds, we carry out the analyses using the sample funds without funds of funds. 
The results are reported in Panels B of Tables 28, 30, and 31, as well as Panels A2, B2, 
and C2 of table 29. Figure 10 Panel A also present the results of performance comparison 
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without funds of funds in our analysis.  Our findings remain true even excluding funds of 
funds from our samples.  
 
3.6.3 Different Measures of Returns 
One concern remains that the higher future performance of revised funds may be 
attributable to a few extreme returns. To address the issue, we compare the differences of 
median returns between the revised funds and unrevised funds. The results are reported in 
Table 32. From the table we can see that the better performance of revised funds is not 
driven by the extreme high performance of a few revised funds.  
One may also worry that the better performance of hedge funds that revised their 
returns result from the more upward revisions in our sample. Therefore, we compare the 
performance of unrevised funds and revised funds using their initially reported return 
rather than their most recently reported return as in our previous analysis. The results are 
shown in Figure 10 Panel B. Our findings hold when using the first reported return. The 
better performance is not attributable to the higher number and percentage of positive 
revisions.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the dynamics in the performance report of hedge funds and 
try to shed light on the determinants of return revisions.  We track changes to the 
statements of historical performance of about 9,500 hedge funds recorded in publicly 
available databases (TASS), at different points in time between 2002 and 2013.  
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We find that as many as two-thirds of funds (over 6,500 individual funds) revised 
their previously reported performance, with more than two-fifths of funds later changing 
a previous monthly return by at least 0.5%. On average, more than one-fifth of monthly 
returns were revised after being first reported. Positive revisions are more common than 
negative revisions.  
We test whether the return revisions in number or percentage are evenly 
distributed among the 12 calendar return months. We find that the uneven distribution of 
revisions to the returns in 12 calendar months occurred in the early half of our sample 
period. We also find that the average number of revisions to increase the returns of 
December is significantly larger than that to decrease the returns of December. This 
finding may provide an alternative explanation for the December spike detected in the 
literature on hedge fund misreporting. 
We find an obvious decreasing time trend in both the number and proportion of 
return revisions, even after adjusting for performance report recency. The declining trend 
is accompanied by the strengthening of hedge fund governance. We find that revisions 
are more common among larger funds with stronger governance, higher incentive fee, 
and better past performance. At the micro-level, the returns are more likely to be revised 
for older funds with stronger governance and managers’ co-investment in funds prior to 
the return being first reported, while the return revisions tend to occur in the next month 
when a fund with higher governance score has better past performance. Return revisions 
also tend to happen when a fund have stronger governance and become more liquid and 
more volatile compared to the fund in the month when the return was first reported. 
These drivers of return revisions are significant no matter the revisions are to increase or 
138 
 
decrease the previously reported returns. Therefore, we find a strong connection between 
return revisions and desirable fund characteristics at the overall fund level, the individual 
fund level, and the individual revision level. The comparison between the hedge funds 
that have revised their returns with those that have not shows that revised funds 
outperform the unrevised funds no matter the comparisons are at the fund level or the 
revision level. Our findings hold under various robustness checks. 
These findings suggest that correction may be a plausible explanation for the 
return revisions in hedge fund performance report. We have not found any direct 
evidence that hedge fund managers manipulate returns. 
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Table 18. Fund Characteristics Summary 
Panel A. Summary Statistics Year by Year (2002–2013), based on the First Reported Returns  
Year # of Funds 
Equal-weighted hedge fund portfolio monthly returns (%) 
 Mean Median  Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
2002 3128 0.236 0.545 0.926 -1.534 1.542 
2003 3581 1.389 1.163 0.986 -0.226 3.488 
2004 4084 0.670 0.779 1.250 -1.411 2.926 
2005 4677 0.730 1.292 1.371 -1.554 1.971 
2006 5148 0.988 1.326 1.424 -1.686 3.323 
2007 5379 0.954 0.941 1.531 -1.878 3.103 
2008 5349 -1.644 -1.947 2.666 -6.381 1.854 
2009 4637 1.422 1.300 1.567 -0.945 4.808 
2010 4405 0.745 0.919 1.747 -2.969 3.098 
2011 4074 -0.523 -0.333 1.691 -3.584 1.966 
2012 3544 0.493 0.614 1.237 -2.154 2.434 
2013 2896 0.728 0.881 1.053 -1.710 2.428 
 
Panel B. Summary Statistics Year by Year (2002–2013), based on Last Reported Returns 
Year # of Funds 
Equal-weighted hedge fund portfolio monthly returns (%) 
 Mean Median  Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
2002 3128 0.246 0.555 0.934 -1.560 1.557 
2003 3581 1.397 1.180 0.995 -0.233 3.509 
2004 4084 0.673 0.776 1.255 -1.407 2.924 
2005 4677 0.733 1.300 1.372 -1.552 1.968 
2006 5148 1.005 1.346 1.434 -1.682 3.370 
2007 5379 0.963 0.929 1.529 -1.854 3.135 
2008 5349 -1.671 -1.970 2.689 -6.444 1.856 
2009 4637 1.423 1.307 1.579 -0.942 4.835 
2010 4405 0.751 0.920 1.769 -2.996 3.150 
2011 4074 -0.537 -0.326 1.712 -3.641 2.014 
2012 3544 0.493 0.613 1.250 -2.193 2.449 
2013 2896 0.710 0.899 1.071 -1.743 2.440 
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Panel C. Cross-sectional Statistics (Over Sample Period: 2002–2013) 
  N Mean Median Std.dev Minimum Maximum 
Average monthly return over the 
life of the fund (%) First Reported 
9494 0.330 0.403 1.262 -17.074 17.397 
Average monthly return over the 
life of the fund (%) Last reported 
9494 0.327 0.402 1.272 -22.087 17.397 
Average monthly AUM over the 
life of the fund(millions$) 
7652 149.04 38.09 414.02 0.001 15516.67 
Age of the fund(# of months in 
existence) 
9492 80.60 66.00 56.72 1.00 480.00 
Management fee (%) 9472 1.45 1.50 0.63 0.00 22.00 
Incentive fee (%) 9441 15.10 20.00 7.88 0.00 50.00 
 
Table 18 Panel A and Panel B report the number of hedge funds and the mean, median, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum monthly returns on the equal-weighted hedge fund portfolio. The 
statistics of returns in Panel A and Panel B are based on the returns reported for the first time and the 
returns that were reported for the last time in the snapshots, respectively.  Panel C reports the cross-
sectional mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum statistics for hedge fund 
characteristics including returns, size, age, management fee, and incentive fee. The first two rows of 
the table are average monthly return over the life of the fund based on the returns reported for the first 
time and the returns that were reported for the last time in the snapshots, respectively. The sample 
period is from January 2002–December 2013 
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Table 19. Revision Summary  
Panel A. Fund Revision Summary 
# of Changes Number of Funds Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
0 2,927 30.83% 30.83% 
1 1,059 11.15% 41.98% 
2 667 7.03% 49.01% 
3~13  2,439 25.69% 74.70% 
14~38 1,472 15.50% 90.20% 
39~90 742 7.82% 98.02% 
91~398 188 1.98% 100.00% 
 
Panel B. Fund Revision Magnitude 
    at least 0.01% at least 0.1% at least 0.5% at least 1% 
All Revisions 
Funds 6567 5806 4145 3155 
% of Funds 69.17% 61.15% 43.66% 33.23% 
Revisions Occur 
3 Months Later 
Funds 3660 2825 1830 1389 
% of Funds 38.55% 29.76% 19.28% 14.63% 
 
Panel C. Summary Statistics for the Distribution of all Revisions 
  Revisions Absolute Revisions Positive Revisions Negative Revisions 
Count 119017 119017 63651 55366 
Mean  0.008% 0.645 0.603 -0.693 
Meandian 0.02 0.105 0.103 -0.107 
95th 1.164 2.541 2.305 -0.02 
5th  -1.213 0.02 0.02 -2.812 
Std Dev. 3.215 3.149 3.011 3.3 
Panel D. Return Revision Direction Comparison 
  
2002-2013 2002-2007 2008-2013 
Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease 
All 
Revisions 
Average Number  of 
Monthly Revisions 
445.1 387.2 521.9 404.9 367.2 369.2 
T value of Mean 
Equality Test 
3.49 5.93 0.09 
Revisions 
Occurred 
More than 3 
Months Later 
Average Number of 
Monthly Revisions 
148 144.9 192.9 184.8 100.5 102.6 
T value of Mean 
Equality Test 
0.43 2.04 0.22 
 
Panel E. Recency of Revisions 
  1 or more 
months 
more than 3 
months 
more than 6 
months 
more than 
12 months 
more than 
24 months 
Funds 6,531 3,642 2,618 1,744 1,074 
% of Funds 100% 55.76% 40.09% 26.70% 16.44% 
Revisions 119,017 41,010 31,488 23,267 15,507 
% of Revisions 100% 34.46% 26.46% 19.55% 13.03% 
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Panel F. Return Status in Revisions 
Revision   
Estimated or Actual Returns before and After Revision 
Missing AA AE EA EE Total 
Revisons in 3 
months 
# of Revisions 29 22,695 456 46,250 8,577 78,007 
% of Total Revisions 0.02 19.07 0.38 38.86 7.21 65.54 
Revisions after 
3 months 
# of Revisions 
 
34,393 1,065 3,866 1,686 41,010 
% of Total Revisions 
 
28.9 0.89 3.25 1.42 34.46 
Total 
# of Revisions 29 57,088 1,521 50,116 10,263 119,017 
% of Total Revisions 0.02 47.97 1.28 42.11 8.62 100 
 
Panel G. Proportion of Revisions in Style 
  
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
Dedicated 
Short 
Bias 
Emerging 
Markets 
Equity 
Market 
Neutral 
Event 
Driven 
Fixed Income 
Arbitrage 
Percentage of revisions 
in the same style 
22.34 19.49 17.51 19.15 20.75 23.56 
Percentage of all the 
revisions 
2.71 0.52 6.76 3.84 7.68 3.63 
 
Fund of 
Funds 
Global 
Macro 
Long/Short 
Equity 
hedge  
Managed 
Futures 
Multi-
strategy 
Other 
Percentage of revisions 
in the same style 
22.46 16.79 15.4 22.74 13.86 16.48 
Percentage of all the 
revisions 
34.93 3.67 21.05 7.52 4.76 2.92 
 
 
 
 
 
This table shows summary statistics of changes in returns reported at different points in time. Panel A 
reports the number of funds with different number of changes in reported returns. Panel B shows the 
proportion of revising funds with at least one revision that is at least as large as the size thresholds 
listed, Panel C shows various percentiles of (positive, negative and net) revisions, and their absolute 
values. Panel D shows the average number of returns that were increased and decreased compared to 
the previously reported returns in each month over the time periods from 2002 to 2013, from 2002 to 
2007, and from 2008 to 2013.  It also shows the t-value of the equality test of the average number of 
revisions in the direction of increase and decrease in each month.  Panel E shows the proportions of 
revising funds with at least one revision that relates to a return that is at least as old as the “recency” 
thresholds listed, Panel F shows the proportions of revisions with the return status listed. AA indicates 
that the actual return as stated by fund manager before the revision and is still to actual return after the 
revision;  AE indicates the return revision is from actual return as stated by fund manager to estimated 
return and EA indicates exactly the opposite; and EE indicates revision from estimated return to 
estimated return.  Panel G shows return revisions of hedge funds in each style as the percentage of the 
number of all the funds in each style and as the percentage of all the revisions.  
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Table 20. Calendar Distribution of Revisions 
Panel A.  All Revisions  
   Revisions in Numbers  Revisions in Percentage 
 
2002-2013 2002-2007 2008-2013 2002-2013 2002-2007 2008-2013 
1 959.25 1048.83 869.67 25.57 28.57 22.56 
2 859.00 916.67 801.33 22.88 24.83 20.94 
3 865.17 972.67 757.67 22.83 25.92 19.75 
4 846.08 937.00 755.17 22.24 24.76 19.73 
5 835.00 944.50 725.50 21.99 24.68 19.30 
6 843.42 918.00 768.83 22.12 23.85 20.38 
7 807.58 918.33 696.83 21.35 23.72 18.97 
8 754.83 822.50 687.17 19.71 20.74 18.68 
9 778.92 894.83 663.00 20.25 22.79 17.71 
10 786.25 871.00 701.50 20.65 22.01 19.30 
11 759.50 897.67 621.33 19.81 22.49 17.13 
12 897.91 979.33 800.20 23.18 24.57 21.51 
F 0.55 0.28 0.28 1.79 6.26 0.63 
P-Value 0.8609 0.9847 0.983 0.0795 <0.0001 0.7817 
 
Panel B. Revisions Occurred More than 3 Months Later 
  Revisions in Numbers Revisions in Percentage 
 
2002-2013 2002-2007 2008-2013 2002-2013 2002-2007 2008-2013 
1 352.75 448.17 257.33 9.53 12.62 6.45 
2 320.17 407.00 233.33 8.59 11.33 5.85 
3 309.17 405.17 213.17 8.33 11.24 5.41 
4 297.83 398.00 197.67 7.95 10.89 5.00 
5 284.50 384.67 184.33 7.56 10.42 4.70 
6 283.33 380.50 186.17 7.45 10.18 4.71 
7 279.92 377.83 182.00 7.35 10.05 4.64 
8 260.25 343.67 176.83 6.79 9.07 4.50 
9 277.18 337.00 205.40 7.19 8.82 5.23 
10 276.09 335.00 205.40 7.14 8.66 5.33 
11 263.64 335.17 177.80 6.82 8.65 4.61 
12 306.27 380.83 216.80 7.98 9.88 5.70 
F 0.44 11.65 0.16 0.54 1.95 0.24 
P-Value 0.929 <0.001 0.9983 0.8687 0.0845 0.9914 
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Panel C. Comparison of Number of Revisions in Different Directions between Different Calendar 
Months 
  
2002-2013 2002-2007 2008-2013 
Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease 
All 
Revisions 
Jan 
Mean  515.9 443.3 587.2 461.7 444.7 425 
F value  1.64 2.71 0.06 
Feb 
Mean  459.3 399.7 520.8 395.8 397.8 403.5 
F value  1.59 4.72* 0.01 
Nov 
Mean  404.5 355 507.7 390 301.3 320 
F value  0.6 2.63 0.04 
Dec 
Mean  503.2 394.6 582.3 397 408.4 391.8 
F value  3.09* 7.15** 0.03 
Revisions 
Occurred 
More 
than 3 
Months 
Later 
Jan 
Mean  175.8 177 222.7 225.5 128.8 128.5 
F value  0 0.15 0 
Feb 
Mean  161.8 158.4 206.5 200.5 117 116.3 
F value  0.02 0.6 0 
Nov 
Mean  130.5 133.2 169.5 165.7 83.6 94.2 
F value  0.01 0.24 0.1 
Dec 
Mean  157 149.27 202.2 178.7 102.8 114 
F value  0.09 4.41* 0.08 
 
This table reports the results of ANOVA to test the equality of mean revisions to the returns in 
different calendar months. The revisions are in numbers or in proportion.  Panels A and B report the 
results of ANOVA to test the equality of means of the return revisions among the 12 calendar months. 
Panel A includes all the return revisions and Panel B only includes the revisions that occurred 3 
months after the return months. Panel C reports the paired ANOVA tests of the equality of the means 
of revisions to increase the returns and those to decrease the returns of January, February, November, 
and December. Statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 21. Average Number and Proportion of Return Revision in Each Year 
 
Panel A. Original Average Monthly Number and Proportion of Return Revision in Each Year 
    2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Overall 
Original 
Revision 
# of 
Revisions 
367 373 354 368 392 412 345 308 208 150 107 50 286 
% of 
Revisions 
13.31 11.63 9.74 8.9 8.7 8.63 7.57 7.57 5.33 4.16 3.44 1.88 7.57 
 
Panel B:  Average Adjusted Number and Proportion of Return Revision in Each Year 
    2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Overall 
Original 
Revision 
# of 
Revisions 
367 373 355 370 397 420 357 323 224 167 124 62 295 
% of 
Revisions 
13.31 11.64 9.76 8.95 8.8 8.8 7.83 7.96 5.74 4.62 3.99 2.33 7.81 
 
 
Table 4 Panel A shows the average monthly number of returns and proportion of returns that have been revised more than three months after the 
return month in each year during our sample period.  The average monthly number of return revision in each year is calculated as the mean of the 
12 monthly numbers of return revisions in each year. The proportion of return revisions in each month is the number of revisions to the returns of 
that month as a percentage of the total number returns of that month. The average monthly proportion of return revision in each year is calculated 
as the mean of the 12 monthly proportions of return revisions in each year. Panel B shows the average monthly number of returns and proportion 
of returns that have been revised later than three months after the return month in each year during our sample period.  The number and 
proportion of returns that have been revised are adjusted for the return report recency using the adjust factor shown in Panel B. 
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Table 22. Determinants of Average Proportion of Return Revision in Each Year 
 
  Gov1 Mfee Ifee Levid Notice Lockup Personalcapid Waterid Return Stdret Size Age 
Coeff. -0.173 
-
0.580 
0.053 0.774 -0.015 -0.040 0.700 -0.524 0.146 
-
0.172 0.029 
-0.003 
Sig. *** *** *** *** *** ** *** *** 
  
** *** 
Adj. R 0.317 0.397 0.499 0.304 0.724 0.026 0.510 0.570 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.791 
 
 
This table shows the univariate regression of average monthly percentage of return revision in each year on average monthly characteristic of all 
funds in each year. The percentage of returns is the proportion of returns that have been revised more than three months after the return month in 
each year during our sample period.  In panel B, the number and proportion of returns that have been revised are adjusted for the return report 
recency using the adjust factor shown in Figure 7 Panel B. Governance is calculated as the sum of four individual governance variables: auditing, 
high-water mark, country of domicile, and SEC. The variable auditing is equal to one if a fund reports a completed financial audit in the past 6 
months or in the next 6 months. High-water mark variable is equal to 1 when there is a high-water mark provision for charging incentive fee. The 
variable representing country of domicile is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is offshore. Sec is a variable equal to 1 if a fund is 
registered with the SEC. Mfee and Ifee give the magnitude of management and incentive fees, respectively. Levid is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 when the fund uses leverage. The variables Notice denotes the fund’s redemption notice period (in days). Lockup is the period (in months) 
over which investors cannot withdraw their investment. Personalcapid is an indicator variable set to 1 when fund managers invest personal 
capital in the fund. Return is the return of a month reported in that month. Stdret is the standard deviation of the fund’s returns in the past 12 
months. Age is defined as the number of months between a fund’s observation date and its inception date. Size is defined as the logarithm of 
asset under management. Statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 23. Determinants of Return Revisions at Individual Fund Level 
 
  Ordered Probit Probit  Probit Increase Probit Decrease 
Governance1 15.34 *** 9.5 *** 16.11 *** 7.58 ** 15.73 *** 7.7 ** 16.48 *** 7.5 ** 
Mfee 
  
-8.77 ** 
  
-4.5 
   
-5.54 
 
  
-4.12 
 Ifee 
  
1.79 *** 
  
1.95 *** 
  
1.64 *** 
  
2.19 *** 
Levid 
  
6.64 
 
  
10.08 ** 
  
12.44 ** 
  
7.09 
 Notice 
  
0.28 *** 
  
0.14 * 
  
0.18 * 
  
0.08 
 Lockup 
  
0.08 
 
  
0.6 
 
  
0.94 * 
  
0.32 
 Personalcapid 
  
12.17 *** 
  
12.28 ** 
  
12.04 * 
  
14.42 ** 
Theta 
  
-10.7 ** 
  
-8.01 
   
-15.92 *** 
  
-3.04 
 Meanreturn 
  
27.43 *** 
  
29.68 *** 
  
31.04 *** 
  
29.95 *** 
Stdret 
  
-1.56 * 
  
-1.33 
   
-4.08 *** 
  
0.89 
 Meansize 
  
8.63 *** 
  
9.57 *** 
  
11.1 *** 
  
8.56 *** 
Style effect Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   
R square 0.0359 0.1338 0.033 0.1177 0.0346 0.1335 0.0287 0.1097 
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This table reports the effects of covariates on the probability of a hedge fund’s return revisions. In the 
ordered probit regression, the dependent variable is 4 if a fund changed its returns more than 20 times, 
3 if the number of revisions is between 7 and 20, 2 if the times of revisions is between 3 and 6, 1 if the 
number of revisions is 1 or 2, and 0 is a fund have never revised its returns.  In the probit regression, 
the dummy variable dependent variable equals to one if the fund has revised its returns at least once, 0 
otherwise. In the probit increase regression, the dependent variable is 1 if all the return revisions of a 
fund sum up to be positive, 0 if the fund has never revised its returns. . In the probit decrease 
regression, the dependent variable is 1 if all the return revisions of a fund sum up to be negative, 0 if 
the fund has never revised its returns. The revisions in this table are those that occurred more than 3 
months after the return months. Governance is calculated as the sum of four individual governance 
variables: auditing, high-water mark, country of domicile, and SEC. The variable auditing is equal to 
one if a fund reports a completed financial audit in the past 6 months or in the next 6 months. High-
water mark variable is equal to 1 when there is a high-water mark provision for charging incentive fee. 
The variable representing country of domicile is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is 
offshore. Sec is a variable equal to 1 if a fund is registered with the SEC. Mfee and Ifee give the 
magnitude of management and incentive fees, respectively. Levid is an indicator variable equal to 1 
when the fund uses leverage. The variables Notice denotes the fund’s redemption notice period (in 
days). Lockup is the period (in months) over which investors cannot withdraw their investment. 
Persncapid is an indicator variable set to 1 when fund managers invest personal capital in the fund. 
The variables Governance, Mfee, Ifee, levid, Notice, Lockup, and Personalcapid of a fund that has 
revised its returns are defined by the characteristics in the months prior to the first return revision.  
While these variables of an unrevised fund are defined by the characteristics in the months prior to the 
last return. Theta denotes fund asset liquidity which is measured using the equation developed in 
Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004).  Meanreturn of a fund that has revised its returns is the average 
of the returns in the months prior to the first return revision.  Meanreturn of a unrevised fund is the 
average of the returns in the months prior to the last return.  Stdret of a fund that has revised its returns 
is the standard deviation of the fund’s returns in the months prior to the first return revision.  Stdret of 
a unrevised fund is the standard deviation of the returns in the months prior to the last return. 
Meansize of a fund that has revised its returns is the average of the sizes in the months prior to the first 
return revision.  Meansize of a unrevised fund is the average of the sizes in the months prior to the last 
return.  Size is defined as the logarithm of asset under management. All independent variables are 
divided by 100. Statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 24. Determinants of Return Revision at Individual Revision Level 
Panel A. Return Month Characteristics 
  
XReturn Month  
2002-2013 
XReturn Month  
2002-2007 
XReturn Month  
2008-2013 
Governance1 8.51 *** 3.24 *** 6.4 *** 2.82 ** 11.84 *** 6.40 *** 
Mfee 
  
-1.84 
   
-0.81 
   
-3.92 * 
Ifee 
  
-0.43 *** 
  
-0.55 *** 
  
-0.27 
 
levid 
  
-0.50 
   
0.09 
   
-0.47 
 
Notice 
  
0.05 
   
-0.19 *** 
  
0.29 *** 
Lockup 
  
0.22 * 
  
0.27 
   
0.06 
 
Personalcapid 
  
6.60 *** 
  
5.25 ** 
  
6.05 ** 
meanreturn 
  
2.41 *** 
  
5.77 *** 
  
0.28 
 
Autocorr 
  
11.39 *** 
  
-5.49 
   
24.24 *** 
Stdret 
  
1.59 *** 
  
0.56 
   
1.96 *** 
Flow3 
  
0.01 
   
-4.51 
   
0.01 
 
age 
  
0.05 *** 
  
0.04 ** 
  
0.06 ** 
R square 0.0036 0.0054 0.0021 0.0075 0.0068 0.0169 
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Panel B. The Month before Revision Month Characteristics 
  
XRevison Month-1 
2002-2013 
XRevison Month-1 
2002-2007 
XRevison Month-1 
2008-2013 
Governance1 11.97 *** 9.71 *** 19.6 *** 14.63 *** 8.02 *** 5.76 *** 
Mfee 
  
-2.97 ** 
  
-6.04 *** 
  
-0.81 
 
Ifee 
  
-1.05 *** 
  
-0.16 
   
-1.35 *** 
levid 
  
-4.90 *** 
  
-5.12 ** 
  
-6.09 *** 
Notice 
  
0.09 *** 
  
0.07 
   
0.07 ** 
Lockup 
  
0.12 
   
0.70 *** 
  
-0.15 
 
Personalcapid 
  
1.73 
   
-2.40 
   
8.20 *** 
meanreturn 
  
5.47 *** 
  
8.63 *** 
  
5.26 *** 
Autocorr 
  
-5.18 * 
  
-24.93 *** 
  
5.13 
 
Stdret 
  
2.04 *** 
  
0.12 
   
2.08 *** 
Flow3 
  
-0.24 *** 
  
28.03 *** 
  
-0.25 *** 
age 
 
0.02 * 
 
-0.07 *** 
 
0.03 ** 
R square 0.0067 0.0183 0.0176 0.0342 0.003 0.0156 
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Panel C. The Change of Characteristics between the Return Month and the Month before Revision Month 
  
XRevison Month-1 - XReturn Month 
2002-2013 
XRevison Month-1 - XReturn Month 
2002-2007 
XRevison Month-1 - XReturn Month 
2008-2013 
Governance1 8.24 *** 18.65 *** 1.33 
 
11.07 *** 11.38 *** 21.85 *** 
Mfee 
  
-23.75 *** 
  
10.1 
   
-26.54 *** 
Ifee 
  
0.44 *** 
  
-0.497 ** 
  
0.76 *** 
levid 
  
2.12 
   
-21.84 
   
5.30 
 
Notice 
  
-0.16 * 
  
-0.64 *** 
  
-0.08 
 
Lockup 
  
0.19 
   
-0.402 
   
0.41 
 
Personalcapid 
  
-17.65 *** 
  
-30.51 ** 
  
-15.09 ** 
meanreturn 
  
-0.02 
   
-0.01 
   
-0.04 
 
Autocorr 
  
-20.91 *** 
  
-2.8 
   
-25.67 *** 
Stdret 
  
1.55 *** 
  
2.85 ** 
  
1.37 *** 
Flow3 
  
0 
   
9.19 ** 
  
-0.01 
 
Age 
  
0.174 ** 
  
-0.67 *** 
  
0.22 *** 
R square 0.001 0.0127 0 0.0107 0.0021 0.0202 
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This table reports the results of probit regression of return revision dummy on fund characteristics in 
monthly level. We match each hedge fund with size data which revised its return at month s to the 
return of month t to the hedge fund which has the same strategy and the nearest asset size in the same 
return month and same month as the fund revised its return but did not revise its return at month s to 
the return of month t. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a fund revised its 
return at month s to the return of month t and 0 for the matched fund.  In Panel A, the independent 
variables are defined by the funds’ characteristics at return month t.  In Panel B, the independent 
variables are defined by the funds’ characteristics at return revision month s. In Panel C, the 
independent variables are differences between the variables corresponding variables defined by the 
funds’ characteristics at return month t and return revision month s.  Governance is calculated as the 
sum of four individual governance variables: auditing, high-water mark, country of domicile, and SEC. 
The variable auditing is equal to one if a fund reports a completed financial audit in the past 6 months 
or in the next 6 months. High-water mark variable is equal to 1 when there is a high-water mark 
provision for charging incentive fee. The variable representing country of domicile is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the fund is offshore. Sec is a variable equal to 1 if a fund is registered with the 
SEC. Mfee and Ifee give the magnitude of management and incentive fees, respectively. Levid is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 when the fund uses leverage. The variables Notice denotes the fund’s 
redemption notice period (in days). Lockup is the period (in months) over which investors cannot 
withdraw their investment. Persncapid is an indicator variable set to 1 when fund managers invest 
personal capital in the fund. Meanreturn12 is the average of the fund’s returns in the past 12 months. 
Meanreturn3 is the average of the fund’s returns in the past 3 months.  Autocorr is first order 
autocorrelation in the past 3 months.  Autocorr is first order autocorrelation in the past 12 months. 
Stdret is the standard deviation of the fund’s returns in the past 12 months. Flow3 is the capital flow in 
the past 3 months. Age is defined as the number of months between a fund’s observation date and its 
inception date. All independent variables except Meanreturn and Stdret are divided by 100. Statistical 
significance of 1, 5, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 25. Determinants of Return Revision Direction 
  XReturn Month XRevison Month-1 XRevison Month-1 - XReturn Month 
 
Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease 
Governance1 2.99 ** 5.74 ** 8.9 *** 8.83 *** 22.53 *** 14.36 *** 
Mfee -3.36 * -0.425 
 
-2.46 
 
-1.25 
 
-23.87 *** -23.95 *** 
Ifee -0.31 * -0.91 *** -0.50 *** -0.65 *** 0.24 
 
0.63 *** 
levid 0.67 
 
-2.45 
 
-4.35 ** -2.26 
 
-8.70 
 
15.01 * 
Notice 0.01 
 
0.14 ** 0.04 ** 0.11 *** -0.22  -0.10  
Lockup 0.61 *** -0.33 
 
0.51 *** -0.22 
 
0.14 
 
0.35 
 Personalcapid 11.7 *** 2.12 
 
5.88 *** -2.12 
 
-25.69 *** -8.50 
 Meanreturn12 1.11 
 
6.07 *** 3.19 *** 6.15 *** 
    Meanreturn3 
    
0.00 
   
0.01 
 
-0.06 
 Autocorr 0.14 *** 0.14 
 
0.00 
 
-0.14 *** -0.18 *** -0.24 *** 
Stdret 0.94 ** 3.69 *** 1.71 *** 1.78 *** 1.74 *** 1.27 *** 
Flow3 0.31 
 
-0.80 
 
0.32 
 
-0.40 
 
-0.30 
 
0.27 
 Age 0.04 ** 0.08 ** 0.04 ** 0.06 *** 0.12 ** 0.23 *** 
R square 0.0063 0.0077 0.013 0.0157 0.0149 0.012 
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This table reports the results of logistic regression of direction dummy of return revision on fund 
characteristics in monthly level. We match each hedge fund with size data which revised its return at 
month s to the return of month t to the hedge fund which has the same strategy and the nearest asset 
size in the same return month and same month as the fund revised its return but did not revise its 
return at month s to the return of month t.  In the columns of “Increase”, the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a fund reported its return at month s to the return of month t is greater 
than what it previous reported, and 0 for the matched fund. In the columns of “Decrease”, the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a fund reported its return at month s to the return 
of month t is smaller than what it previous reported, and 0 for the matched fund. In the first two 
columns, the independent variables are defined by the funds’ characteristics at return month t.  In the 
third and fourth columns, the independent variables are defined by the funds’ characteristics at return 
revision month s. In last two columns, the independent variables are differences between the variables 
corresponding variables defined by the funds’ characteristics at return month t and return revision 
month s.  Governance is calculated as the sum of four individual governance variables: auditing, high-
water mark, country of domicile, and SEC. The variable auditing is equal to one if a fund reports a 
completed financial audit in the past 6 months or in the next 6 months. High-water mark variable is 
equal to 1 when there is a high-water mark provision for charging incentive fee. The variable 
representing country of domicile is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is offshore. Sec is a 
variable equal to 1 if a fund is registered with the SEC. Mfee and Ifee give the magnitude of 
management and incentive fees, respectively. Levid is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the fund 
uses leverage. The variables Notice denotes the fund’s redemption notice period (in days). Lockup is 
the period (in months) over which investors cannot withdraw their investment. Persncapid is an 
indicator variable set to 1 when fund managers invest personal capital in the fund. Meanreturn is the 
average of the fund’s returns in the past 12 months.  Autocorr is first order autocorrelation in the past 
12 months. Meanreturn3 is the average of the fund’s returns in the past 12 months.  Autocorr is first 
order autocorrelation in the past 3 months. Stdret is the standard deviation of the fund’s returns in the 
past 12 months. Flow3 is the capital flow in the past 3 months. Age is defined as the number of 
months between a fund’s observation date and its inception date. All independent variables except 
Meanreturn and Stdret are divided by 100. Statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10% is indicated by ***, 
**, and *, respectively. 
 
157 
 
Table 26. Determinants of Revision Magnitude 
  XReturn Month XRevison Month-1 XRevison Month-1 - XReturn Month 
Governance1 20.96 *** 23.43 *** 124.76 *** 
Mfee 90.43 *** 7.39 
 
-538.20 *** 
Ifee -4.63 *** -5.96 *** 1.44 * 
levid 46.81 *** 25.04 *** -93.78 *** 
Notice -0.54 *** -0.37 *** 2.36 *** 
Lockup -2.31 *** -1.49 *** 9.23 *** 
Personalcapid 20.85 ** 18.04 ** -84.35 ** 
meanreturn12 3.51 
 
1.51 
   meanreturn3  
 
 
 
0.51 
 Autocorr -0.44 * -64.68 *** -0.17 
 Stdret 17.56 *** 11.47 *** 1.37 
 Flow3 0.05 
 
-14.60 
 
0.06 
 age -0.27 *** 0.01 
 
1.23 *** 
R square 0.0277 0.0205 0.1024 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regression of magnitude of return revision on fund characteristics 
in monthly level. We match each hedge fund with size data which revised its return at month s to the 
return of month t to the hedge fund which has the same strategy and the nearest asset size in the same 
return month and same month as the fund revised its return but did not revise its return at month s to 
the return of month t.  The dependent variable is the absolute value of the revision a fund made at 
month s to the return of month t. The dependent variable equals to 0 for the matched fund. In the first 
column, the independent variables are defined by the funds’ characteristics at return month t.  In the 
second column, the independent variables are defined by the funds’ characteristics at return revision 
month  s. In last column, the independent variables are differences between the variables 
corresponding variables defined by the funds’ characteristics at return month t  and return revision 
month  s.  Governance is calculated as the sum of four individual governance variables: auditing, 
high-water mark, country of domicile, and SEC. The variable auditing is equal to one if a fund reports 
a completed financial audit in the past 6 months or in the next 6 months. High-water mark variable is 
equal to 1 when there is a high-water mark provision for charging incentive fee. The variable 
representing country of domicile is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is offshore. Sec is a 
variable equal to 1 if a fund is registered with the SEC. Mfee and Ifee give the magnitude of 
management and incentive fees, respectively. Levid is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the fund 
uses leverage. The variables Notice denotes the fund’s redemption notice period (in days). Lockup is 
the period (in months) over which investors cannot withdraw their investment. Persncapid is an 
indicator variable set to 1 when fund managers invest personal capital in the fund. Meanreturn12 is the 
average of the fund’s returns in the past 12 months.  Autocorr is first order autocorrelation in the past 
12 months. Meanreturn3 is the average of the fund’s returns in the past 12 months.  Autocorr is first 
order autocorrelation in the past 3 months. Stdret is the standard deviation of the fund’s returns in the 
past 12 months. Flow3 is the capital flow in the past 3 months. Age is defined as the number of 
months between a fund’s observation date and its inception date. All independent variables except 
Meanreturn and Stdret are divided by 100. Statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10% is indicated by ***, 
**, and *, respectively. 
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Table 27. Fund Level Performance Comparisons 
Panel A. Portfolios Based on Actual Revision Points 
    Revised Funds 2    
  
Rvised 
Funds 1 
prior to First 
Revision 
post First 
Revision 
  
Unrevised 
Funds 1 
Alpha -0.014     
 
  
  (-0.59)     
 
  
  
Unrevised 
Funds 2 
Alpha       0.004   
        (0.14)   
  Unrevised 
Funds 3 
Alpha   -0.359 *** -0.072 ** 
      (-13.35)   (-2.56)   
Revised 
Funds 2 
prior to First 
Revision 
Alpha 
   
0.167 *** 
        (4.71)   
 
Panel B. Portfolios Based on Average Revision Points 
      Unrevised Funds 2 Revised Funds 2   
      
post Average 
Revision Point 
prior to Average 
Revision Point 
post Average 
Revision Point 
Unrevise
d Funds 2 
prior to Average 
Revision Point 
Alpha 0.158 ** -0.261 ***     
  (3.62)   (-3.5)       
post Average 
Revision Point 
Alpha         -0.242 
 **
* 
          (-7.22)   
Revised 
Funds 2 
prior to Average 
Revision Point 
Alpha 
    
0.175 ** 
          (-2.34)   
 
This table reports the estimated alpha from regression of the difference in returns between the 
unrevised fund portfolio and revised fund portfolio from January 2002 December 2013 on Fung-
Hsiech 7-factor model. The difference in returns is between the portfolio in the left column and the 
portfolio on the upper row. Unrevised funds 1 include all unrevised funds and all revised funds prior 
to first revisions. Unrevised funds 2 include all unrevised funds, revised funds with all revisions in 3 
months after first reporting, and other revised funds prior to first revisions. Unrevised funds 3 include 
all unrevised funds. Revised Funds 1 include all revised funds after their first revisions no matter 
whether the first revisions occurred within 3 months of initial reporting or more than 3 months after 
the initial reporting. Revised Funds 2 include revised funds after the first revisions occurred more than 
3 months after initial reporting. Average revision point is the average of the percentages of fund 
lifecycle over our sample period.  Regression alphas are shown, with t-statistics in parentheses 
beneath them. Statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 28. Robustness Check: Determinants of Return Revisions at Individual Fund Level 
 
Panel A.  Difference Governance Measure 
 
  Ordered Probit Probit  Probit Increase Probit Decrease 
Governance2 18.27 *** 14.54 *** 18.09 *** 11.77 *** 18.97 *** 11.96 *** 17.09 *** 11.16 ** 
Mfee 
  
-8.39 ** 
  
-4.23 
   
-5.33 
 
  
-3.78 
 Ifee 
  
2.09 *** 
  
2.21 *** 
  
1.89 *** 
  
2.42 *** 
Waterid 
  
-1.05 
 
  
-1.13 
 
  
-1.45 
 
  
0.06 
 
Levid 
  
7.19 * 
  
10.57 ** 
  
13.12 ** 
  
7.41 
 Notice 
  
0.29 *** 
  
0.15 * 
  
0.19 ** 
  
0.09 
 Lockup 
  
0.11 
 
  
0.61 
 
  
0.93 * 
  
0.33 
 Personalcapid 
  
10.67 ** 
  
11.08 ** 
  
10.97 * 
  
13.38 ** 
Theta 
  
-10.72 ** 
  
-7.94 
   
-15.95 *** 
  
-2.82 
 Meanreturn 
  
27.17 *** 
  
29.41 *** 
  
30.86 *** 
  
29.66 *** 
Stdret 
  
-1.54 * 
  
-1.3 
   
-4.03 *** 
  
0.9 
 Meansize 
  
8.73 *** 
  
9.64 *** 
  
11.17 *** 
  
8.63 *** 
Style effect Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   
R square 0.034 0.1356 0.0349 0.1186 0.033 0.1345 0.0253 0.1104 
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Panel B. Excluding Funds of Funds 
 
  Ordered Probit Probit  Probit Increase Probit Decrease 
Governance1 9.17 *** 4.81 
 
10.45 *** 2.39 
 
7.63 *** 0.97 
 
13.06 *** 2.76 
 
Mfee 
  
-12.08 *** 
  
-10.85 ** 
  
-8.89 
 
  
-13.27 ** 
Ifee 
  
2.21 *** 
  
2.41 *** 
  
2.1 *** 
  
2.65 *** 
Levid 
  
8.07 
 
  
12.64 ** 
  
20.72 *** 
  
4.53 
 Notice 
  
0.04 
 
  
-0.1 
   
-0.01 
 
  
-0.18 
 Lockup 
  
-0.05 
 
  
0.61 
 
  
0.68 
 
  
0.61 
 Personalcapid 
  
5.28 
 
  
4.73 
 
  
0.24 
 
  
10.69 
 
Theta 
  
-8.09 * 
  
-5.87 
   
-10.85 ** 
  
-2.25 
 Meanreturn 
  
24.85 *** 
  
26.57 *** 
  
29.23 *** 
  
26.46 *** 
Stdret 
  
-0.29 
 
  
-0.53 
   
-2.87 ** 
  
1.51 
 Meansize 
  
7.82 *** 
  
8.1 *** 
  
9.53 *** 
  
6.98 *** 
Style effect Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   
R square 0.035 0.0862 0.033 0.1032 0.0359 0.117 0.0307 0.1004 
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This table reports the effects of covariates on the probability of a hedge fund’s return revisions. In the 
ordered probit regression, the dependent variable is 4 if a fund changed its returns more than 20 times, 
3 if the number of revisions is between 7 and 20, 2 if the times of revisions is between 3 and 6, 1 if the 
number of revisions is 1 or 2, and 0 is a fund have never revised its returns.  In the probit regression, 
the dummy variable dependent variable equals to one if the fund has revised its returns at least once, 0 
otherwise. In the probit increase regression, the dependent variable is 1 if all the return revisions of a 
fund sum up to be positive, 0 if the fund has never revised its returns. . In the probit decrease 
regression, the dependent variable is 1 if all the return revisions of a fund sum up to be negative, 0 if 
the fund has never revised its returns. The revisions in this table are those that occurred more than 3 
months after the return months. Governance is calculated as the sum of four individual governance 
variables: auditing, high-water mark, country of domicile, and SEC. The variable auditing is equal to 
one if a fund reports a completed financial audit in the past 6 months or in the next 6 months. High-
water mark variable is equal to 1 when there is a high-water mark provision for charging incentive fee. 
The variable representing country of domicile is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is 
offshore. Sec is a variable equal to 1 if a fund is registered with the SEC. Mfee and Ifee give the 
magnitude of management and incentive fees, respectively. Levid is an indicator variable equal to 1 
when the fund uses leverage. The variables Notice denotes the fund’s redemption notice period (in 
days). Lockup is the period (in months) over which investors cannot withdraw their investment. 
Persncapid is an indicator variable set to 1 when fund managers invest personal capital in the fund. 
The variables Governance, Mfee, Ifee, levid, Notice, Lockup, and Personalcapid of a fund that has 
revised its returns are defined by the characteristics in the months prior to the first return revision.  
While these variables of an unrevised fund are defined by the characteristics in the months prior to the 
last return. Theta denotes fund asset liquidity which is measured using the equation developed in 
Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004).  Meanreturn of a fund that has revised its returns is the average 
of the returns in the months prior to the first return revision.  Meanreturn of a unrevised fund is the 
average of the returns in the months prior to the last return.  Stdret of a fund that has revised its returns 
is the standard deviation of the fund’s returns in the months prior to the first return revision.  Stdret of 
a unrevised fund is the standard deviation of the returns in the months prior to the last return. 
Meansize of a fund that has revised its returns is the average of the sizes in the months prior to the first 
return revision.  Meansize of a unrevised fund is the average of the sizes in the months prior to the last 
return.  Size is defined as the logarithm of asset under management. All independent variables are 
divided by 100. Statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 29. Robustness Check: Determinants of Return Revision at Individual Revision Level 
Panel A. Return Month Characteristics 
Panel A.1. Different Governance Measure 
  
XReturn Month  
2002-2013 
XReturn Month  
2002-2007 
XReturn Month  
2008-2013 
Governance2 8.2 *** 2.17 * 5.98 *** 2.56 
 
11.29 *** 3.57 * 
Mfee 
  
-1.90 
   
-0.82 
   
-3.85 * 
Ifee 
  
-0.47 *** 
  
-0.56 *** 
  
-0.44 ** 
Waterid 
  
5.40 *** 
  
3.29 
   
14.08 *** 
levid 
  
-0.64 
   
0.06 
   
-0.94 
 
Notice 
  
0.05 
   
-0.19 
   
0.28 *** 
Lockup 
  
0.21 
   
0.26 
   
0.07 
 
Personalcapid 
  
6.97 *** 
  
5.33 ** 
  
6.67 ** 
meanreturn 
  
2.43 *** 
  
5.76 *** 
  
0.41 
 
Autocorr 
  
11.14 *** 
  
-5.57 
   
24.35 *** 
Stdret 
  
1.59 *** 
  
0.57 
   
2.02 *** 
Flow3 
  
0.00 
   
-4.49 
   
0.00 
 
age 
  
0.05 *** 
  
0.04 ** 
  
0.07 *** 
R square 0.0021 0.0055 0.0011 0.0075 0.0042 0.0176 
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Panel A.2. Excluding Funds of Funds 
  
XReturn Month  
2002-2013 
XReturn Month  
2002-2007 
XReturn Month  
2008-2013 
Governance1 6.92 *** 3.33 *** 6.29 *** 3.55 ** 7.6 *** 5.79 *** 
Mfee 
  
1.97 
   
2.04 
   
1.29 
 
Ifee 
  
0.91 *** 
  
0.94 *** 
  
1.12 *** 
levid 
  
-3.84 * 
  
-2.39 
   
-4.83 
 
Notice 
  
0.05 
   
-0.16 *** 
  
0.22 *** 
Lockup 
  
-0.16 
   
-0.03 
   
-0.38 * 
Personalcapid 
  
9.51 *** 
  
10.55 *** 
  
6.10 * 
meanreturn 
  
3.39 *** 
  
6.64 *** 
  
1.18 * 
Autocorr 
  
0.19 *** 
  
0.01 
   
0.39 *** 
Stdret 
  
1.50 *** 
  
1.06 ** 
  
1.24 *** 
Flow3 
  
0.02 
   
-855.00 ** 
  
0.01 
 
age 
  
0.07 ** 
  
0.07 *** 
  
0.08 *** 
R square 0.0023 0.0106 0.0019 0.0138 0.0026 0.0184 
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Panel B. The Month before Revision Month Characteristics 
Panel B.1. Different Governance Measure 
  
XRevison Month-1 
2002-2013 
XRevison Month-1 
2002-2007 
XRevison Month-1 
2008-2013 
Governance2 13.12 *** 7.84 *** 21.73 *** 14.14 *** 9.10 *** 4.61 *** 
Mfee 
  
-2.98 ** 
  
-6.04 *** 
  
-0.80 
 
Ifee 
  
-1.14 *** 
  
-0.18 
   
-1.42 *** 
Waterid 
  
14.04 *** 
  
15.64 *** 
  
8.70 *** 
levid 
  
-5.11 *** 
  
-5.17 ** 
  
-6.25 *** 
Notice 
  
0.08 *** 
  
0.07 
   
0.07 ** 
Lockup 
  
0.11 
   
0.69 *** 
  
-0.15 
 
Personalcapid 
  
2.26 
   
-2.23 
   
8.44 *** 
meanreturn 
  
5.48 *** 
  
8.60 *** 
  
5.27 *** 
Autocorr 
  
-5.70 * 
  
-25.04 *** 
  
4.81 
 
Stdret 
  
2.02 *** 
  
0.15 
   
2.06 *** 
Flow3 
  
-0.24 *** 
  
28.04 *** 
  
-0.25 *** 
age 
 
0.03 * 
 
-0.07 *** 
 
0.04 *** 
R square 0.0051 0.0143 0.013 0.0342 0.0025 0.0195 
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Panel B.2. Excluding Funds of Funds 
  
XRevison Month-1 
2002-2013 
XRevison Month-1 
2002-2007 
XRevison Month-1 
2008-2013 
Governance1 9.3 *** 6.86 *** 17.66 *** 10.96 *** 4.13 *** 2.71 ** 
Mfee 
  
2.38 * 
  
-2.83 
   
4.91 *** 
Ifee 
  
-0.05 
   
0.34 
   
-0.26 
 
levid 
  
-6.47 *** 
  
-3.27 *** 
  
-9.01 *** 
Notice 
  
0.16 *** 
  
0.09 * 
  
0.17 *** 
Lockup 
  
-0.27 ** 
  
0.32 
   
-0.56 *** 
Personalcapid 
  
4.67 *** 
  
-6.07 ** 
  
13.75 *** 
meanreturn 
  
5.72 *** 
  
9.24 *** 
  
4.88 *** 
Autocorr 
  
-17.10 *** 
  
-47.41 *** 
  
-2.14 
 
Stdret 
  
2.26 *** 
  
1.16 ** 
  
2.21 *** 
Flow3 
  
-0.46 *** 
  
32.33 *** 
  
-0.51 *** 
age 
 
0.02  
 
-0.04  
 
0.03 * 
R square 0.0038 0.0199 0.014 0.0362 0.0007 0.0224 
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Panel C. The Change of Characteristics between the Return Month and the Month before Revision Month 
Panel C.1. Different Governance Measure 
  
XRevison Month-1 - XReturn Month 
2002-2013 
XRevison Month-1 - XReturn Month 
2002-2007 
XRevison Month-1 - XReturn Month 
2008-2013 
Governance2 8.26 *** 18.1 *** 0.58 
 
-0.067 
 
12.00 *** 27.28 *** 
Mfee 
  
-23.93 *** 
  
5.97 
   
-24.89 *** 
Ifee 
  
0.44 *** 
  
-0.476 ** 
  
0.76 *** 
Waterid 
  
20.10 *** 
  
49.93 *** 
  
9.06 * 
levid 
  
2.08 
   
-17.51 
   
5.89 
 
Notice 
  
-0.16 * 
  
-0.57 ** 
  
-0.06 
 
Lockup 
  
0.19 
   
-0.49 
   
0.47 
 
Personalcapid 
  
-17.76 *** 
  
-27.36 ** 
  
-13.83 ** 
meanreturn 
  
-0.02 
   
-0.02 
   
-0.04 
 
Autocorr 
  
-0.21 *** 
  
-2.52 
   
-25.81 *** 
Stdret 
  
1.55 *** 
  
3.04 *** 
  
1.38 *** 
Flow3 
  
0 
   
9.21 ** 
  
0.00 
 
Age 
  
0.17 *** 
  
-0.81 *** 
  
0.24 *** 
R square 0.001 0.0127 0 0.0149 0.0018 0.0208 
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Panel C.2. Excluding Funds of Funds 
  
XRevison Month-1 - XReturn 
Month 2002-2013 
XRevison Month-1 - XReturn Month 
2002-2007 
XRevison Month-1 - XReturn Month 
2008-2013 
Governance1 4.7 *** 15.92 *** -2.78 
 
12.54 *** 8.70 *** 17.92 *** 
Mfee 
  
-16.55 *** 
  
10.13 
   
-18.81 *** 
Ifee 
  
-1.20 *** 
  
-1.08 *** 
  
-1.22 *** 
levid 
  
12 * 
  
-8.34 
   
16.85 ** 
Notice 
  
0.03 
   
-0.63 ** 
  
0.13 
 
Lockup 
  
0.16 
   
-1.09 
   
0.57 
 
Personalcapid 
  
-24.53 *** 
  
-34.21 ** 
  
-20.93 *** 
meanreturn 
  
-0.09 
   
0.00 
   
-0.13 * 
Autocorr 
  
-0.3 *** 
  
-0.16 * 
  
-0.34 *** 
Stdret 
  
1.81 *** 
  
3.17 *** 
  
1.60 *** 
Flow3 
  
0 
   
0.14 *** 
  
0.00 
 
Age 
  
0.10 ** 
  
-0.53 *** 
  
0.12 ** 
R square 0.0003 0.0153 0.0001 0.0132 0.0012 0.0208 
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This table reports the results of probit regression of return revision dummy on fund characteristics in 
monthly level. We match each hedge fund with size data which revised its return at month s to the 
return of month t to the hedge fund which has the same strategy and the nearest asset size in the same 
return month and same month as the fund revised its return but did not revise its return at month s to 
the return of month t. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a fund revised its 
return at month s to the return of month t and 0 for the matched fund.  In Panel A, the independent 
variables are defined by the funds’ characteristics at return month t.  In Panel B, the independent 
variables are defined by the funds’ characteristics at return revision month s. In Panel C, the 
independent variables are differences between the variables corresponding variables defined by the 
funds’ characteristics at return month t  and return revision month s.  Governance is calculated as the 
sum of four individual governance variables: auditing country of domicile, and SEC. The variable 
auditing is equal to one if a fund reports a completed financial audit in the past 6 months or in the next 
6 months. High-water mark variable is equal to 1 when there is a high-water mark provision for 
charging incentive fee. The variable representing country of domicile is an indicator variable equal to 
one if the fund is offshore. Sec is a variable equal to 1 if a fund is registered with the SEC. Mfee and 
Ifee give the magnitude of management and incentive fees, respectively. Levid is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 when the fund uses leverage. The variables Notice denotes the fund’s redemption notice 
period (in days). Lockup is the period (in months) over which investors cannot withdraw their 
investment. Persncapid is an indicator variable set to 1 when fund managers invest personal capital in 
the fund. Meanreturn12 is the average of the fund’s returns in the past 12 months. Meanreturn3 is the 
average of the fund’s returns in the past 3 months.  Autocorr is first order autocorrelation in the past 3 
months.  Autocorr is first order autocorrelation in the past 12 months. Stdret is the standard deviation 
of the fund’s returns in the past 12 months. Flow3 is the capital flow in the past 3 months. Age is 
defined as the number of months between a fund’s observation date and its inception date. All 
independent variables except Meanreturn and Stdret are divided by 100. Statistical significance of 1, 5, 
and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 30. Robustness Check: Determinants of Return Revision Direction 
Panel A: Different Governance Measure 
  XReturn Month XRevison Month-1 XRevison Month-1 - XReturn Month 
 
Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease 
Governance2 2.41 
 
1.94 
 8.60 *** 
7.73 *** 21.19 *** 14.63 *** 
Mfee -3.39 * -0.34 
 -2.47 
 
-1.26 
 
-24.39 *** -23.88 *** 
Ifee -0.336 * -0.63 *** -0.52 *** -0.70 *** 0.24 
 
0.63 *** 
Waterid 4.17 
 
6.91 ** 9.59 *** 11.41 *** 26.10 *** 13.67 ** 
levid 0.59 
 
-1.72 
 
-4.39 ** -2.39 
 
-8.70 
 
15.05 * 
Notice 0.01 
 
0.08 * 0.04 
 
0.11 *** -0.22 
 
-0.10 
 
Lockup 0.60 *** -0.22 
 
0.51 *** -0.22  0.12 
 
0.35 
 
Personalcapid 11.91 *** 1.88 
 
5.98 *** -1.80  -26.10 *** -8.47 
 Meanreturn12 1.11 
 
3.84 *** 3.20 *** 6.16 *** 
    Meanreturn3 
    
  
  
0.01 
 
-0.06 
 Autocorr 0.14 *** 8.53 
 
0.30 
 
-0.15 *** -0.19 *** -0.24 *** 
Stdret 0.95 ** 2.31 *** 1.70 *** 1.76 *** 1.74 *** 1.27 *** 
Flow3 0.32 
 
-0.40 
 
0.32 
 
-0.40 
 
-0.30 
 
0.27 
 Age 0.05 ** 0.06 ** 0.04 ** 0.06 *** 0.12 ** 0.23 *** 
R square 0.0063 0.0079 0.013 0.0158 0.0149 0.012 
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Panel B. Excluding Funds of Funds 
  XReturn Month XRevison Month-1 XRevison Month-1 - XReturn Month 
 
Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease 
Governance1 1.91 
 
4.79 *** 4.3 *** 9.24 *** 18.28 *** 13.37 *** 
Mfee 0.99 
 
2.87 
 
2.59 
 
2.40 
 
-19.80 *** -13.13 ** 
Ifee 1.04 *** 0.77 *** 0.70 *** 0.38  -1.40 *** -1.04 *** 
levid -1.73 
 
-5.83 ** -5.58 ** -7.52 *** 5.31 
 
18.73 ** 
Notice -0.01 
 
0.11 ** 0.07 * 0.18 **** -0.04  0.09  
Lockup 0.16 
 
-0.51 ** 0.16  -0.50 *** 0.16 
 
0.19 
 
Personalcapid 16.81 *** 2.29 
 
9.49 *** -2.23 
 
-36.30 *** -13.27 
 Meanreturn12 1.65 ** 5.19 *** 3.15 *** 6.53 *** 
    Meanreturn3 
        
-0.05 
 
-0.14 
 Autocorr 0.24 *** 0.14 ** -0.05 
 
-0.21 *** -0.26 *** -0.34 *** 
Stdret 1.01 ** 2.05 *** 1.93 *** 1.84 *** 1.87 *** 1.67 *** 
Flow3 0.33 
 
-0.40 
 
0.33 
 
-10.00 
 
-0.30 
 
157.00 
 Age 0.07 *** 0.07 *** 0.03 
 
0.05 ** 0.06 
 
0.14 ** 
R square 0.0114 0.0143 0.0122 0.0215 0.0183 0.0141 
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This table reports the results of logistic regression of direction dummy of return revision on fund 
characteristics in monthly level. We match each hedge fund with size data which revised its return at 
month s to the return of month t to the hedge fund which has the same strategy and the nearest asset 
size in the same return month and same month as the fund revised its return but did not revise its 
return at month s to the return of month t.  In the columns of “Increase”, the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a fund reported its return at month s to the return of month t is greater 
than what it previous reported, and 0 for the matched fund. In the columns of “Decrease”, the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a fund reported its return at month s to the return 
of month t is smaller than what it previous reported, and 0 for the matched fund. In the first two 
columns, the independent variables are defined by the funds’ characteristics at return month t.  In the 
third and fourth columns, the independent variables are defined by the funds’ characteristics at return 
revision month s. In last two columns, the independent variables are differences between the variables 
corresponding variables defined by the funds’ characteristics at return month t and return revision 
month s.  Governance is calculated as the sum of four individual governance variables: auditing, high-
water mark, country of domicile, and SEC. The variable auditing is equal to one if a fund reports a 
completed financial audit in the past 6 months or in the next 6 months. High-water mark variable is 
equal to 1 when there is a high-water mark provision for charging incentive fee. The variable 
representing country of domicile is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is offshore. Sec is a 
variable equal to 1 if a fund is registered with the SEC. Mfee and Ifee give the magnitude of 
management and incentive fees, respectively. Levid is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the fund 
uses leverage. The variables Notice denotes the fund’s redemption notice period (in days). Lockup is 
the period (in months) over which investors cannot withdraw their investment. Persncapid is an 
indicator variable set to 1 when fund managers invest personal capital in the fund. Meanreturn is the 
average of the fund’s returns in the past 12 months.  Autocorr is first order autocorrelation in the past 
12 months. Meanreturn3 is the average of the fund’s returns in the past 12 months.  Autocorr is first 
order autocorrelation in the past 3 months. Stdret is the standard deviation of the fund’s returns in the 
past 12 months. Flow3 is the capital flow in the past 3 months. Age is defined as the number of 
months between a fund’s observation date and its inception date. All independent variables except 
Meanreturn and Stdret are divided by 100. Statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10% is indicated by ***, 
**, and *, respectively. 
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Table 31. Robustness Check: Determinants of Revision Magnitude 
Panel A. Different Governance Measure 
  XReturn Month XRevison Month-1 XRevison Month-1 - XReturn Month 
Governance2 36.58 *** 14.49 *** 30.03 * 
Mfee 90.49 ***  ***  *** 
Ifee -3.99 *** -8.06 *** 1.63 ** 
Waterid -12.96 
 
58.08 
*** 
354.51 
*** 
levid 49.73 *** 35.47 *** -90.70 *** 
Notice -0.47 ** -0.54 *** 2.26 *** 
Lockup -2.18 ** -1.22 ** 6.22 ** 
Personalcapid 15.45 
 
30.83 *** -115.01 *** 
meanreturn12 3.10 
 
4.84 ** 
  meanreturn3  
 
 
 
0.67 ** 
Autocorr -0.39 * -0.62 *** -0.21 *** 
Stdret 17.66 *** 6.44 *** 0.87 *** 
Flow3 0.04 
 
-33.00 
 
0.06 
 age -0.32 *** 0.13 ** 0.97 ** 
R square 0.0286 0.0213 0.1135 
 
Panel B. Excluding Funds of Funds 
  XReturn Month XRevison Month-1 XRevison Month-1 - XReturn Month 
Governance1 -7.27 * -13.70 *** 1.13 
 Mfee 8.71 * 14.55 *** 17.15 
 Ifee -3.81 *** -2.89 *** 2.99 *** 
levid 23.66 *** -6.69 
 
-20.83 
 Notice 0.12 
 
0.11 
 
-0.71 
 Lockup -2.10 *** -0.72 ** 3.68 *** 
Personalcapid -3.02 
 
12.98 *** 8.93 
 meanreturn12 -1.16 
 
1.88 
   meanreturn3  
 
 
 
0.21 
 Autocorr -0.51 *** -0.49 *** -0.02 
 Stdret 11.56 *** 4.92 *** 2.89 *** 
Flow3 -0.06 
 
-2471.90 *** 0.09 
 age -0.14 *** -0.10 ** 0.36 ** 
R square 0.0251 0.0221 0.0079 
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This table reports the results of OLS regression of magnitude of return revision on fund characteristics 
in monthly level. We match each hedge fund with size data which revised its return at month s to the 
return of month t to the hedge fund which has the same strategy and the nearest asset size in the same 
return month and same month as the fund revised its return but did not revise its return at month s to 
the return of month t.  The dependent variable is the absolute value of the revision a fund made at 
month s to the return of month t. The dependent variable equals to 0 for the matched fund. In the first 
column, the independent variables are defined by the funds’ characteristics at return month t.  In the 
second column, the independent variables are defined by the funds’ characteristics at return revision 
month s. In last column, the independent variables are differences between the variables 
corresponding variables defined by the funds’ characteristics at return month t and return revision 
month s.  Governance is calculated as the sum of four individual governance variables: auditing, high-
water mark, country of domicile, and SEC. The variable auditing is equal to one if a fund reports a 
completed financial audit in the past 6 months or in the next 6 months. High-water mark variable is 
equal to 1 when there is a high-water mark provision for charging incentive fee. The variable 
representing country of domicile is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is offshore. Sec is a 
variable equal to 1 if a fund is registered with the SEC. Mfee and Ifee give the magnitude of 
management and incentive fees, respectively. Levid is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the fund 
uses leverage. The variables Notice denotes the fund’s redemption notice period (in days). Lockup is 
the period (in months) over which investors cannot withdraw their investment. Persncapid is an 
indicator variable set to 1 when fund managers invest personal capital in the fund. Meanreturn12 is the 
average of the fund’s returns in the past 12 months.  Autocorr is first order autocorrelation in the past 
12 months. Meanreturn3 is the average of the fund’s returns in the past 12 months.  Autocorr is first 
order autocorrelation in the past 3 months. Stdret is the standard deviation of the fund’s returns in the 
past 12 months. Flow3 is the capital flow in the past 3 months. Age is defined as the number of 
months between a fund’s observation date and its inception date. All independent variables except 
Meanreturn and Stdret are divided by 100. Statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10% is indicated by ***, 
**, and *, respectively. 
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Table 32. Robustness Check: Fund Level Performance Comparisons 
Panel A. Regressions on Median Return Differences of Portfolios Based on Actual Revision Points 
    Revised Funds 2    
  
Rvised 
Funds 1 
prior to First 
Revision 
post First 
Revision 
  
Unrevised 
Funds 1 
Alpha -0.054 ***   
 
  
  (-2.96)     
 
  
  
Unrevised 
Funds 2 
Alpha       -0.041 * 
        (-1.8)   
  Unrevised 
Funds 3 
Alpha   -0.254 *** -0.080 *** 
      (-14.38)   (-3.55)   
Revised 
Funds 2 
prior to First 
Revision 
Alpha 
   
0.055 ** 
        (2.07)   
 
Panel B. Regressions on Median Return Differences of Portfolios Based on Average Revision Points 
 
      Unrevised Funds 2 Revised Funds 2   
      
post Average 
Revision Point 
prior to Average 
Revision Point 
post Average 
Revision Point 
Unrevise
d Funds 3 
prior to Average 
Revision Point 
Alpha 0.094 ** -0.189 ***     
  (3.57)   (-2.64)       
post Average 
Revision Point 
Alpha         -0.183 *** 
          (-8.51)   
Revised 
Funds 2 
prior to Average 
Revision Point 
Alpha 
    
0.100 
 
          (-1.38)   
 
This table reports the estimated alpha from regression of the difference in returns between the 
unrevised fund portfolio and revised fund portfolio from January 2002 December 2013 on Fung-
Hsiech 7-factor model. The difference in returns is between the portfolio in the left column and the 
portfolio on the upper row. Unrevised funds 1 include all unrevised funds and all revised funds prior 
to first revisions. Unrevised funds 2 include all unrevised funds, revised funds with all revisions in 3 
months after first reports, and other revised funds prior to first revisions. Unrevised funds 3 include all 
unrevised funds. Revised Funds 1 include all revised funds.  
Revised Funds 2 include revised funds with revisions occurred more than 3 months after first reports. 
Average revision point is the average of the percentages of fund lifecycle over our sample period.  
Regression alphas are shown, with t-statistics in parentheses beneath them. Statistical significance of 1, 
5, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Figure 7. Average Monthly Characteristic of All Funds in Each Year 
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This figure shows average monthly characteristic of all funds in each year. The monthly characteristic 
is the average of the funds’ characteristics in each month. The revised funds are funds whose returns 
are revised more than 3 months after they are first reported.  Unrevised funds are the rest of the funds. 
Governance is calculated as the sum of four individual governance variables: auditing, high-water 
mark, country of domicile, and SEC. The variable auditing is equal to one if a fund reports a 
completed financial audit in the past 6 months or in the next 6 months. High-water mark variable is 
equal to 1 when there is a high-water mark provision for charging incentive fee. The variable 
representing country of domicile is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is offshore. Sec is a 
variable equal to 1 if a fund is registered with the SEC. Management Fee and Incentive Fee  give the 
magnitude of management and incentive fees, respectively. Leverage dummy is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 when the fund uses leverage. Notice period denotes the fund’s redemption notice period (in 
days). Lockup is the period (in months) over which investors cannot withdraw their investment. 
Personal capital dummy is an indicator variable set to 1 when fund managers invest personal capital in 
the fund.  
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Figure 8. Average Monthly Revision Percentage in Each Year 
 
Panel A. Original Average Monthly Revision Percentage in Each Year 
 
 
 
Panel B. Adjust Factor for Performance Report Recency 
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Panel C. Adjusted Average Monthly Revision Percentage in Each Year 
 
 
Figure 8 Panel A: This figure shows the average monthly proportion of all returns that have been 
revised after being first reported (upper line) and the returns that have been revised later than three 
months after the returns have been first reported (lower line) in each year during our sample period.  
The proportion of return revisions in each month is the number of revisions to the returns of that 
month as a percentage of the total number returns of that month. The average monthly proportion of 
return revision in each year is calculated as the mean of the 12 monthly proportions of return revisions 
in each year. Panel B: This figure shows the factor used to adjust for the return report recency.  
Revision Recency Adjust Factor=2-cumulative percentage of revision recency. X-Axis is the number 
of months between December 2013 and the return month. Panel C This figure shows the average 
monthly proportion of all returns that have been revised after being first reported (upper line) and the 
returns that have been revised later than three months after the returns have been first reported (lower 
line) in each year during our sample period.  The proportion of return revisions in each month is the 
number of revisions to the returns of that month as a percentage of the total number returns of that 
month. The average monthly proportion of return revision in each year is calculated as the mean of the 
12 monthly proportions of return revisions in each year. 
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Figure 9. Revision Level Performance Comparisons 
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Figure 9 shows the CAAR (Cumulative Average Abnormal Return) in 12 months before and 12 
months after the return revisions that occurred more than 3 months after first reports. A revised fund is 
a hedge fund with which revised its return at month s to the return of month t and s-t>3. An unrevised 
fund is a matched fund which has the same strategy and the nearest asset size in the same return month 
and same month as the fund revised its return but did not revise its return at month s to the return of 
month t.   
 
 
Figure 10. Robustness Check: Revision Level Performance Comparisons 
Panel A.  Excluding Funds of Funds 
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Panel B.  First Reported Returns 
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Figures show the CAAR (Cumulative Average Abnormal Return) in 12 months before and 12 months 
after the return revisions that occurred more than 3 months after first reports. A revised fund is a 
hedge fund with which revised its return at month s to the return of month t and s-t>3. An unrevised 
fund is a matched fund which has the same strategy and the nearest asset size in the same return month 
and same month as the fund revised its return but did not revise its return at month s to the return of 
month t.   
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